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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the discourse of intra-national charitable giving in the UK.  I combine a 
rhetorical discourse analysis of Children in Need (CiN), a popular charity telethon for ‘disadvantaged’ 
British children, with that of six focus groups carried out with people who have different relationships 
with charities (student volunteers, a local Amnesty International group, bereavement counselling 
volunteers, non-charity related office workers, employees of different charities, and academics). 
Although the focus group discussions all included some consideration of CiN and its methods, they 
were primarily concerned with broader issues to do with disadvantage, fairness and, where relevant, 
charitable giving more generally.  Boltanski’s (1999) seminal idea of ‘the politics of pity’ holds that 
relationships between those who suffer and those who observe their suffering are radically altered by 
distance.  Seeing suffering people face-to-face is not the same as seeing them via the mass media 
because of the actions that are or are not possible in relation to them.  This idea has been utilised in 
numerous studies of international charity, but so far no one has applied it to situations in which the 
viewed are in the same country as the viewers. I argue that the sort of (social, perceived) distance that 
may exist between citizens who live in the same country has similar consequences for their 
relationship as actual physical distance has.  Indeed, representing others as if they were distant means 
that charity comes to be seen as the only way to relieve suffering, even though in this instance there 
are, in fact, many other available options.  The central tension I highlight in the CiN data is that, on 
the one hand, British beneficiaries of charitable aid are represented as socially distant from the rest of 
the population, which makes the mediation that CiN offers seem necessary, while on the other hand 
their experiential closeness is constantly being highlighted by appealing to a particular (nostalgic) 
ideal of Britishness. This tension is also reflected in the focus group data: although the recipients of 
intra-national charitable giving are typically talked about as members of the speakers’ own in-group, 
there is also a lot of scepticism regarding the truthfulness and reliability of the spectacle of suffering 
that is presented on television screens and that does not always match up with people’s own 
experiences.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
“The interests of all persons ought to count equally, and geographic location and citizenship make no 
intrinsic difference to the rights and obligations of individuals.” 
 
Peter Singer (2005: 173) 
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0.1 Distant Suffering at Home 
 
In order to introduce the key topics that will be explored in this thesis, I would like to start by sharing 
a small section of my data.  This brief extract is taken from a telethon (a charity fundraising 
broadcast) called ‘Children in Need’.  The clip is from the 2011 broadcast, which was aired on British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 1 on Friday 18th November from 19:30.  It represents an 
introduction to the first of the show’s many clips about the sorts of people who might benefit from the 
viewers’ donations.  This first example began around 19 minutes from the start of the programme.   
 
1 19:00 
 
Alesha Dixon: now we really hope you 
enjoy the feast of entertainment laid on 
for you tonight (.) and we also hope (.) 
that at some point you’ll pick up the 
phone (1.0) the children you help will 
never be able to thank you in person (.) 
but we sent (.) Olly Murs (1.0) to meet 
some of the kids who benefit from your 
donations   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audience 
screams  
2 19:05 
 
 Acoustic 
guitar 
music  
3 19:12 
 
Olly Murs: this is Ella (.) and she’s four Acoustic 
guitar 
music 
4 19:14 
 
years old (1.5) and (.) she’s just started 
school like other four-year-olds (2.0) 
but um (1.0) things (.) are a little 
different for Ella   
Acoustic 
guitar 
music 
5 19:20 
 
Olly Murs V/O: Ella was deprived of 
oxygen at birth (2.0) it left her severely 
disabled (.) she can’t walk (.)  
Acoustic 
guitar 
music 
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6 19:25 
 
or talk (1.0) she’s fed through a tube in 
her stomach (.) and (.) she’s partially-
sighted  
Acoustic 
guitar 
music 
 
 
What I find immediately striking when looking at this extract is the verbal and visual contrast between 
different parts of the show.  While the first image is taken from the studio, subsequent images are 
from a pre-recorded package that has very different visual features.  Verbally, presenter Alesha Dixon 
also has to manage a contrast between the ‘feast of entertainment’ that precedes this clip and the pity 
that the audience is expected to feel on hearing Ella’s story.  The transition between these two frames 
(Goffman 1974) in the show is provided with a degree of continuity by the appearance of a celebrity 
in both parts.  Olly Murs, a British pop star, guides the viewer into a world that is hitherto unknown.  
In order to make Ella’s world understandable to a viewer in the UK, he makes reference to the 
country’s norm of starting school at the age of four.   
 
All of this, as remarkable as it might seem when studied in detail, is nevertheless fairly normal in 
terms of Western charity appeals.  The use of celebrities to introduce beneficiaries, the juxtaposition 
of entertainment with a serious message, the evocation of reference points for comparison with the 
lives of expected viewers and the selection of one child to represent the problems of many are all 
recognisable tropes.  What is different about this clip is that it is taken from a programme based in a 
single, relatively small, country.  Olly Murs need not state that he is referring to ‘British’ children in 
frame 4, because the shared location of donors and recipients has already been repeatedly stated.  
Why, then, will the children that the viewers’ donations help never be able to thank them in person 
(frame 1)?  And how is mediated charity presented as the best way to address Ella’s problems, when 
state systems for health, education and social security, and the opportunity to meet face-to-face, exist?   
 
0.2 Setting and rationale for studying this data 
 
The UK regards itself as a charitable country.  In the year 2011-12, 55% of the population made 
donations to charitable causes in a typical month, a reduction of 3% on the previous year (Dobbs et al. 
2012: 4).  Yet only a small percentage (17%) of private donations were made to overseas aid charities 
(2012: 13).  While the idea of charity for many people, and certainly for many researchers, seems to 
be tied up in a paternalistic, imperialist narrative, in which the rich West gives to the poor East 
(Burman 1994: 30; Burnell 1992), this is not, in reality, what most charitable giving consists of.  
Furthermore, the British Government continued to fall short of its promise to give 0.7% of its GNP 
(Gross National Product) to Official Development Assistance overseas, as pledged at the 1970 
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General Assembly Resolution, and again at the G8 summit in 2008, until finally reaching it in 2013 
(Booth 2013).  While Britain is extensively involved in international trade and political networks, in 
terms of aid, its priorities appear to be within the UK, aside from meeting its obligations to these 
multinational fora.  The decision to ring-fence the international aid budget taken by the Conservative-
Liberal coalition government in 2011 was, and still is, widely criticised in the popular press (e.g. 
Brennan 2010; Telegraph View 2013; Brown 2015).  This is in part because of the reports that have 
emerged of this money being ill-spent and / or syphoned off by illegitimate parties (Verweij, and 
Gyawali 2006).  The fact that the government donates apparently large sums of money to help people 
elsewhere is also used to argue that it is more concerned with the welfare of these people than those 
within the UK (Birrell 2015, Wheeler 2015), despite evidence to the contrary.  These criticisms are 
based on the assumption that we bear more responsibility for others who are members of the same 
nation as us than for those who live elsewhere.  Meanwhile, other modes of action such as meeting 
face-to-face and giving practical help are engaged in less frequently than giving.  In 2011-12, for 
example, only around 25% of people formally volunteered in a typical month (NCVO 2015).   
 
This raises two concerns.  The first is that there appears to be a gap between perceptions of UK aid 
priorities and the reality.  If people believe that international needs are being disproportionately 
provided for, they will be less likely to take action, monetary and otherwise, themselves.  The second 
is that charity has become a means to address problems in our society without making solutions 
permanent and compulsory through the state or by engaging with the needy in person.  The latter 
concern is the basis for the two primary research questions that drive this piece of research: Why 
donate to a national charity?  That is to say: how are UK citizens encouraged to donate to UK-based 
charities over other possible modes of action?  And: what sort of relationship do programmes such as 
Children in Need suggest should occur between donors to and beneficiaries of a national charity?  
 
This study identifies and addresses a gap in the literature on charity.  I take as my subject the 
phenomenon of intra-, rather than international giving, and focus on the way that a charity telethon 
represents the relationship between donors and recipients and how this theme is reflected in focus 
group discussions with its actual or potential viewers.  I also consider how viewing fellow British 
citizens as the recipients of charity affects the way that those in need elsewhere are perceived.    
 
My work is situated within communication studies, seeking to explore how people who belong to 
different social groups in relation to charity (for example donors, recipients, and other disadvantaged 
people who lie outside of the charity’s remit) are rendered more or less close to viewers.  I use 
discourse analysis, including multimodal analysis, to examine my data, and I therefore align this work 
with that of other discourse analysts who explore social and political issues.  I also draw upon insights 
from scholars in a range of other disciplines, including philosophy, psychology and media studies.  I 
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engage with theoretical work on the idea of perceived distance and the politics of pity, principally on 
the work of Boltanski (1999), Chouliaraki (2005; 2006; 2013) and Bilandzic (2006).  
 
Currently, there are broadly two strands of literature about the presentation of beneficiaries in charity 
campaigns.  The first, generally in the field of business studies or psychology, seeks to understand 
how campaigns should be designed in order to maximise their success at securing donations.  The 
second, which encompasses a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, sociology and 
communication studies, seeks to examine the broader social implications of representing a group of 
people in a certain way.  The present study falls into the latter category.   
 
Like private sector businesses, charities seek to get as much financial revenue from advertising as 
possible, while minimising how much is spent on it (Callen 1994: 217).  Increasing income to 
charities is often assumed to be directly correlated with increasing outputs, although this is not always 
the case (1994: 215).  The value of work that fulfils this aim therefore promises to likewise increase 
outcomes.  Due to their well-established relationships with a variety of stakeholders, as well as their 
ability to respond more reflexively to emerging problems than state organisations are able to, charities 
are often best placed to help members of the most vulnerable groups in society (Schmid 2013: 308).  
Helping charities to do any part their work (including fundraising) more efficiently therefore becomes 
an attractive opportunity for researchers seeking to engage with and give back to their communities 
(Hughes and Kitson 2012: 739).  Such research is extremely valuable.  However, applied research 
with charities, as with any sector of society, should also be complemented by critical work that 
examines the broader assumptions that lie behind a particular way of addressing social problems. 
 
For example, critical work has revealed a number of important drawbacks of persuading people to 
engage primarily by donating money rather than lobbying governments for institutional changes or 
doing voluntary work.  Giving money obscures the individuality of donors, recipients, and the nature 
of the acts they are taking part in (Boltanski 1999: 18; Mason 2011).  Displaying care via the donation 
of money reasserts the superiority of a capitalist system (Berg 2005, Seu 2010) and awards a greater 
degree of power to those who have more money, and thus gives the rich the power to set the aid 
agenda.  The suitability of potential donors as decision-makers about which causes should get most 
support has, understandably, been questioned.  Researchers have pointed out the disproportionate 
amount of support that some causes receive (Richey and Ponte 2008).  The number of people affected 
by an illness, for example, does not correspond to the amount of financial support that is awarded to 
charities for its sufferers (2008: 715).  And this form of action privileges situations that demand an 
immediate response, such as natural disasters and wars, over more chronic problems of infrastructure, 
for example (Polman 2011).  The aim of creating communication that appeals to a wide audience of 
potential donors is also sometimes at odds with the overall aims of a charity.  For example, 
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Vestergaard (2008: 490) notes that a 2004 Amnesty International appeal succeeds in encouraging a 
response only by making viewers concerned with potential threats to their own human rights and 
therefore fails to evoke the concern for others that might ultimately lead to a more widespread interest 
in human rights.  Similarly, Eayrs and Ellis (1990: 349) found that adverts for MENCAP were more 
likely to elicit donations when they did not ‘illustrate people with a mental handicap as having the 
same rights, value and capability as non-handicapped persons’. 
 
With so much to question about the system in which charities are forced to operate, there is clearly a 
need to shed light on some of the assumptions surrounding charitable giving in the UK from a critical 
distance.  However, it should be noted that while work that questions the role of charities is useful, 
research that concludes by criticising both individual charities and charitable giving in general is 
already plentiful both in academia and the public domain, and can sometimes encourage a nihilistic 
attitude toward giving by critiquing without offering an alternative.  For example, ‘Intelligent Giving’ 
and later ‘New Philanthropy Capital’ are organisations which set out to help donors make informed 
decisions about where to direct their money, based on factors such as how much of a charity’s money 
is spent on administration.  Although such information is aimed at redirecting rather than discouraging 
donations, this is not how such information often reaches the public.  For example, evidence from 
Intelligent Giving’s 2006 report on Children in Need was cited in newspaper articles that urged 
readers to boycott the charity (Kelly 2006).  Encouraging cynicism towards charitable giving in the 
absence of a clear alternative is liable to make people disengage from these issues altogether.   
 
This thesis addresses the way that charitable giving is talked about and represented, rather than 
assessing its effectiveness.  While its representation of donors and beneficiaries will be critically 
discussed, it is not my intention to discourage donations to Children in Need.  Other solutions that 
might be sought, such as political ones, can, and in my opinion should, be explored in tandem with 
giving.  I now introduce my data, before turning to the key theoretical idea I engage with in my 
analysis. 
 
0.3 Data set 1: Children in Need 
 
BBC Children in Need (henceforth CiN) is Britain’s only yearly telethon, and the only telethon to 
raise money exclusively for British citizens.  In 2011, it raised just over £26 million (BBC 2011).  The 
show is broadcast on a Friday night in mid-late November every year, and represents the culmination 
of a series of fundraising efforts carried out both by members of the public and by the presenters of 
some of the BBC’s other television and radio programmes. It consists of a series of entertainment 
items, often featuring news presenters and other celebrities from the BBC, such as actors from its 
popular soaps, as well as pop stars.  These items are interspersed with reports about the fundraising 
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activities that have been carried out by celebrities, youth groups, schools and businesses and with 
clips about the sorts of individuals and organisations that are likely to benefit from donations.  These 
organisations include breakfast clubs for poorer children, youth clubs, and centres in which children 
and their families receive specialist support with medical conditions.  Viewers pledge money to the 
organisation throughout the night by phone, text and online, and the total pledged is announced 
throughout the programme.  Once the money has been raised, organisations who share the remit of 
‘supporting disadvantaged children and young people in the UK’ (Children in Need 2013) may apply 
for grants from the fund in order to carry out such projects. 
 
Even for people who do not watch CiN there are several ways in which they might be made aware of 
it.  The show is advertised on other television and radio channels across the BBC, as well as in print 
and online television guides.  The charity is also sponsored by over 30 high-profile businesses, such 
as Lloyds bank, Boots pharmacy, Asda supermarkets, British Telecom, Debenhams department stores 
and Greggs bakery.  Workers in these organisations also often carry out fundraising events and sell 
special products for the charity in stores.  After the telethon, reports about its success, particularly in 
relation to other years, appear in a wide range of national newspapers.  CiN thus plays a significant 
role in producing, as well as potentially replicating, the discourse of UK-based charitable giving.   
 
0.4 Data set 2: Focus Groups 
 
My approach to carrying out focus groups is the second way in which the present study differs from 
previous literature on the topic of charitable giving (the first being the use of mass media data on an 
intra-national charity).  Unlike in many other such studies and studies on discourse around social 
issues in general, I combine an analysis of focus group data with that of a media text without asking 
participants in the former to view the latter.  While focus groups are used by a range of scholars 
looking at charity discourse, and even at charity media (e.g. Burgoyne, Young & Walker 2005; Hoijer 
2004; Seu 2010), combining any form of audience research with the analysis of media texts is rare.   
 
Studies that do consider reception of media texts naturally request that participants view the text in 
question.  However, my focus is not on how CiN is interpreted, but on the possible similarities and / 
or differences between how this programme represents issues of inequality and how they are 
discussed in the society more broadly.  The focus group participants were therefore not requested to 
watch the programme, and I also did not ask them explicitly about the programme until late on in the 
discussions (after at least the first half hour, in an hour-long session).  This unusual approach also 
feeds into debates about the extent to which audiences and publics can be considered to be the same 
thing (e.g. Richardson, Parry and Corner 2013: 102-104).  While mass and new media increasingly 
challenge and blur the traditional boundaries between the producers of programmes and their 
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audiences (2013: 105), the decision not to engage remains equally important.  Following Richardson 
(1994), Atkinson et al. (2012) and Henderson (2014), I selected groups which had different roles in 
relation to charities, including two groups which had no direct connection to charities at all), rather 
than selecting groups based on demographic features.  The groups were: current or recent student 
volunteers at Cardiff University (henceforth ‘Students’); office workers in a small depot in Cardiff 
(henceforth ‘Office’); members of Cardiff Amnesty International (‘Amnesty’); people who were in 
paid employment with different registered charities based in Cardiff (‘Charities’); volunteers for 
‘Pembrokeshire Cruse’, who provide bereavement counselling for adults (‘Counselling’); academics 
employed at Cardiff University (‘Academics’).  All of these groups were based in South Wales.  
Although this limits the extent to which results can be generalised to other areas of Britain, I chose to 
use groups based in only one constituent country because this meant that differences between the 
groups were more likely to result from their different experiences of charity, rather than from 
geographical variations.  It was my intention to garner diverse responses to the issues in question.  As 
I will discuss in more depth in my methodology (chapter 2), this data is examined as a supplement to 
the CiN data, and analytic chapters are accordingly structured by discussing the themes as they appear 
in CiN before examining how they appear in the focus group data.    
 
0.5 Charity and the politics of pity and distance 
 
One of the key theoretical concepts in the critical study of charity communication is what has been 
referred to as ‘the politics of pity’ (Boltanski 1999).  This idea brings together a number of strands of 
thought about how we relate, or fail to relate, to people whose suffering we witness via media 
channels rather than face-to-face.  It takes as its starting-point the idea that when presented with 
images of distress we are not generally called upon to assess the usefulness of a particular project, or 
the role of beneficiaries, but to respond emotionally.  In the regime of pity, we are led to believe that 
if we stop to consider other options for addressing a given problem, we will run the risk of failing to 
respond adequately to the crisis that is presented now (Boltanski 1999: 5).  Pity has been a popular 
way of framing the study of charitable giving in recent years (Balaji 2011; Littler 2008; Boltanski 
1999; Chouliaraki e.g. 2006; Vestergaard 2008), although it has been suggested that it no longer 
applies in the context of some new adverts for international charities, which employ the technique of 
calling on the viewer to imagine herself in different contexts, rather than to respond to the suffering of 
other per se (Chouliaraki 2013).   
 
Boltanski makes a number of assertions about how sufferers are represented in the mass media that 
chime with how they are both selected and presented in CiN.  Like the politics of pity suggests, CiN’s 
beneficiaries appear blameless and in need of nurturance (1999: 107).  They are also presented as 
groups, who are often represented by individuals (1999: 5-6).  The action it suggests that viewers 
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should take (donation) is presented as being too urgent to allow for critical reflection, and the 
transformation that occurs in beneficiary vignettes for the most part appears emotional rather than 
material.   
 
The most notable point of difference between CiN and the politics of pity is that the latter is tied up 
with ideas about viewers’ distance from those who are suffering, whereas both CiN’s viewers and its 
beneficiaries live within a relatively small country.   Boltanski’s (1999: 5) pity is predicated on the 
idea that giving at a distance necessitates mediation in order to convey sufferers’ anguish to others.  
However, he also states that this distance need not be physical, but could be social in nature (1999:5).  
In other words, this ‘distance’ could be metaphorical rather than literal and thus could certainly exist 
within a country as well as between continents.  Yet the title of the work in which he outlined his 
theory is ‘Distant Suffering’, and this term is primarily interpreted in the literal sense.  For example, 
scholars have applied the theory of pity to Flemish and Dutch Haiti relief telethons (Driessens, Joye 
and Biltereyst: 2012), Danish and British adverts for Amnesty International (Vestergaard: 2008; Seu: 
2010), and celebrities’ involvement in international aid appeals (Littler: 2008).  I will argue that the 
theory needs considerable development in order for it to be applicable to intra-national settings.   
 
0.6 Accounting 
 
The analysis takes as its starting-point the idea that people and organisations involved in charitable 
giving are engaged in a process of accounting for the actions they carry out and the positions they take 
up in relation to others.  This idea, which forms the basis of Rhetorical Discourse Analysis, has 
generally been used in health communication settings (Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi and Clarke 2013), but 
also seems particularly apposite to the research into charity discourses, in which a moral dimension is 
ever-present (Hattori 2003; Allahyari 2000; Norris 2012).  I pioneer the use of this method in 
analysing charity data and, in particular, media representations (so far it has been applied only to talk 
produced in medical settings, such as doctor-patient interactions).  In CiN, I presuppose that there is 
an attempt to account for donation requests, both in terms of justifying the request for money in itself, 
and in the selection of particular beneficiaries over others.  Different justifications appear at different 
points during the show.  One of the justifications involves the idea of reciprocity: the show provides 
entertainment and asks for something in return. Another justification, as I discuss in chapter 5, is 
based on the needs of beneficiaries, which are highlighted by contrasting their situations with those of 
the idealised audience member.   
 
In the focus group discussions, I also interpret participants’ talk as attempts to account for their 
responses or lack of responses to particular representations of inequality and need.  This analytical 
lens is aimed at conferring an understanding not only of the standpoints of particular individuals or 
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organisations, but also at indicating the society’s ideas about what is important and normal (Arribas-
Ayllon  et al. 2013: 59).  In other words, different societies or social groups will determine what 
counts as an adequate justification, and individuals will choose which of these to utilise.  For example, 
in one of the focus groups I will be studying one participant uses a metaphorical reference to 
Darwinian evolution to justify her standpoint that British citizens should not give international aid.  
Such metaphors are used to describe a range of phenomena, such as competition in industry (Morgan 
1995) and technological development (Businaro 1983).  Reference to evolution can be interpreted as 
an indicator of Western society’s tendency to value a scientific discourse.   
 
To reiterate, my primary research questions are: Why donate to a national charity?  And: what sort of 
relationship do programmes such as CiN suggest should occur between donors to and beneficiaries of 
a national charity? 
 
0.7 Structure of the thesis 
 
The first chapter is the literature review, in which I give a brief overview of the history of charity and 
welfare provision in the UK, indicate the pressures on charities in the current political and economic 
climate, and review the literature on mediated charity and the giving of monetary gifts.  I also outline 
psychological research on the role of empathy in philanthropy.  I end the chapter by identifying four 
key themes across all of this literature: emotional responses, monetary donation, visibility and the role 
of group-based identities in deciding whom to help. 
 
In the second chapter, I explain the use of each of my two sources of data as well as the decision to 
combine them.  I give details about focus group recruitment, settings, incentives and questions. I also 
consider the ethical issues involved in a study using data from live participants.  I describe my 
transcription decisions and examine the method of analysis I have chosen (Rhetorical Discourse 
Analysis) in more detail. 
 
The third chapter complements the literature review.  It is concerned with developing a framework 
with which to analyse my data.  I identify the concept of pity as a key idea in the critical study of 
charity discourse.  In Boltanski’s (1999) highly influential writing about pity, he is mainly concerned 
with viewing suffering from a distance, the emotionalisation of responses to it, and the act of 
donating.  This theory therefore unites the key themes identified in the literature review.  As I 
indicated above, I contend that Boltanksi’s pity leaves the relationship between pity and non-physical 
distance unclear.  Reviewing literature on different types of distance, and in particular on the work of 
Bilandzic (2006) I decide to focus on the following types of closeness / distance between CiN’s 
beneficiaries and its potential viewers:  
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 Social closeness / distance, defined as the degree to which contact between members of 
different groups is encouraged or minimised by them occupying the same or different places 
at the same or different times 
 Experiential closeness / distance, defined as the degree to which viewers of suffering are 
encouraged to see themselves as similar to or different from sufferers 
 Representational closeness / distance, defined as the degree to which viewers are encouraged 
to see the suffering of others as real and as something that they are able to respond to in 
practice  
 
The four analytic chapters (4-7) set out to examine each of these four types of distance in turn.  In the 
first analytic chapter (chapter 4), I examine social distance in the data.  I explore how in CiN, groups 
of people with different roles in relation to the charity (givers, beneficiaries, celebrity supporters) are 
represented in physically separate places.  I then explore what the focus group discussions reveal 
about investment in the idea of social distance between different groups in the UK in general.  In the 
second analytic chapter, I explore the concept of experiential distance in relation to viewers’ and 
beneficiaries’ shared national identity.  I examine how a sense of shared national identity is both 
emphasised and to some extent produced in CiN.  I argue that this emphasis on building a sense of 
national identity goes beyond the attempt to minimise experiential distance and instead appears to be a 
separate project in the show.  I examine the use of war discourse in CiN and how, in the focus group 
data, Darwinian evolution is appropriated and developed as a way of accounting for prioritising 
compatriots’ needs over those of others.   
 
In chapters 6 and 7, I consider different aspects of my idea of representational distance.  Chapter 6 
explores the extent to which sufferers in Britain are depicted as ‘real’, drawing on literature around 
the idea of the spectacle (Debord 2002 [1967]).  I consider the portrayal of beneficiaries in terms of 
visual modality (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996).  I argue that the representational distance between 
sufferers and viewers is to some extent minimised in CiN because the places that viewers are 
encouraged to picture themselves being in (fundraising places) have a similar degree of modality to 
the places occupied by the charity’s potential beneficiaries, which means that sufferers’ lives are 
imbued with a similar sense of reality to those of viewers.  This sense of closeness is enhanced by the 
fact that viewers are encouraged to respond emotionally to what they see.  However, I argue that 
representational closeness is counteracted by the juxtaposition of these emotional scenes with those of 
celebration.  The focus group data reveal an interesting interaction between the visibility and 
perceived reality of suffering.  In particular, participants describe media representations as less real 
than the suffering that they personally witness or hear about through their social networks and which, 
they argue, goes underreported in the mass media.   
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In chapter 7, I draw on Barthes’ (2009 [1972]) concept of myth to explore the mode of action 
suggested in CiN.  I argue that the giving of money has come to be understood and enacted as a 
marker of social good in itself and is thus imbued with an additional level of meaning.  I conclude that 
the pre-existing link between money and the actions facilitated by it has been replaced with a belief 
that to fundraise is to do these actions.  In both CiN and the focus groups, it appears that fundraising 
has come to be seen as an end in itself. 
 
In the concluding chapter, I draw together ideas about how the different types of closeness / distance 
considered in the analytic chapters give differing impressions about the level of interaction between 
sufferers and viewers in both data sets.  I revisit the research questions posed in the literature review, 
drawing together the findings from chapters 4-7.  I suggest that CiN proposes a relationship between 
its viewers and its beneficiaries that can only take place through the charity itself.  At the same time, it 
also encourages its viewers to prioritise its own beneficiaries over those of other charities - 
particularly those with an international focus.   
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
As indicated in the introduction, this thesis is concerned with studying the discourse of charity in the 
UK.  In the current chapter, I present a range of research that will inform my study in terms of the 
knowledge that can be built upon and the questions that have not yet been fully answered.  I begin by 
considering literature on the agents involved in organising and promoting giving, such as charities and 
the state.  I provide a broad historical overview of the role of different providers of poor relief in the 
UK.  I then address the particular pressures on charities working within the UK at present, before 
considering the role that charity media events have played and might play in shaping attitudes towards 
disadvantaged others.  In the final part, I explore psychological studies that have sought to understand 
who gives, why, and under what circumstances, paying particular attention to the role of reason and / 
or emotion in motivating giving.  In each of the areas of research I explore, there is a tension between 
practical research, which suggests solutions to present problems, and critical research, which points 
out the possibly harmful longer-term outcomes of current approaches.   
 
1.1 History: the state and charity welfare provision in the UK  
 
In this section, I begin by considering ideas about what constitutes charity from as far back as the 
Middle Ages.  I then provide a broadly chronological overview of major laws on and debates about 
who to help, and how, since this time.  Within the scope of this study it is not practical to examine all 
aspects of charity.  This brief examination therefore focuses on provision for the poor, in terms of 
both wealth and health.  I also consider other agencies that are or have been involved in preventing or 
minimising ‘disadvantage’ to some members of society, including the historical role of the state in 
promoting and enforcing poor relief.  Indeed, much of the literature suggests that charitable poor relief 
in Britain has always been in dialogue with state policies, even when the role of the state was limited 
to law-making.  On the one hand, this research reveals a number of interesting differences between 
past and present practices of and views about giving.  On the other hand, it also indicates that a 
surprising number of concerns that preoccupy present givers and would-be givers have been shared by 
those engaged in debates about these issues in the past.   
 
Organizations can register as charities in the UK based on a variety of objectives.  Historically, the 
term ‘charity’ has encompassed a similarly broad range of aims.  In ‘The Vision of Piers Plowman’, a 
14th century narrative poem, the following list is given in reference to the causes that money should be 
donated to:  
repair hospitals,  
help sick people,  
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mend bad roads,  
build up bridges that had been broken down,  
help maidens to marry or make them nuns,  
find food for prisoners and poor people,  
put scholars to school or to some other craft,  
help religious orders, and ameliorate rents or taxes. 
 
(Jordan, 2013: 112) 
 
Whilst most of these aims seem to be in keeping with those of at least some present charities, one 
example of a practice that was classed as charity in the Middle Ages that seems to be at odds with 
modern understandings is the contribution of poorer members of society to grand endeavours, such as 
the building of cathedrals (Vroom 2010).  Current conceptions of charity usually involve the wealthier 
helping the poorer, leading to the criticism that it tends to divide donors and recipients (Boltanski 
1999: 4).  However, the fact that all levels of a society were once encouraged to contribute to shared 
projects like this demonstrate that, at some points in history, charitable projects have unified rather 
than divided communities.   
 
Another form of community-uniting charity, which Bennett (1992: 23) suggests has been 
underrepresented in historical accounts of aid, are fundraising events.  Events called ‘help-ales’, ‘scot-
ales’ or ‘bid-ales’, recorded as early as 1000, were drinking festivals at which money was raised for a 
particular person or cause.  At these events, donors often included those who were also likely to face 
or have faced hardship at some point in their lives (1992: 20).  Such events provide evidence that, in 
the past, giving occurred not only by those who were in a wealthier social bracket to the poor, or (as 
above) from all levels of society to a shared endeavour, but also between poorer members of society.  
This has two important consequences for present debates about charity.  Firstly, the fact that 
charitable giving in British society took place within social groups provides a further basis for 
questioning what has been seen as the necessarily divisive relationship between donors and recipients 
(Boltanski 1999: 4).  Secondly, evidence of such events suggests that charity is not inherently a 
capitalist or neoliberal way of dealing with the problems in a society (as argued by, for example, 
Livingstone 2013).     
 
Evidence of early organised giving is also documented in religious texts.  Giving has long been 
channelled through Christian churches, which, like many other religions, recommended or imposed 
the giving of alms (Brown 2012).  The request for money was and still is often represented in terms of 
a spiritual duty within faiths (Krafess 2005: 328).  The historical link between charity and religion is 
well-documented.  While some argue that organised religion started the trend for charitable behaviour, 
others believe that both religion and pro-sociality emerge from a common origin, namely the need to 
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unite and regulate behaviour in large societies (e.g. Norenzayan and Shariff 2008; Henrich et al. 
2010).   
 
In the Middle Ages in Britain, poor relief was primarily a church matter, into which kings intervened 
only in a limited capacity, for example by ruling that a certain proportion of church collections be 
distributed to the poor (Leonard 1900: 3).    Remarkably, the earliest such law relating to poor relief 
was to limit rather than to promote charitable giving.  In the wake of the Black Death (1348-9), giving 
to the poor was prohibited in order to maximise employment at a time of scarcity of labourers 
(Leonard 1900: 3).  Voluntary giving was seen as a threat to the wider national good when it provided 
an income without work in return.  By contrast, in 1535-6, Henry VIII ordered that alms be regularly 
collected and redistributed to the poor.  There was, however, a substantial gap between laws and 
enforcement during and beyond the Middle Ages.  Henry VIII’s instructions were not implemented 
until around 40 years later, in the reign of Elizabeth I (Leonard 1900: 2).  Elizabeth’s Privy Council 
endeavoured to enforce the poor laws, but the justices of the peace (local officials) failed to execute 
them.  This changed under the reign of Charles I (1625 – 1649), when the justices of the peace were 
regularly made to hold special meetings on the subject, and reports were sent back to the Privy 
Council (Leonard 1900, ix).   
 
Concerns that charitable giving might be detrimental to the wider good resurfaced in the 18th century, 
when a range of texts and organisations set out to limit giving in the belief that it would encourage a 
reliance on hand-outs (Ryan 2000: 689).  Philanthropy was described as a lazy and squeamish 
reaction to witnessing the suffering of others, and rationality was advocated over emotion.  Charities 
set out to professionalise giving, investigating the needy to identify the genuinely destitute among 
what were assumed to be a multitude of fakes, who not only diverted money that might be better spent 
but disrupted the presumed hierarchy between donors and recipients (Ryan 2000: 692).     
 
The much-cited Victorian (1837 – 1901) distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor 
differentiated between those who could be assimilated into a morally demanding society and those 
who could or would not.  These standards were almost impossible to meet, as it was insisted, for 
example, that the deserving would not make their wants known to others, and therefore those who 
were seen begging were presumed to be undeserving (Ryan 2000: 690).  In one of the most popular 
novels of the time, Dickens’ Bleak House (1853), charity, especially towards those outside of Britain, 
was ridiculed in the characters of Mrs Jellyby and her daughter.  These women were cautionary 
characters, exemplifying how attempting to solve the problems of others through poorly thought-
through charity could lead to the neglect of those directly in your care.  In keeping with the idea that 
charity should be sparingly and judiciously given, the Charity Organisation Society (COS) was 
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founded in 1869 to ‘supervise the issue of the financial and material supplies provided by the upper 
classes as rationally as possible’ and to ‘avoid anarchical and useless charity’ (Gente 2002: 257).   
 
Victorian (1837-1901) liberal ideology supported the unregulated play of the market and resisted any 
state intervention on behalf of the poor.  The Edwardian (1901-10) era saw major challenges to this 
ideology, and public thinking began to accommodate increasingly socialist ideals (Gente, 2002: 255-
261).  Initially, however, the idea that the state might take on responsibility for its citizens was widely 
opposed.  It was still asserted by politicians that the problems of the poor were partly moral in 
character, and they argued that what was required to improve their situation was ‘cooperation, 
spontaneous and whole-hearted, of the community at large’ (Parliamentary Papers 1909, as cited in 
Gente 2002: 261), rather than an organised system of poverty relief. The so-called ‘radical liberals’ 
pushed for convergence between local philanthropic bodies and national public systems of help.  The 
COS, set up under the previous system, initially resisted this move.  However, it seems that their 
member charities played a key role in popularising the idea of helping others that the state was now 
ready and willing to take up (Gente 2002).  Developments in both charity and government provision 
went hand-in-hand as part of broader ideological changes.  In the 1910s, the COS was made 
responsible for carrying out the practical work of wealth redistribution that the government wanted to 
enforce (2002: 265).  This changed the nature of its member charities considerably.  Early 
philanthropy had encouraged a deferential attitude to donors and reinforced individualistic ideals, but 
charitable bodies now had a new role, increasingly being asked to cooperate with, and accommodate 
to, the national systems of poor relief (2002: 256).  However, they were also able to point out, and to 
provide for, shortcomings in state provision.  Thus, charities worked to support and improve upon the 
state system (Ryan 2002: 265).   
 
Gente (2002) argues that it was the need for an able British army that forced the government into 
finally recognising and addressing the literally crippling poverty that many Britons were enduring.  Of 
those who enlisted for the Boer Wars (1880–1881 and 1899–1902), only one third was declared fit for 
service (2002: 259).  The impact of this situation on Britain’s former image of superiority was, Gente 
argues, a driving-force for social change.  Later, the First World War (1914-1919) would see rising 
parliamentary support for social welfare programs that would increase social stability and assimilate 
fractious groups that might otherwise threaten the war effort (2002: 262).  It appears, therefore, that 
the state’s willingness to set up systems of poor relief was directly linked to wider concerns about the 
nation’s operation as a whole.  Similarly, it has been argued that non-governmental charitable giving 
around this time was also partially motivated by a sense of national pride.  When different national 
groups came into contact, for example as immigrants to America, they vied to be seen as successful.   
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In order to present this image, it was necessary for these groups to look after their members and to 
prevent them from begging (Ryan 2000: 267).  Attention to the effects of poverty on society or the 
nation as a whole, rather than simply concern for the poor themselves, echoes earlier British history, 
in which interest in providing for the poor was driven at least partly by the desire to eliminate beggars, 
who presented a threat to other members of the society (Leonard 1900: 12).  Leonard (1900:12) states 
that ‘the poor laws themselves were at least partly police measures’.  These concerns, although they 
might be recognised as selfish, were an effective force for social change.  
 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a more collective ethos emerged, which replaced the earlier 
ideologies of commodification and individualism (Clarke, Smith and Vidler, 2005: 168).  Market 
forces were increasingly recognised as unstable and it was seen as important to ensure collective 
protection (2005: 168).  When Atlee’s Labour government was voted in in 1945, the welfare state was 
vastly expanded, including the founding of the National Health Service in 1948.  Charities who had 
been involved in providing financial support for the needy were somewhat cut back, but continued 
their activities in areas not prioritised by the state.  Their role was thus to complement state provisions 
(Taylor 2004). 
 
In more recent years, however, this expansion in state provision has been reversed.  During the 1960s 
and 70s, public dissatisfaction with the welfare state grew.  The Conservative Party, under Margaret 
Thatcher, won the general election in 1979, and began to retrench public services (Pierson 1994).  
Robson (1989: 149) notes how, as part of broader ideologically-driven changes, overall tax rates were 
reduced by the Conservative government, while charitable giving was encouraged by the introduction 
of tax breaks.  Meanwhile, people were being encouraged, both rhetorically and through concrete 
changes to policy, to move away from their birthplaces to find work (Ginsburg 1989).  This separation 
from networks of extended families enhanced a growing culture of individualism.  It has been argued 
that in the absence of traditional ways of defining oneself, spending patterns, including giving, 
became increasingly important as compensatory symbols of identity (Belk 1984).  During these years 
(from 1979 to 1990), the relationship between voluntary agencies and government was fundamentally 
changed again (Bills and Harris 1992).  The UK government, along with those of many other Western 
countries, increasingly employed private (both for profit and non-profit) companies to provide 
services for its citizens (Billis 1993, Schmid 2003). In some areas, this meant that voluntary agencies 
had to compete with private companies in order to secure contracts (Chesterman and Fisher 2009). 
This resulted in a change of culture within the charitable sector (Palmer and Randall 2005: 46).  An 
increase in voluntary agencies’ budgets, supplemented by the government, was accompanied by 
demands to target state-specified groups and to live up to increased scrutiny.  Their work less 
frequently involved ‘self-help, community development, or campaigning work’ and increasingly 
included ‘the management of funded projects or the direct provision of services’ (Billis and Harris 
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1992: 214).  On the one hand, this involvement of charities in the provision of services was welcomed 
by charities and scholars because non-governmental organisations were able to respond more 
reflexively to the needs of clients than government agencies (Schmid, 2003: 308).  It has also meant 
that charities were able to secure long-term funding for their activities (Carmel and Harlock 2008: 
161).  On the other hand, for the charities themselves, having to act within a remit defined by 
governments severely impeded their ability to respond to other demands (2008: 164).   While the 
retrenchment of public services during the Conservative years might have been ‘incremental rather 
than revolutionary’ (Pierson 1995: 173), its progress since then, as I detail below, has been unhalted.   
 
Charities are often seen as being in tension with the state on the one hand (Fyfe 2005) and with 
businesses on the other (Staples 2004).   Since the New Labour government (1997-2010), charities 
have increasingly been employed under contracts to provide services that were formerly state-
operated (Clarke et al. 2005: 251).  Even though the voluntary sector could still be considered a 
‘junior partner’ to the state in the provision of welfare services during this time (2005: 251), this gap 
has lessened since then.  These changes were also part of a broader ideological shift, which placed the 
responsibility for social problems again on the shoulders of private individuals and voluntary groups, 
rather than on the state (Billis and Harris 1992: 215).  More broadly, public services have been 
(re)commodified and citizens redefined as consumers, for example in New Labour’s introduction of 
the ‘choice agenda’ for public services including schools and hospitals (Jordan 2005).   This tendency 
to see citizens as consumers has been extended since the election of the Conservative / Liberal 
Democrat coalition in May 2010, and the Conservative government in May 2015.  A close working 
relationship between NGOs and governments has in many cases brought about a crisis of identity for 
the former, as the independence of their aims and accountability structures are compromised 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996; Najam 2000; Young 2006). 
 
Reviewing the history of charitable giving in Britain reveals some similarities and some stark 
contrasts between age-old concerns and current ones.  This brief historical exploration has highlighted 
an ongoing interest in the place that reason and / or emotion has in deciding whether and how to 
donate.  In the Victorian era, wealthy individuals were encouraged to decide the fates of others based 
on their personal preferences, but overly sentimental approaches to giving were discouraged.  Over a 
range of historical periods, different group-based identities, including national identities, have 
motivated charitable actions.  Whether maintenance of the poor was a matter of helping fellow 
members of one’s own community, as in the case of help-ales, or a means of protecting national 
interests in the case of wars, looking after disadvantaged others has often been linked to the need to 
survive as a group.  Anxieties over the reliability of representations of suffering appears to predate the 
use of the mass media to encourage giving, in that such concerns were central in deciding whether to 
assist beggars, and which agencies could be best trusted with one’s money.  Current debates over 
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wealth redistribution are often couched in terms of an opposition between the socialist solution of the 
welfare state and the once liberal, now conservative, suggestion that such actions should be voluntary, 
often involving donations to charities (Levy 2002; Harris 2005).  However, this review suggests that 
they have sometimes worked in tandem.  Furthermore, while scholars such as Kapoor (2012) argue 
that current forms of charity fail to result in the genuine and sustainable redistribution of wealth - 
because they operate under the same logic of promotion and consumption as other businesses and are 
controlled by the unaccountable elites of the capitalist system - historical research suggests that 
charity can and has operate(d) under very different conditions.    
 
The literature examined above is also united by a shared, though not always openly articulated, notion 
of what charity is.  In all of the forms of charitable giving discussed above, two elements are present:  
firstly, what is offered is in the form of money; secondly, this money is distributed by some form of 
mediator.  While this is not true in the case of giving money, food or clothes to beggars, the charitable 
organisations that set out to prevent the duplication of help to some recipients and the absence of it to 
others did so by mediating between the givers and the beneficiaries.  In the case of help-ales, the 
money was transferred between members of the community at close range, but the crucial difference 
between this type of charitable action and simply giving money between friends is the involvement of 
a mediating collector and distributor of money.  Of course, this review was focused on charity giving 
rather than volunteering, and the volunteering that formed a central part of these organisations is 
therefore omitted.  However, it is worth noting that charity, understood in this way, has important 
consequences for the relationship between different social groups in that it introduces a form of 
distance.  On the other hand, this brief review has also indicated that charity is not always divisive but 
is potentially socially cohesive, bringing communities together for a shared cause, whether that be a 
mutual friend or the building of a cathedral.   
 
Literature on the history of charitable giving thus provides an informative counter-point to present 
debates around charitable giving.  In the following section, I examine research on the current 
conditions for charities operating in the UK, before considering the role of charity events.   
 
1.2 Conditions for charities in the UK in 2011 
 
It is difficult to get an accurate picture of the current conditions that charities in the UK operate under, 
not least because what counts as charity is hard to determine.  While the current legal definition put 
‘the prevention or relief of poverty’ first in its list of possible ‘charitable purposes’ (Charities Act 
2011), the list also includes less obvious charitable aims: ‘the advancement of education; the 
advancement of religion; […] the advancement of amateur sport; […] the promotion of the efficiency 
of the armed forces of the Crown or of the efficiency of the police, fire and rescue services or 
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ambulance services’.  In both its range and its foci, this list echoes the one included in ‘The Vision of 
Piers Plowman’ in the 14th century.  Given this diversity of what might be considered to constitute 
charitable practice, it is useful to look at the relationships between charities and other organizations in 
order to generate an impression of what charities are and are not, and to gain an idea of the particular 
pressures that they face at this time.    
 
Studies within many disciplines have pointed to a changing relationship between business 
corporations and charities in recent years.  On the one hand, businesses are increasingly called upon to 
display their altruism, in order to meet the requirements of consumers and shareholders (Saiia, Carroll 
and Buuchholtz 2003; Bakan 2004).  On the other hand, giving by corporations is increasingly 
targeted at achieving both successful outcomes for beneficiaries and at enhancing these businesses’ 
own position within the marketplace.  Two key terms introduced by Post and Waddock (1995) refer to 
these different targets in corporate giving: ‘philanthropic strategy’ is used to refer to the practice of 
ensuring that giving is orderly and that the aims of the giving are met; ‘strategic philanthropy’ is used 
to refer to the requirement that giving should improve the position of the corporation in the 
marketplace.  The latter is facilitated by ‘corporate giving managers’ whose remit is specifically to 
direct donations in a way that increases share prices (Saiia et al. 2003; Gautier and Pache, 2013).  
Some researchers as well as business leaders interpret strategic philanthropy as unproblematic, 
‘socially responsible business practice’ (Saiia et al. 2003: 186), which sets up ‘symbiotic’ and ‘win-
win’ relationships between corporations and the communities they operate in.  However, the benefits 
of corporate giving appear to apply only to those who are within a position to affect the corporation 
by buying stocks or products.  In this way, its benefits to society must always be limited.  
Nevertheless, research indicates that considerable time and money is being invested in strategic 
philanthropy. 
 
While businesses are showing increasing interest in charitable giving, charities are also becoming 
more business-like.  The multiplying number of charities in recent years has led to increased 
competition between, and commercialisation of, charitable organisations (Cottle and Nolan 2007: 
865).  This means that there is increased pressure to put across an image that will appeal to as many 
people and private companies as possible.  Balabanis, Stables and Phillips (1997) used questionnaires 
to examine UK charities’ market-orientation.  They found that charities’ orientation towards donors’ 
needs and preferences had increased over the previous five years.  In other words, these charities were 
progressively shaping what they did in response to what they thought donors and potential donors 
wanted, in the same way that businesses design their products and services to meet the demands of 
their customers.  Research also suggests that charities are increasingly professionalising their 
communications strategies (Cottle and Nolan 2007, Boycoff and Goodman 2009, Goodman 2010) and 
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their products (Richley and Ponte 2008).  Under such conditions, charities are less likely to engage in 
campaigns aimed at challenging existing attitudes (Vestergaard 2008).   
 
However, the attempt to analyse charities from an economic point of view has pointed to a number of 
peculiarities in the relationship between consumers and producers in these organisations when 
compared with businesses.  Unlike other private organisations providing public services, in the case of 
charities, the demand for goods is not increased by the ultimate consumers (beneficiaries) but by 
donors.  There is a tacit agreement between donors and charities that more giving will provide an 
improved quality and level of these goods to end users (Callen 1994: 216), but in reality this output is 
radically altered by a number of other factors, such as the input of volunteers, for example.  There is 
also much evidence to suggest that when funding to given charities is increased by bodies such as 
governments, the amount of private donations given to these charities is not lessened, or ‘crowded 
out’ (Callen 1994: 225).  So, for example, if the government took over the provision of some of a 
given charity’s services, this would not necessarily result in the charity gaining less money from 
individuals.  Donors cannot, therefore, be seen as filling funding gaps left by governments, for 
example.  Rather than being exclusively interested in the provision of goods and services, they are 
also motivated by values and emotions.  This is something I explore further in section 1.4.    
 
As well as the recent changes in the relationship between charities and both the public and private 
sectors detailed above, legal constraints on what counts as a charity have also altered the remit of 
charities in ways that curtail their activities.  The 2006 Charities Act specified that charities could not 
pursue political goals.  This excludes not only working on behalf of political parties but also 
campaigning for any changes to the UK law (Malik 2008).  More recently, on October 9th 2013, 
despite fierce opposition, MPs narrowly voted in favour of the Lobbying Law, which stops all 
organisations, including charities, from carrying out campaign work in the run-up to elections.  UK-
based charities are thus barred from being political during these times.  This means that the health and 
welfare structures provided by the government cannot be explicitly criticised, which restricts 
charities’ potential to complement and enhance welfare provision that they have had at other times.   
 
For charities that are independent from government contracts, some of these problems do not exist.   
Nevertheless, all charities are required to meet legal criteria, and they are under pressure to respond to 
the shifting demands of donors and to adapt to an increasingly competitive ‘marketplace’.  One of the 
key ways in which charities can compete effectively is to better understand how people are motivated 
to give and to adapt their communication accordingly.  In section 1.4, I present an overview of some 
of the key findings in research on charitable giving, and charitable acts more generally, within the 
field of psychology.  For now, I consider a particular form of giving that has become increasingly 
popular for charities seeking to generate donations and awareness: mediated charity events. 
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1.3 Charity events: mediation and money  
 
As suggested in section 1.1, charity events have been taking place in different forms throughout 
history.  Since the ‘help-ales’ of the 1000s, people have come together to carry out fundraising 
activities that seem to have little to do with the problems they seek to address.  In the twentieth 
century, charity events that appeared more like those carried out today began to take place.  
Designated regular fundraising event days, such as British Red Cross’ annual ‘Our Day’, started in 
1915 to raise money for the WW1 war effort (British Red Cross: 1918).  Sporting events became 
increasingly popular from the 1990s onwards (Higgins and Lauzon 2003: 365).  Events involving 
celebrities and / or the mass media have also become prevalent.  Many cite the 1971 ‘Concert for 
Bangladesh’ as the first of a new genre of charity event (e.g. Einolf, Philbrick and Slay 2013: 246, van 
Leeuwen, et al. 2013: 226).  The show’s scale was unprecedented and, in its video recorded format, 
the event was made available to view worldwide.  Although smaller fundraising media events had 
been taking place in America since 1950 (Einolf et al. 2013: 246), this international event, along with 
the even bigger ‘Live Aid’ telethon for victims of the Ethiopian famine in 1985, has been cited as 
changing the nature of reactions to charity.  In particular, these events made giving part of a media 
spectacle, where the outpouring of public emotion was encouraged (Cohen 2001: 179).   
 
Charity media events have become a particularly important site for the mediation and mediatisation of 
giving.  Mediation can be defined as the mass media becoming the primary channel through which 
communication occurs between parties, such as between charities, or political institutions, and the 
public (Strömbäck 2008: 231).  Mass media channels stand between the author and the audience, 
mediating between them.  Mediatisation, by contrast, refers to the process of social or political 
activities increasingly acquiring characteristics associated with mass media (2008: 232).  In other 
words, ‘media logic’, in relation to the organisation and presentation of material, comes to dominate 
the way in which information is both presented and interpreted (Altheide and Snow 1979: 10, 
Strömbäck 2008: 233).  For example, ‘sound bites’ replace in-depth analysis (Cottle and Nolan 2007: 
866), and images of suffering others are replaced with those of celebrities (Goodman 2010).  There is 
evidence to suggest that both terms can be applied to aspects of charities’ communication.    Charities’ 
donors and recipients gain knowledge and awareness of each other primarily through the media 
(mediation).  It has also been argued that ‘media logic’ has come to dictate some of the activities of 
charities (mediatisation).  For example, Cottle and Nolan (2007: 863-4) carried out a series of 
interviews with communications managers and media officers who worked in world-leading aid 
NGOs.  They documented how, in order to attract much-needed funds in an increasingly competitive 
market, humanitarian organisations were adapting their practices and communications in order to 
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facilitate press coverage, sometimes at the cost of compromising their broader missions, such as 
promoting global humanitarianism.   
 
Mediatisation can be driven by the desire to make charity media more effective. For example, Eckel, 
Grossman and Milano (2007) found that there can be an ‘overloading’ effect, in the sense that viewers 
become less responsive when given too much information.  Charities have responded to such research 
by making their communication more user-friendly.  Adopting such an approach, however, can have 
wider consequences, as it is sometimes at odds with achieving broader social change. Goodman 
(2010: 105) argues that the Fair Trade movement has become less challenging and transgressive as it 
has become more market-savvy.  He observes that limiting the amount of information that consumers 
are given on packaging, while making products more appealing, also obscures the relationships 
between producers and consumers that the movement initially set out to expose (2010: 105).   This is 
a central dilemma for many social and political movements.  While working within the capitalist 
system may provide the fastest route to achievable success, it also plays into a system that is 
hampered by existing inequalities.   
 
For many scholars, the depictions of poverty used in charity events represent a similar triumph of 
pragmatism over idealism.  Indeed these events were seen by some as a backwards step in the battle 
for long-term equality.  As Cohen (2001: 178-9) puts it:  
 
Fund-raisers belonged to the old charity discourse of “pragmatic amorality” – patronizing, 
ethnocentric, fatalistic (poverty just happens, like natural disasters).  They were “merchants of 
misery” who would use any images to grab attention and shame audiences into giving money.  
By contrast, educationalists talked about empowerment, structural causation, political change 
and social justice.   
  
Criticism of what has been dubbed ‘consumer aid’ in events like Live Aid has become widespread 
(Cohen 2001: 180).  The involvement of celebrities and the mass media in such events, it is argued, 
signalled the de-politicisation of action on suffering.  This is because these celebrities tend not to 
engage long-term in, or provide structural solutions to, problematic situations, and because, in shows 
where they are present, broader political issues are often side-lined in favour of emotional responses 
and positivity (Driessens et al. 2012: 721).  However, the politically-divisive miners’ strikes of the 
1980s gained financial support using a similar format, by persuading popular musicians to play 
benefit gigs and release fundraising songs and albums (Tranmer 2012: 82).  This suggests that it is the 
added element of mediation, rather than the use of entertainment or celebrities per se, that is linked to 
depoliticised responses to suffering (perhaps driven by a desire to appeal to a wider audience). 
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Another aspect of charity media events that has been identified as problematic by some theorists is 
their request for action in the form of donating money.  On the one hand, asking for financial 
contributions to a cause has the advantage of giving viewers a clear form of action to take.   Boltanski 
(1999: 153) argues that it is this orientation towards action that separates the depiction of real events 
from those of fictional events, because, while one might watch a representation of suffering and 
respond emotionally whether the representation is real or not, it is only when real situations are 
represented, for example in charity events, that viewers are usually called upon to respond, for 
example by giving money.  Collecting donations, rather than requesting other forms of help, allows 
charities to decide how best to channel resources, because money can be used to purchase a range of 
goods and services for beneficiaries.  Charities are well placed to make such decisions because they 
often have well-established relationships with the communities they seek to help (Seu 2010). Many 
researchers, however, have noted the shortcomings of appeals that garner only monetary support.  
Unlike giving time, giving money is more often prompted by acute situations such as natural disasters 
and wars than by chronic problems (Polman 2011).  It has been associated with the will to find a 
quick fix, which is unsuitable for more wide-ranging problems (Driessens et al. 2012).   
 
The act of giving can also been seen as donor-oriented in a number of ways.  Perhaps the most 
transparent way that donors benefit from making donations is the avoidance of tax by charitable 
givers (Robson 1989).  As discussed above, many businesses are also engaged in straightforwardly 
self-oriented giving via the well-established practice of ‘strategic philanthropy’, in which donations to 
charities are made only in ways that will improve their own position in the market-place (Saiia, 
Carroll and Buuchholtz 2003). Businesses can enhance the position of their stakeholders by 
broadcasting their support for charity events in ways that enhance their image, while failing to adopt 
truly socially responsible practices (Devinney 2009). It is certainly the case that apparently generous 
donations can mask the conditions which are sometimes attached to them.  For example, the Canadian 
government’s promise to match the donations its citizens made to disaster relief charities in the wake 
of Haiti’s 2010 earthquake appeared generous, but made little difference to the earthquake survivors 
themselves, as the money was used to cancel some of Haiti’s world debt rather than for relief efforts 
(Mason 2011).  It is important not to undermine the very great work that has been done by charities 
receiving donations or underemphasize the complexities of seeking an alternative.  However, it should 
be noted that there are compelling reasons to look for complementary ways of helping others.   
The way that charities communicate to donors in these media fundraising events has also been 
interpreted as being giver- rather than beneficiary- focused.   Tester (2001: 123) argues that the 
common practice of showing the figure raised at fundraising events prompts a sense of competition 
between the current fundraising efforts and those of previous years or of other charities.  This 
preoccupation with fundraising success as opposed to outcomes for beneficiaries is part of a 
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problematic separation between the money raised and its uses.  Others have argued that, when we 
donate to others, we assert our individual or cultural superiority over those we assist (Berg 2005; 
Mason 2011).  This is partly because gifts that are not reciprocated are understood as resulting in a 
loss of status for the recipient in many societies (Mauss 1990; Belk 1984; Berg 2005).  Mauss uses 
‘potlatch’ ceremonies performed between indigenous tribes of the Northwest Coast of Canada as an 
example.  At these gift-giving feasts, when one group or individual gives something to another, the 
second group or individual is expected to reciprocate at least in kind.  In the event that this does not 
happen, the first group is rewarded and the second punished by being awarded differing levels of 
status in relation to each other.  In any society, Mauss argues, the apparently free gift is therefore 
never truly free; either it is returned, or the recipient must accept his inferiority in relation to the giver.  
This rule has also been assumed to apply in state-wide charity exchanges, so that when capitalist 
countries give money to countries with different political systems, it can be interpreted as a way to 
display the pre-eminence of a capitalist system (Berg 2005; Seu 2010).  It is worth noting, however, 
that this conception is tied up with the assumption that the individual bears some responsibility for his 
or her conditions.  If reliance on help was not seen as a personal failure, the inability to give in return 
would not have implications for the status of the recipient.   
 
A further criticism that has been levelled at charities’ use of monetary gifts is that they impersonalise 
both the donor and the recipient and therefore do nothing to encourage a better understanding of each 
other (Boltanski 1999: 18).  This view is part of a wider theory of charity that suggests that it 
minimises real interactions between donors and recipients and circumvents the possibility for political 
change.  I suggested in the historical overview that this boundary-creating aspect of charity is a 
feature of modern, rather than necessarily of all, giving.  It is however, an important aspect of charity 
in the twenty-first century.  Boltanski (1999) explores this issue extensively.  As I explore in section 
1.5, his theory has been used in research on the discourse of charity, but only in the context of 
international charities.  Whether charity telethons contribute to the distancing of donors from 
beneficiaries, or simply reflect it by taking as their subject socially (and often physically) distant 
groups, is a question that remains unanswered. 
 
1.4 The psychology of charity: why give and to whom? 
 
In this part of the literature review, I summarise some of the key research on charitable giving within 
Psychology.  I present some important areas of debate and highlight influential studies as potentially 
relevant to the present research.  Many psychologists have designed studies aimed at maximising the 
success of appeals by charities in terms of the number of donors and the amount donated.  Early 
examples include Cialdini and Schroeder’s (1976) experiment which found that, when asking people 
to contribute to a charitable cause, saying that ‘even a penny would help’ resulted in more people 
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contributing, as objections based on the cost to them of donating were lessened.  The work of 
providing a thorough overview of all of the existing findings in relation to who gives and under what 
circumstances has been undertaken by Bekkers and Wiepking (2010 and 2011).  Based on an 
extensive literature review, they identify eight mechanisms that drive charitable giving: ‘(1) 
awareness of need; (2) solicitation; (3) costs and benefits; (4) altruism; (5) reputation; (6) 
psychological benefits; (7) values; (8) efficacy’ (2010).  They identify typical donors as having:  
 
affiliation with a religion (especially Judaism and Protestantism), stronger religious involvement, a 
higher age, a higher level of education, income and wealth, home ownership, a better subjective 
financial position, being married, having children, having a paid job, higher cognitive ability, having 
prosocial personality characteristics such as empathy, and growing up with parents with higher 
education, income, religiosity, and volunteering activity (2011: 6).   
 
In the present review, I focus on research about the ethical dimension of charity and the features of 
charity communication that are most likely to produce successful outcomes.   
 
In a seminal laboratory study, Small and Loewenstein (2003) found that participants were more likely 
to compensate others who they had been told had lost money in the past than they were to give to 
others who they had been told would lose money in the future.   Further, in a field study, they found 
that ‘people contributed more to a charity when [informed that] their contributions would benefit a 
family that had already been selected from a list than when told that the family would be selected 
from the same list’ (2003: 5).  This has been dubbed the ‘identified victim effect’.  A shortcoming of 
this study is that, in each of these cases, people might think that a future event might not happen (even 
when told it is certain), whereas events that have happened are definite.  However, Small and 
Loewenstein’s findings are supported by the other studies that have found that identifying information 
has increased the likelihood of giving.  For example, Kogut and Ritov (2005) asked students to 
contribute to a cause for children with life-threatening diseases.  Some were given information about 
an individual child and others about a group of children.   Participants who were informed about a 
single victim reported significantly higher levels of distress than those who were informed about a 
group.  Strikingly, participants also gave more money to single victims than they did to groups (2005: 
164).  This suggests that if charities single out individuals as case studies, they are likely to garner 
more financial support (2005: 157).   
 
While seeing people as members of a group rather than as individuals might make giving less likely, 
being made aware that people who are suffering belong to the same group as you has the opposite 
effect.  Levine and Thompson (2004) found that activating different forms of locality-based identity 
impacts upon the likelihood of donating to those who have suffered from a natural disaster.  They 
asked participants to donate to victims of (fictional) hurricanes located either within or outside 
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Europe, after making either European or British identities salient.  Participants whose European 
(rather than British) identity had been made salient were more likely to give to the disaster which 
occurred in Europe than in South America (2004: 237).  Those in the British-identity salience 
condition were not significantly more likely to give to either European or South American disasters 
(2004: 238).  It is worth noting, however, that Levine and Thompson’s findings are not limited to 
national identities.  Therefore, even when an identity that is made salient is not particularly strongly 
felt otherwise (such as ‘European-ness’, rather than ‘Britishness’) this shared identity can still affect 
people’s willingness to help others (2004: 241).  Other studies have also suggested that the extent to 
which presentations highlight similarity between viewers and sufferers also affects whether the former 
are more or less likely to empathise with the latter (Batson et al. 1997).  If this is the case, then 
presentations that could invoke feelings of similarity, for example by making reference to shared 
humanity, might also be successful.  Encouraging people to see themselves as citizens of the world, 
for example, might make them more likely to give internationally.  However, it remains the case that 
intra-national giving is the norm in practice in both the UK and US.  UK giving is primarily to UK-
recipient charities (Charities Aid Foundation 2012), and giving by US citizens is higher to US-
beneficiary charities than to charities elsewhere for both natural and manmade disasters (Einolf, 
Philbrick and Slay, 2013: 253).  This bias in giving is not, however, reflected in much of the research 
on charitable giving, perhaps because its starting-point is often the idea that donating to people in 
other countries is the ultimate altruistic act, as its positive consequences, if there are any, are 
untraceable.  Whatever the reason, this is a notable gap in the literature that is worth addressing in the 
present research. 
 
While the above research suggests that the norm is in-group giving, which is expected to benefit the 
self in some way, much attention has been focused on addressing whether ‘pure’ (non-egoistic) 
altruism exists.  A range of studies have been designed to answer this question, often looking at a 
range of helping behaviours, such as giving assistance to someone who appears to be unwell in the 
street, as well as giving money to people who are described and / or pictured.  Notably, studies on 
assisting people who are seen in person often seek to explain ‘failure to respond’ to needy others, 
while giving to charities is more often put forward as behaviour that needs to be accounted for.  
Milinski, Semmann and Krambeck (2002), for example, view people donating to ‘poor people outside 
the social group’ as ‘an evolutionary puzzle’ (2002: 881) and attempt to explain it in their research.  
Factors explaining the ‘failure’ to respond in person include the phenomenon ‘diffusion of 
responsibility’ (Darley and Latané 1968), whereby observers fail to respond when they are aware of 
other bystanders because their sense of personal responsibility for the situation is diminished.  
Milgram (1970) argued that ‘cognitive overload’ explained the reduced level of response from people 
in cities compared with those in quieter places.  In other words, people have to pay less attention to 
what’s going on around them, including cries for help, in order to function in this environment.  Other 
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factors that influence helping behaviour are whether the problems appear a) clear or ambiguous and b) 
serious or non-serious (Clark and Word 1972).   
 
While the above studies go some way towards accounting for why people fail to help those in front of 
them, studies on mediated giving have revealed some reasons for helping more distant others.  
Milinski et al. (2002) explored the idea that donors might reap rewards from their own generosity to 
others at a later date, for example by gaining a reputation of being socially reliable.  They used a 
computerised game in which players were given the opportunity of giving money to other players 
(which would cost the donor less than the recipient gained in monetary terms), or to a charitable 
organisation (UNICEF).  If the latter happened, this information would appear to other members.  
After the 16th round of this game, participants were given the opportunity to select a fellow player for 
a position of delegate at the student council.  Findings suggested that there were financial benefits to 
giving to other group members, because participants who did this were more likely to receive money 
from other players.  Players who donated to UNICEF were more likely to receive nominations for the 
student council.  Milinski et al. (2002: 882) conclude that charity donors gain a good reputation from 
acts of giving, and people who are generous to members of their social group secure the help of others 
later on.  As in any experimental research with people, the study suffers from a number of external 
validity problems, such as the lack of real consequences for players of being generous as the money 
was not theirs, and the experiment’s reliance on charity being made public, which it often is not.  
However, it does point to a number of positive consequences for people of giving publicly or of 
displaying their generosity.   
 
Other researchers have approached the question of why we give to mediated others by focusing on 
aspects of givers’ personalities.  Harper et al. (1990) asked 89 participants to rate their beliefs about 
the world on Lerner’s (1980) ‘Just World Scale’.  Participants also rated their level of agreement with 
different statements about the causes of Third World Poverty. They found that there was a significant 
correlation between belief in a just world and blaming the poor for Third World poverty.  In other 
words, people who thought that the world was fair thought that the poor were therefore responsible for 
their own conditions.  This indicates that making people more compassionate about the suffering of 
others might involve challenging their broader beliefs about how the world works.  Conversely, 
attempting to elicit sympathy from people without challenging the idea that people are responsible for 
their own fate is unlikely to be successful.   
 
Beliefs about both donors and potential recipients are, however, only one part of the picture.  The 
scientific study of charitable giving has both led and been led by the idea that emotions, as well as 
thoughts, have the ability to instigate giving.  The link between representations of suffering and 
emotion was initially posited by Coke, Batson and McDavis (1978), who suggested that the desire to 
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help a person in need is prompted by taking that person’s perspective and the subsequent arousal of 
empathetic feelings.  This is called the empathy-altruism hypothesis.  A person’s feelings of empathy 
are seen as what causes his or her altruistic action, whether or not this action also results in a ‘side 
effect’ of a positive impact on his or her own feelings (e.g. Batson et al. 1989).  Although the idea that 
emotional responses are linked to giving behaviours has been widely accepted, the nature of the 
specific emotional state that is responsible for prompting altruism has been contested.   
 
Empathy has been defined as an emotion in which the pain of the other is imaginatively shared 
(Dymond 1949: 127).  It is contrasted with sympathy, in which the other’s emotion is recognised, but 
responded to with a separate emotion, such as pity (Keen 2006: 209).  Empathy is also contrasted with 
identification, an idea originating in psychoanalysis, in which a person models himself after another.  
I examine these key concepts in more detail in order to develop my own framework for understanding 
data about intra-national charity in chapter 3.   
 
In the literature about charitable giving, these distinctions have been seen as very important.  Many 
have argued that negative or self-centred emotions are more predictive of altruistic behaviours than 
empathy is.  Cialdini et al. (1987) argue that altruistic acts serve only to relieve people of the negative 
feelings evoked when they empathise with others.  They found that helping behaviour was more 
strongly predicted by levels of sadness reported by participants than by their reported feelings of 
empathy (1987: 749).  When they convinced participants that because of a drug they could take, their 
negative mood would not be changed by helping others, these participants did not help others, despite 
being empathetically aroused.  This alternative to the empathy-altruism hypothesis is called the 
negative-state relief model.  According to this view, people give because charity campaigns upset 
them and they want to feel better, not because they emotionally connect with the people they see.  If 
this was true, then it would benefit charities to make viewers feel upset by what they saw, rather than 
(or as well as) to encourage them to empathise with the people depicted in their campaigns. 
 
The negative-state relief model was contradicted by Shaw, Batson and Todd (1994), who found that 
participants actively sought to avoid empathy-inducing situations that might lead them to be 
motivated to help.  In other words, they avoided giving by avoiding feeling empathy.  This response 
was most likely when participants were made aware that, after hearing an appeal, they would be given 
the opportunity to provide costly help than when they were unaware that they would be asked to help, 
or when they were aware that they would be asked for help but that the amount requested would be 
small.  This suggests that empathy and helping are directly linked, rather than being mediated through 
feelings of personal sadness.  More recently, however, Kogut and Ritov (2005: 164) found that 
reported ratings of distress were positively correlated with a willingness to contribute money for a 
child / children’s medical treatment, but ratings of empathy were not.  Their interpretation of this 
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finding was that, whereas there is social pressure to express empathy, which might mediate between 
the emotional arousal felt and what is reported, expressions of distress reflect emotional arousal more 
accurately (2005: 162).  Cialdini et al. (1987) see this difference as reflecting two comorbid but 
distinct feelings, only one of which (distress) affects helping behaviour.   
 
Regardless of the nature of the emotion considered to be most significant, these studies all support the 
idea that emotional reactions are the root cause of helping behaviours.  This has important 
consequences for how charities choose to communicate.  If certain emotions are predictive of giving, 
it makes sense for charities to design their communication around eliciting these emotions, rather than 
around providing certain types of information.  The way that charities communicate visually is central 
to their ability to elicit emotions.  Burt and Strongman (2005: 571) found that images of children were 
particularly emotive for respondents, and that ‘images showing negative emotions generated 
significantly larger donations’.  However, this was not the only outcome.  Just as pre-existing beliefs 
about the world influence readings of charity communication (Harper et al. 1990), the precise nature 
of the images used by charities can also affect our beliefs.  McWha and Carr (2009) found that using 
cropped images with little background information significantly increased the chances of attributing 
blame to the poor amongst some of their respondents.  Analytic work on images themselves rather 
than on viewers’ responses also highlights the potential for emotive images of powerless victims to 
dehumanise and disempower charities’ beneficiaries (see Chouliaraki 2010, pp. 111-112 for an 
overview of these arguments).  The point that emphasising the distress of others in an attempt to 
evoke emotional responses to them can detract from the humanity of sufferers is also made about 
verbal appeals.  Boltanski, Chouliaraki and others argue that emotional appeals  ‘displace[…] the 
long-term concern with establishing structures of justice with the urgent concern for doing something 
for those who suffer’ (2010: 108).   
 
As well as doing a possible disservice to represented participants, another disadvantage of relying on 
people’s emotional responses to compel action towards others is that this resource is exhaustible.  The 
notion of compassion fatigue appears frequently in literature about mediated charity.  The term was 
initially coined to describe the diminishing ability to nurture others, particularly in professional 
settings such as nursing, as a result of secondary post-traumatic stress disorder (Figley 1995: xiv), but 
it has since been applied to the idea that viewers’ emotional and practical responses to the suffering of 
others lessen after repeated exposure to it (Driessens et al. 2012: 717).  Some empirical evidence in 
support of this hypothesis has been found (Kinnick et al. 1996), but it seems to be dependent on 
individuals’ initial responses to certain issues.  If, for example, participants were initially 
unsympathetic to a certain issue, they would be more likely to report compassion fatigue over 
campaigns in relation to it than to those that they were initially sympathetic to (1996: 702).  In other 
words, we are less likely to suffer from compassion fatigue if we truly care in the first place.   
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As well as looking at what conditions prompt compassion fatigue, some researchers have also studied 
the reasons given by individuals for their (lack of) response to appeals.  This was the approach taken 
by Seu (2010), who used focus groups to explore viewers’ responses to an Amnesty International 
appeal.  She found that when viewers attempted to account for their decision not to respond to others’ 
suffering, they often argued that this suffering was being misrepresented in some way.   Seu (2010: 
443) argues that when people choose to discuss the problems with a particular campaign, it is often a 
way of deflecting responsibility for responding to its message.  According to her, criticisms of the 
representativeness of charity campaigns function to facilitate a collective denial of serious issues.  On 
the other hand, both Cohen (2001) and Boltanski (2003) see such arguments as an inevitable reaction 
by viewers to media representations that present situations as hopeless and make the reliability of their 
messages impossible to gauge.   
 
Chouliaraki (2010: 112) breaks down ‘compassion fatigue’ into two categories, one of which leaves 
the viewer feeling powerless (and therefore less likely take action) and the other which is a negative 
feeling directed at the channel or campaign.  She argues that viewers must take responsibility for the 
latter, whereas the former highlights the failings of charity media.  These two aspects appear to work 
in tandem.  In response to demands from the public to alter their messages, charities sometimes make 
their campaigns less challenging and more donor-focused (Vestergaard 2008; Chouliaraki 2010).  In 
turn, the public becomes even less tolerant of disturbing depictions of others.   
 
For charities deciding how to communicate their message, there are thus conflicting factors to take 
into account.  On the one hand, shocking, guilt-provoking scenes might create the best outcomes in 
terms of donations.  On the other hand, as these formats become familiar to audiences, they become 
less effective in evoking the desired responses as they leave viewers feeling negative not only about 
the situations shown but also towards the charities themselves as sources of this information.  When 
charities focus on the question of what communicative strategies are likely to produce the best 
financial outcomes, they are likely to become less inclined to confront viewers with realities that are 
unpleasant, but unlikely to persuade people to give.  Television companies are also reluctant to show 
images repeatedly that might deter viewers.  Commercial ownership of channels also makes them less 
likely to provoke their audiences, as vital sponsorship deals are often at stake (Gamson et al. 1992).  
Both of these pressures privilege the immediate responses of television bosses and potential donors 
over the more gradual process of educating viewers to inspire lasting change.  In these ways, the need 
to elicit support in the short-term might make the longer-term aims of charities harder to achieve. 
 
In this section, I have focussed mainly on psychological studies of charity, which use experimental 
methods to discover the conditions under which people are most likely to give. Such research 
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provides valuable insights into the mechanisms behind specific instances of giving, but it is focussed 
on solving particular problems within the process of giving, such as how to elicit donations, rather 
than on shedding light on the system as a whole.  In indicating some potential drawbacks of adopting 
approaches aimed exclusively at eliciting donations, I have briefly mentioned some studies on the 
discourse of giving.  In the following section, I look at this area of study in more detail.   
 
1.5 The discourse of charity: how is charitable action represented? 
 
So far, the studies considered here have examined charity media only insofar as it led, or failed to 
lead, to emotional responses and giving behaviours.  These responses are, however, not the only 
possible outcomes of viewing charities’ representations of others.  It is logical to assume that charity 
media contributes to the spread of ideologies in the same way that other media do.  It is this 
ideological aspect of discourse that most of the studies on charity discourse are concerned with.  Gee 
(1999: 7) highlights the contrast between ‘discourse’ understood simply as language-in-use and 
‘discourse’ used to refer to the combination of language with other social practices (behaviour, values, 
ways of thinking, etc.), by referring to the former as ‘discourse’ and to the latter as ‘Discourse’.  This 
is a useful distinction to make.  Although I will not use the capitalised form in the rest of the thesis, it 
is Discourse that I will be interested in examining and unveiling.  
 
This strand of research on charity media has been picked up by a number of scholars.  For example, 
Driessens, Joye, and Biltereyst (2012) analyse the 2010 Dutch and Flemish Haiti relief shows with a 
view to laying bare the assumptions that they make about different social actors.  They argue that the 
Dutch show in particular contains elements of patriotism, as it sought to unify nationals (2012: 720) 
and to portray the Netherlands in a positive light, while Haiti was represented with less specificity, to 
the extent that it might easily be interchanged with other beneficiary countries (2012: 721).  They also 
point out that the representation of disasters as short-term problems that can be addressed by relief aid 
is ideological in itself.  They do not, however, examine the extent to which their own readings are 
shared by the shows’ audiences.   
 
Vestergaard (2008) finds a different ideology in charity discourse.  Her analysis of an Amnesty 
International campaign (one that does not call for any specific action on the part of its audience) 
focuses on how viewers of the advert are encouraged to position themselves in relation to those 
suffering from human rights abuses.  She argues that the ad interpellates its audience as humanitarians 
(2008: 488), but, by articulating human rights abuses as something that might one day threaten them, 
rather than something that only affects others, it does so egocentrically (2008: 490).  Again, her own 
reading, which is informed by Luc Boltanski’s (1999) theory of ‘the politics of pity’, is not 
accompanied by an examination of viewers’ interpretations.  Chouliaraki (e.g. 2006a; 2006b, 2013) 
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likewise draws extensively on Boltanski’s theory of pity in a series of elaborate and thorough 
interpretations of different types of media representation of distant suffering.  She too uses close 
textual readings, rather than audience-generated data.  
 
Researchers have theorised the power balance in relationships between television programmes and 
their viewers in radically different ways.  Early theories saw the mass media as powerful manipulators 
of social signs, to which viewers were helplessly subjected (e.g. Lasswell 1927: 627).  Later work, 
such as that by Katz and Lazarsfeld (2009 [1955]), asserted the importance of a viewer’s social 
network in guiding her interpretation of media texts.  McQuail, Blumler and Brown (1972) suggested 
that we should look at the problem in a different way, focusing not on how people are influenced but 
on how individuals use the mass media to fulfil their own ends.  Hall (1980) and Morley (1980) 
argued that media texts propose certain understandings, but that viewers actively decode them in 
preferred, negotiated or oppositional ways.  Such theories have been matched by counterarguments 
reasserting the power of the mass media to shape public opinion (e.g. McCombs 2013).  Another 
strand of research has suggested that audiences with different relationships to a given topic accept the 
assumptions of mass media to different extents.  For example, Richardson (1994) found that a 
documentary programme on poverty in Britain was interpreted more sympathetically by those who 
had experienced poverty recently than by older people who had experienced poverty only in their 
youths.  As well as changes in theory, it is also likely that the reality of the power balance between the 
producers of mass media and their audience has shifted over time, particularly with the dawn of the 
Internet age.  Even if the direction of influence is unidirectional from media outlets to audiences, it is 
worth reassessing or reconfirming this influence in the form of audience research.   
 
A number of academics have sought to analyse audiences’ discursive responses to mass media 
representations of suffering.  Hoijer (2004) draws on viewer responses to violent news in order to 
explore what she describes as the ‘discourse of global compassion’, again informed by Boltanski’s 
theory of pity.  She uses participants’ self-reporting to examine the differences between male and 
female responses to distant suffering.  However, she does this without exploring the potentially 
performed aspect of these identities.  Another problem is that Hoijer interprets her interviewees’ 
reports as giving transparent access to their feelings (2004: 520).  She argues that her participants tend 
not to question the authenticity of the depictions of others they see, and that they experience 
documentaries as if they give direct access to reality (2004: 521).  Seu’s (2010) participants, by 
contrast, frequently question the reality of and motivations behind the depictions of others in the 
Amnesty campaign they are shown.  Seu (2010: 445) argues that her participants put forward critical 
views of the campaign in order to present themselves in a positive light, while accounting for their 
decision not to respond to it.  The difference between Hoijer’s and Seu’s participants in terms of their 
tendency to read the media critically can be explained at least in part by the difference in the type of 
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media they were asked to provide opinions on: Hoijer’s data were interview and focus group 
responses to television news programmes on war or in general, which are perhaps regarded as more 
objective, while Seu’s focus group participants were asked about a charity advert.  Seu (2010: 445) 
notes with frustration her participants’ cynical responses to the Amnesty appeal, in which the charity 
was represented as emotionally manipulative and categorised as being the same as other charities, 
notably including the expectation that donations would be requested (even though in this instance they 
were not).  Like Hoijer (2004), Seu seeks to uncover broader discourses through the talk produced by 
her participants.  However, by focusing on the production of accounts by her participants, Seu 
produces a more convincing analysis.  She views people as being motivated to provide socially-
acceptable reasons for their stances.  By identifying a number of ways in which arguments are put 
forward, she is also able to identify some of the reasons for not giving money that are seen as 
acceptable in this social group.  Although they analyse mediated rather than ‘everyday’ talk, Hanson-
Easey and Augoustinos (2011) adopt a similar approach.  They interpret radio talk show callers as 
being involved in acts of self-positioning, in which viewpoints that might be interpreted as prejudiced 
are softened, using what they term ‘sympathy talk’. In the methodology chapter, I explore the idea of 
accounts more fully.  For now, it is worth noting that examining talk about media has been 
instrumental in extending our knowledge about the discourse of charity.  
 
As I mentioned in section 1.4, most of the studies on charitable giving in the field of psychology are 
concerned with inter- rather than intra- national giving.  This bias is also present in the field of 
discourse studies, with many researchers studying adverts for international charities or international 
telethons, but relatively few examining intra-national giving, and those few are generally focused on 
specific issues, such as the representation of people with disabilities in charity campaigns (e.g. Barnett 
and Hammond 1999).  Many charity discourse scholars refer to Boltanski’s (1999) notion of ‘distant 
suffering’ in their analysis, often without being precise about what this notion means (e.g. Hoijer 
2004; Driessens et al. 2012; Cottle and Nolan 2007; Seu 2010).  Boltanski (1999: 5) specifies that 
‘distant suffering’ is not synonymous with international suffering and suggests that many different 
types of distance, including those which can occur between people within one country, can bring 
about a similarly detached relationship between sufferers and those who observe them.  The absence 
of literature addressing this idea is particularly significant as so many scholars engage with and 
modify the concept of ‘distant suffering’ (most notably Chouliaraki, 2013).  In chapter 3, I construct a 
framework for analysing data on intra-national giving, drawing heavily on Boltanski’s theory.  This 
framework will be suitable for application to both verbal and visual data.  In the aspect I examine in 
chapter 6 in particular, I draw on social semiotics (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996).  Although 
multimodal aspects of representations of suffering, especially visual aspects, have been analysed by 
Chouliaraki (2006: 268), I suggest that social semiotics in particular provides a means of 
operationalising abstract ideas that have been linked to pity. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a broad overview of studies on charitable giving.  I started by presenting an 
impression of the history of charity in the UK.  This revealed that, contrary to some current 
conceptions, the state and charities have, historically, often worked in tandem, if not in collaboration 
(Gente 2000).  Unlike in modern times, the virtue of reason was extolled over emotion in the 18th 
century (Ryan 2000).  It was also discovered that concerns about the reliability of representations that 
are a central concern for modern givers precede charities’ representation in the mass media.  I then 
considered the current conditions for charities operating in the UK.  Key issues included the need for 
the voluntary sector to accommodate to the shrinking welfare state (Clarke et al. 2005; Fyfe 2005), the 
proliferation of charities (Cottle and Nolan 2007) and the resulting need to become more business-like 
(Balabanis et al. 1997).  Thirdly, I explored mediated giving and indicated a number of key critiques 
of charity media events and giving as a mode of action in itself.   
In section 1.4, research on individuals’ motivations for giving was explored.  Of particular note was 
the idea that some sort of emotion, rather than reason, is involved in triggering philanthropic 
responses to others.  This led to two other important research concerns: how to trigger these emotions 
most effectively, and the degree to which these emotions might be exhaustible.  Literature on the role 
of charity media in (re)producing discourses about others was then reviewed.  I highlighted a 
significant gap in this literature: its failure to address the potential influence of representations of 
fellow nationals in charity media.  I also indicated that an important question that remains unanswered 
is whether telethons might contribute to the distancing of donors from beneficiaries or simply reflect 
the existence of this distance. 
 
Returning to the research questions put forward in the introduction, I suggest that the following more 
specific questions remain unanswered in relation to intra-national giving:    
 
What sort of relationship does CiN suggest should occur between its donors and beneficiaries? 
What effect does mediation have on this relationship? 
How does a shared national identity between these groups alter the relationship? 
What sorts of actions are presented as possible in redressing the suffering of others? 
 
As a whole, this literature review has indicated a number of tensions between different ideas about 
who should be helped and in what way.  It has also raised some questions about the distance between 
donors and recipients.  Historical research indicated that social distance between donors and recipients 
is not a necessary condition of charity, but a number of contemporary scholars have suggested that 
distance is increased by money and mediation, which are the corollaries of modern philanthropy.  In 
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chapter 3, I engage with more literature on issues of representation, and in particular on the distance 
between donors and recipients.  I build a framework for analysing my data, based on a theory that 
unites the key ideas identified in my literature review: emotion versus reason, the use money as a 
form of action, anxiety about the reliability of representations, the role of national and other group-
based identities in deciding who to help.  I outline my methodological approach in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
In this chapter, I outline the procedure I adopted to address my research questions.  I detail the 
rationale for gathering certain types of data and the means by which it was collected, transcribed and 
analysed.   In the literature review, I identified an important gap in the research on charitable giving: 
its failure to address how other members of one’s nation are represented in charity media and in 
discourse on charity more generally.  I suggested that this literature left the following questions 
inadequately answered in relation to intra-national giving, and that the present research might begin 
by attempting to address them: 
What sort of relationship does CiN suggest should occur between its donors and beneficiaries? 
What effect does mediation have on this relationship? 
How does a shared national identity between these groups alter the relationship? 
What sorts of actions are presented as possible in redressing the suffering of others? 
 
2.1 Data collection 
 
My aim was to gather data that would allow me to carry out an in-depth analysis of the discourse of 
intra-national charitable giving in the UK.  In terms of Gee’s (1999:7) distinction between ‘discourse’ 
on the one hand and ‘Discourse’ on the other, it is the latter that the present study is designed to 
access.  In other words, I am interested in the broad ways of framing issues of disadvantage that were 
circulating in UK society in 2011, rather than focusing on particular instances of communication 
about more specific topics.  Practical constraints, including a limited time scale, prevented me from 
collecting and analysing a very large data set.  Instead, I chose to select examples of different types of 
data that might indicate wider discourses, but which I would be able to subject to in-depth analysis. 
 
My decision to study a media event as well as focus group talk reflects an assumption that mass media 
have a role to play in producing and reproducing discourse on charitable giving.  Research suggests 
that other factors, such as our beliefs about the world (Harper et al. 1990) and educational 
backgrounds (McWha and Carr 2009) are likely to play an important role in how we conceive of 
disadvantaged others.  However, the way that information is presented to us also has an effect.  For 
example, when individual victims are identified, we are more motivated to relieve their suffering than 
when information about a group is presented to us (Kogut and Ritov 2005).  I therefore consider mass 
media representations to be an important influence on our attitudes towards and ways of talking about 
others. Media data on the topic of charity is plentiful, and a range of potential sources was considered, 
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including newspaper articles, printed charity flyers, television campaigns and interviews or 
questionnaires with the producers of this material.   
 
From these potential sources, I selected a UK charity telethon called ‘Children in Need’ as my 
primary source of data for the following reasons.  Despite fluctuations in the amount of money given 
by UK citizens to different charities over time, the proportion of overall giving that occurs at 
fundraising events has remained remarkably stable.  It accounts for 13% of all private donations over 
seven years of the Office for National Statistics’ survey up until 2012 (Charities Aid Foundation 
2012).  In terms of television coverage, interactive charity media events have increased in both size 
and number in the UK in recent years.  In 2002, the charity Comic Relief introduced a biennial Sport 
Relief event to supplement the Red Nose Day event that occurs on alternate years, and in 2009 
Children in Need began a series of music concerts called ‘Children in Need Rocks’ to complement 
every other Children in Need event.  Non-broadcast event days have also been increasingly used by 
charities to generate interest and donations.  Cancer Research, for example, has built on the success of 
its first ‘Race for Life’ in 1994 and now hosts over 300 events across the UK a year (Cancer Research 
2016), and Amnesty International’s Secret Policeman’s Ball events have increased in frequency since 
their reintroduction in 2006, following a 5-year hiatus.  In the UK, Comic Relief, Sport Relief and 
Children in Need are advertised in a range of media formats across the BBC, as well as in print and in 
online television guides.  They are also reported on in a wide range of national newspapers.  In terms 
of their contribution to discourses on how and why we should respond to people in need, charity 
telethons are thus potentially powerful.  
 
Children in Need is the only UK telethon that raises money exclusively for UK citizens.  It was 
therefore expected that it would play an important role in producing and reflecting the discourse of 
UK-based charitable giving.  Comic Relief, a telethon that is broadcast every other year on the same 
channel (BBC One) awards grants to both UK and overseas charities.  Although Comic Relief could 
have been used as a supplementary source of data, the timing of the two programmes (CiN takes place 
in November yearly, but following the commencement of the current project in 2011, the first Comic 
Relief show was not until March 2013), meant that this was not practical within the scope of the 
study.  My review of the literature also revealed a notable gap in the consideration of intra-national 
charities.  Analysing CiN would start to provide some understanding of this area.  
 
Depending on their theories about the distribution of power between the mass media and their 
viewers, many researchers have chosen to focus exclusively either on television programmes or the 
views of their audiences (Vestergaard 2008; Chouliaraki 2010; Seu 2010).  But even if we accept that 
producers of media texts are more powerful than their consumers, the influence of these texts should 
also be the focus of study (Hall 1993).  As I discussed in the literature review, researchers have sought 
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to address the ways in which viewers actively make sense of mass media representations of a range of 
topics (e.g. Hall 1993; Morley 1980; Richardson, 1994).  But, as I indicated, there is a dearth of 
studies combining audience research with textual and visual analyses of stimulus material in the 
‘politics of pity’ debate (Seu 2010).  Moreover, focusing exclusively on either media or audience data 
means omitting an important part of the dialogue between them (see Wood 2006 pp. 78-80 for a 
discussion of this relationship).  Therefore, I decided to supplement my media event data (the 2011 
broadcast of CiN) with a series of focus group discussions carried out with different groups in a short 
period following this broadcast.   
 
Following a number of scholars who have examined reactions to topics represented in the media 
generally, rather than to specific programmes (e.g. Atkinson, Bellis, & Sumnall 2012; Henderson 
2014; Glasgow University Media Group 1976), I sought to understand not only the ways in which my 
participants would react to a specific television programme (in this case, CiN), but how they had 
understood the topic of disadvantage in the UK more broadly.  I therefore chose to include the views 
of people who had taken the decision not to watch the programme and did not make this a prerequisite 
for participation in the focus groups.  After all, a programme can only be persuasive to the extent that 
it is watched.  Focus group participants were also not asked to watch the Children in Need programme 
after recruitment.  Indeed, no mention was made of it at all in the recruitment process, or in the initial 
questions in the focus groups themselves.  If the programme was not mentioned by the participants 
themselves, the topic was introduced by the moderator (myself) in the second half of the 
conversations (after at least 30 minutes).  As one of the central research questions concerned the 
extent to which there were similarities between the programme’s presentation of social inequality and 
the manner in which it was represented in unrelated discussions on the topic, it was important that the 
talk data should not be directly influenced by the programme.  Both sets of data represented ways of 
framing issues around social inequality at a given time and place.  All 25 focus group participants 
appeared to be aware of the event when it was mentioned.  But the decision of some participants not 
to watch it also seemed to be an important part of their framing of social inequality and how it should 
and should not be responded to.  For example, one participant stated that she would be willing to 
watch the programme for analytical purposes but would not choose to watch it for enjoyment.  A 
discussion of her reasons for not watching the programme formed part of her argument about what 
she saw as its objectionable juxtaposition of suffering and silliness (see chapter 6). 
 
Many published research articles using focus groups combine them with other methods (see Morgan 
1996: 133 for a discussion).  However, these supplementary data most commonly include in-depth 
individual interviews or surveys (1996: 133), and rarely include analyses of the source materials 
discussed in them.  As I assumed both mass media professionals and individual audience members 
would be engaged in the production and reproduction of discourses, I chose to study the discourses 
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produced by both separately, and to compare the representations of different aspects of this topic.  I 
assumed that both of these sources contributed to an ongoing discourse on the topic, albeit to different 
degrees.  Programme-makers are, after all, subject to the same influences as audience members (Gitlin 
1994: 90).  Where themes converged across these two data sources, these themes were understood as 
constituting a significant way of framing debates around intra-national charity in the UK at the current 
time.   
 
2.2 Focus group data 
 
Focus groups are better suited to the purpose of extending the range of responses collected as far as 
possible than to the aim of creating a representative sample (Macnaghten and Myers 2006: 68).  My 
approach to recruitment was primarily informed by the work of Richardson (1994), who gained a 
wide range of responses to a television representation of poverty by selecting groups of viewers based 
on their relationship to the topic rather than on their demographic features.  In order to access as many 
ways of talking about a given topic as possible, I selected groups of participants who had diverse 
relationships to UK charities.  These groups were volunteers for two different types of charity, 
campaigners for a human rights group, professional charity workers and two groups of people who 
had no explicit link to the topic of charity and whose relationship to each other was professional.   
 
In detail, these groups were: 
 
1) Current or recent student volunteers at Cardiff University, henceforth ‘Students’ 
Aged 21-27, 1 female, 3 males, including current chairperson of student volunteering organisation 
2) Office workers in a small depot in Cardiff, henceforth ‘Office’ 
Aged 40 – 59, 4 female, including one line manager 
3) Members of Cardiff Amnesty International, henceforth ‘Amnesty’ 
Aged 19 – 65, 2 female, 2 male 
4) People who were in paid employment with different registered charities based in Cardiff, 
henceforth ‘Charities’ 
Aged 24 – 31, 4 females 
5) Volunteers for ‘Pembrokeshire Cruse’, who provide bereavement counselling for adults, henceforth 
‘Counselling’  
Aged 44 – 70, 5 females, including one group supervisor 
6) Academics employed in Cardiff University, henceforth ‘Academics’ 
Aged 38 – 58, 3 female, 1 male 
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Like Richardson (1994), Atkinson et al. (2012) and Henderson (2014), I chose to conduct the focus 
groups with each of these groups separately instead of combining different groups.  This was because 
I wanted to gain access to a maximally realistic impression of these groups’ ways of discussing the 
topic (Kitzinger 1994: 105).  Four of these six sets of people came from pre-existing groups (group 3 
meet for monthly meetings, group 5 meet regularly for group supervision, and groups 2 and 6 are co-
workers), and two of them were made up of individuals who had not met, or did not usually meet 
(group 1 was recruited from a student volunteering mailing list and group 4 work for different 
charities, but were either known by the researcher, or by contacts of the researcher).  In the latter two 
cases, two of the participants in each group already knew each other.   
 
Myers (2004: 9) stresses that the researcher should not assume that participants’ opinions exist and 
can be made available to the researcher in ways that are consistent with what might be expressed in 
other contexts.  However, for the purposes of the present study, whether or not peoples’ private 
opinions exist is less relevant than the discourses participants draw upon when talking about these 
issues.  This is in line with my analytic approach (discussed in section 2.9), which rejects the idea that 
language is ‘the overt expression or manifestation of a life within’ (Edwards and Stokoe 2004: 499).   
 
As I mentioned in the introduction, all of the groups were recruited in South Wales.  CiN is UK-wide 
(although it sometimes uses the term ‘Britain’ or ‘British’ to refer to its scope).  I therefore considered 
selecting groups, or at least group members, from Scotland, England and Northern Ireland in order to 
reflect the views of people on the same scale as the programme.  However, this would have meant that 
geographical differences could also have contributed to participants’ ideas about charity, and that 
divergences between them could therefore be attributed to this, rather than to differences in their 
relationships to the topic.  I was mindful that holding focus groups in only one of the UK’s constituent 
nations might limit the generalizability of results and that participants in Wales, for example, might 
view Wales, rather than the UK, as a more meaningful political unit.  However, Wales was mentioned 
only rarely as a scope for action and the Welsh Government was only discussed when one group 
considered the possible impact of education policy on social inequality.       
 
Focus groups were carried out during a period of ten days following the Children in Need broadcast.  
This meant that both the telethon and talk data were taken from a relatively small window of time.  
This was done in order to minimise the effects of time differences on the data, so that intervening 
events would be less likely to produce differences between the groups, and between the talk and 
telethon data.  I also thought it likely that recording conversations about disadvantage shortly after 
Children in Need would make it more likely that talk about the programme (and / or reports about it) 
would occur in this data.  This time limit introduced an additional constraint on the organisation of 
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focus groups, but it was successful in minimising the impact of this potential variable, as none of the 
groups discussed media events that had occurred since the CiN broadcast, apart from in the Charities 
group, in which a programme broadcast four days after the event was briefly discussed.   
 
2.3 Why focus groups? 
 
Although the format of focus groups as a method of accessing people’s views originated in market 
research, they have since been used in a variety of academic studies to generate data, either as the 
only data for analysis or to supplement other forms of research (Morgan 1997: 3).  One of the reasons 
that this technique is so popular is that the data obtained seems to be more similar to that of naturally-
occurring speech than that obtained in interviews, for example.  Naturally-occurring talk is very 
difficult to obtain.  Ethical considerations require that speakers are made aware of their speech being 
recorded and their talk is likely to be influenced by this (Golato 2003: 97).  Furthermore, it is very 
difficult to acquire naturally-occurring talk on a given topic without recording an unwieldy amount of 
data.  
 
It is worth bearing in mind, however, that focus group talk is different from everyday talk in a number 
of important ways (Myers 1998: 87).  For instance, many focus groups bring together groups of 
people who have not met before.  This has a number of consequences for the resulting interactions.  
Firstly, the situation is fairly unusual.  People do of course come into contact with strangers, but, with 
the exception of some work and educational settings, it is relatively rare that a whole group of 
individuals is required to interact when they are all unknown to each other.  Secondly, constructing 
groups in which members do not know each other means that there are fewer consequences for the 
relationships of participants of expressing their views, which might mean that they discuss these 
topics quite differently in this setting than they would elsewhere (Myers 1998: 87).  For example, it 
has been found that more ideas are generated in groups when participants are not acquainted with 
each other than when they are (Fern 1982: 10).  In my own study only two of the groups (the Students 
and Charities groups) were recruited from a pool of people who did not necessarily know each other.  
Both of these groups contained members who had met before, albeit infrequently.  As it turned out, 
these individuals, as is common with many focus groups, consisted of people living in a similar 
geographical location, with similar interests or occupations, so the need to manage potential 
relationships between them would be no less pressing than in other settings.   
 
Speer (2002: 512) suggests that concerns about ‘contaminating’ data with researcher bias should be 
neglected altogether and that the interview or focus group can be regarded as an interaction in its own 
right, although it is not necessarily an accurate reflection of what goes on beyond it.  It is in this spirit 
that I collected and interpreted my own data.  I assumed that the ways in which the participants 
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expressed their ideas about the topic in the focus groups would be similar to how they would have 
expressed these ideas in other settings, but my analysis did not depend on the way that speakers 
interacted in this setting being entirely ‘natural’.  What I sought to uncover were ways of expressing 
arguments about social inequality or disadvantage that might circulate in society, rather than focusing 
on how these particular participants expressed their ideas with other people.     
 
I carried out focus groups rather than interviews because I wanted to access participants’ ways of 
talking about these issues in a conversation, while minimising the effect of my own way of framing 
them (Morgan 1997: 3).  Focus groups are commonly described as a more egalitarian method than 
interviews in their attempt to balance the roles of moderator and participant (Puchta and Potter 1999: 
316).  The moderator facilitates, rather than controls, the development of the conversation (Krueger 
1998: 2).  This dissemination of power should mean that topics are selected by participants as well as 
the moderator, so that themes that are not anticipated by the researcher would be more likely to appear 
in the data.  Conversely, it also means that the data collected could deviate substantially from the 
focus of the study, if the talk is insufficiently directed by the moderator.  I discuss this further under 
section 2.7. 
 
2.4 Recruitment and incentives 
 
The groups were recruited by a variety of means.  In all but the Charities group, I made contact via 
one individual within an organisation, who forwarded information on to other potential participants.  
Such ‘gatekeepers’ are often vital in ensuring the success of recruitment procedures (Minichiello et al. 
1990).  Student volunteers were recruited by way of an email sent to Student Volunteering Cardiff’s 
contact list by the president of this organisation.  The Office group were recruited via the Operational 
Manager of the organisation, who agreed to send an email to employees asking them to participate.  In 
the case of the Amnesty group and the Counselling volunteers, contact was made through one group 
member, who asked other members to take part.  Employees of charities in Cardiff were recruited by 
utilising my network of existing contacts and their contacts, via an advertisement on Facebook.  At 
recruitment stage, contributors were told only that the study would involve a focus group discussion 
on social inequality.   
 
A donation of £30 was made to the Pembrokeshire Cruse charity in return for their volunteers’ time, 
and a donation of £10 was made to each of the Charities group’s respective charities.  Lunch was 
provided for the Office group.  The other groups were not paid in any way for their participation.  
This variation might be considered important because particular personality characteristics have been 
associated with voluntary participation in research (Martin and Marcuse 1958).  Across different types 
of research, volunteers have been found to be significantly more intelligent than non-volunteers, and 
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other personality traits have been found to differ between volunteers and non-volunteers for a range of 
types of study (1958: 478).  Given the subject under investigation, this might seem particularly 
important.  But none of the participants was personally financially rewarded for his or her 
participation.  The Charities group, however, was the most inconvenienced of any of the groups, as 
they attended the focus groups at a different time and place from their work or voluntary activities.  
Mindful that this might make it more difficult for me to recruit an adequate number of participants, I 
wanted to maximise people’s willingness to take part by offering an incentive.  As the Counselling 
group were using some of their weekly supervision time to take part, I also wanted to show my 
appreciation to the charity for allowing me to use its volunteers’ time in this way. 
 
At both the recruitment stage and at the opening and closings of the group discussions, I expressed my 
gratitude for the participants’ help with the study.  Given the nature of my enquiry, I was aware that it 
was unlikely that the findings would be directly beneficial to my participants.  I was, however, keen to 
stress what I saw as the collaborative nature of the process.  Although I did not involve the 
participants in the research design, their contribution to the discussions informed my analysis of both 
their talk and, to a certain extent, CiN.   
 
2.5 Anonymity and ethical approval 
 
As collecting focus group data means working with people, I was required by Cardiff University to 
submit an ethical approval form to an ethics officer. As my research did not involve vulnerable 
individuals or use any deception, this was a relatively straightforward process.  However, as the 
University guidelines indicate, ethical considerations should involve reflection, and can never be 
completely resolved.  Having to engage in this process made me more aware of the potential impact 
my study might have on my participants, which I consider below. 
 
Cardiff University’s ethical policy is built around three key ideas: obtaining informed consent from 
participants; conducting risk-benefit analyses; and peer review.  There are several stages in the 
research process where ethical issues might have arisen.  Firstly, during data collection, the immediate 
effects of taking part in the focus group were considered.  The physical risks to my participants were 
minimal, but it was possible that there could be emotional consequences of taking part.  As the topic 
to be discussed was a potentially emotive one, and for some groups involved co-workers or managers, 
it was possible that participants could feel uncomfortable about sharing their opinions or about having 
these recorded.  Informed consent was obtained by means of asking all participants to sign the form in 
appendix 1.  This highlighted participants’ right to withdraw from the study at any time without being 
questioned, as well as detailing as fully as possible what participants could expect to happen in the 
session, and how the data would be used. 
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In addition to considering the possible impact of the focus groups on participants, it was also 
necessary to reflect on the possible implications of the use of the data generated in them at a later 
stage in the research process.  Tisdale (2004: 28) describes research participants as ‘vulnerable’ in this 
respect.  Firstly, what participants say can be open to misrepresentation, in terms of either factual 
accuracy or of how they would like to be seen.  In either case, when research participants read what 
they think of as inaccurate or negative representations of themselves by researchers, it can cause 
considerable distress.  Secondly, the way that data is represented in research papers can lead to 
negative consequences for participants, such as reinforcing negative stereotypes of certain groups for 
those who read it (2004: 28). 
 
My approach to the data also meant that I was likely to interpret some of the talk in ways that the 
participants themselves might not be happy with.  I was interested in the ways of talking about the 
issue that participants drew on and I assumed that these discourses were in some ways independent of 
the individuals themselves.  This stance, however, made it likely that people might feel 
misrepresented by an analysis of what they said and might find some of the inferences that I drew, for 
example about the metaphors they used, offensive.  Using data in a way that does not sit well with 
participants is often an issue where multiple stakeholders are involved and it sometimes means 
making a decision about where one’s primary responsibilities lie.  For example, when carrying out 
research within a school setting, Sleeter (1996: 55) decided that, in situations where the needs of 
teachers and pupils were incompatible, she would present her work in a way that benefitted the 
children.  In my own research I identify broadly disadvantaged groups, both within and outside the 
UK, as my primary concern.  I therefore wanted to find the right balance between respecting my 
participants and reporting on the potentially unhelpful ways in which they might speak about such 
disadvantaged groups.  One way in which the needs of participants could be protected is by 
anonymising not only their own names but also the names of the places that they mention when these 
relate to their everyday lives (Saunders, Kitzinger and Kitzinger 2015: 8).  I have done this wherever I 
thought it possible that personal details could be gleaned from the transcript.  Anonymity is never 
absolute, and deductive disclosure (Kaiser 2009: 1632) can occur whenever any identifying 
characteristics of individuals or groups mean that they can be recognized from transcripts or reports.  
In my case, the occupation, either professional or voluntary, of my participants, particularly in 
combination with their location, is the feature most likely to compromise their anonymity.  In many 
cases, the groups I recruited were from a relatively small pool of people.  However, not disclosing this 
information would risk compromising the usefulness of the data as a representation of these 
participants’ ways of framing the issues (Saunders et al. 2015: 1).  This is a factor that is almost 
always in tension with maintaining anonymity (Scott 1998).  I could have chosen to refer, for 
example, to the Amnesty group as ‘a local human rights activist group’, but this would hardly broaden 
 
 
46 
 
the scope of possible participants, or as ‘a local campaigning group’, but this would give too little 
information about how to interpret their responses.  There might be situations where these 
participants’ membership of this particular group, rather than a political organisation for example 
might be relevant.  As well as anonymising the transcripts I produced from these recordings in terms 
of both participants’ names (leaving only their gender the same) and the names and locations that they 
mentioned, I protected their data by storing the audio recordings of the discussions securely on my 
private computer. 
 
Saunders et al. (2015) suggest that the question of what to anonymise can form a helpful part of the 
interview process when dealing with very sensitive data, such as in their own study about patients in a 
vegetative state.  In my own data, the topics covered are of a much less sensitive nature, both morally 
and legally, and the focus group format drastically changes the nature of the interaction, in the sense 
that participants are less likely to disclose information that they would like to remain private.  On the 
other hand, if participants had raised sensitive topics, it would also have been more difficult to discuss 
what they would like to happen with the data than in a one-to-one interaction.  Another way of 
allowing participants to maintain some control over the use of their data is to allow them to read and 
comment on the analysis and to give them the option of withdrawing their consent if they disagree 
with it.  I therefore gave each of my participants written information detailing the reason for their 
participation in the study and offering them a copy of any findings and the opportunity to ask further 
questions (see appendix 2).  None of the participants took this opportunity, and I therefore concluded 
that they were not concerned about this aspect of the study.   
 
2.6 Setting 
 
The implications of using different settings for focus groups or interviews are well-documented (e.g. 
Macnaghten and Myers 2009: 67; Elwood and Martin 2000).  Some focus group guides suggest that a 
‘neutral’ setting should be sought, even though, in terms of power relations and associations, all 
places carry connotations (e.g. Gibbs 1997, Longhurst 2003: 109).  I was keen to minimise 
inconvenience to participants and to elicit conversation as much like the groups might have had 
without my presence as possible.  I therefore decided that it would be advantageous to meet as many 
of the groups as possible at both the places and the times that they would normally meet.  I met the 
Students in a room in the Students’ Union on a weekday at lunchtime; Office workers came to their 
workplace informal meeting room at lunchtime on a work day; the Amnesty group met in a room in 
the building that they hold their meetings in, directly after a meeting; the Counselling volunteers 
agreed for me to join them in the church hall used for regular supervision meetings directly after one 
of these meetings; and the Academics met me in a room in the department where they were based, at 
the end of a working day.  This arrangement was not possible for the Charities group.  Because they 
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work at different locations, and their hours of work also vary, I found it too difficult to arrange a 
meeting either on a weekday at lunchtime or at the end of a working day.  Instead, I arranged to meet 
these individuals in a room at Cardiff University Graduate Centre on a Saturday afternoon.  This was 
an easy location for all of the participants to access, and the room used was quiet and had chairs and 
tables, but no other particular markers of a university setting.  As one of the participants mentioned in 
this group, they had all attended university at some point in the past, so this sort of setting was also 
likely to be familiar to them.  In line with the ethos of accessing data in a relatively egalitarian way 
that focus groups can provide, the participants in all groups sat in chairs in a circular formation with 
the moderator, as recommended by Stewart and Shamdasani (2014: 98).  This maximised eye contact 
and allowed interactions between all members of the group. 
 
2.7 Questions  
 
As the aim of the research was to examine the discourse of charitable giving in the UK, I was 
interested in the extent to which charities appeared to be considered the best or most obvious avenue 
for redressing certain problems.  I therefore decided not to start the focus groups by talking about 
charity, but to open up a discussion about the sorts of problems that charities might want to address 
and see whether participants made this link of their own accord.  In particular, I wanted to obtain data 
that showed the similarities or differences between CiN’s presentation of the situation it sought to 
redress and the everyday discussion of similar issues.  I therefore sought to phrase my initial questions 
in line with Children in Need’s remit.  Both online and on television, Children in Need’s objectives 
are stated only in vague terms.  As a grant-giving organisation, their beneficiaries are only identified 
after the money has been raised.  Applicants are advised that grants are awarded to ‘children and 
young people of 18 years and under experiencing disadvantage through: illness, distress, abuse or 
neglect; any kind of disability; behavioural or psychological difficulties or; living in poverty or 
situations of deprivation’ (Children in Need 2014).  This statement encompasses a wide range of 
situations, with the only uniting term being ‘disadvantage’.  I therefore decided to base my opening 
question around the idea of redressing ‘disadvantage’, or the difference between people who are 
‘disadvantaged’ and those who are not.  I also made reference to the narrative of ‘fairness’ that had 
been a major part of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s rhetoric since their election in 
2010 (e.g. BBC Election News broadcast 2010).  It was formulated as an ‘elaborate question’ (Puchta 
and Potter 1999) in order to maximise the range of potential responses: 
 
(As you know,) I’m interested in your opinions about social inequality.  There’s a lot of talk about 
‘fairness’ and building a ‘fair society’, which assumes that society isn’t fair.  So I’d like to put it to 
you – would you agree / say that society isn’t ‘fair’?  And if so, do you think it should be?  And if so, 
how do you think that could happen?  What do you think would need to change? 
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Although all focus groups were initiated with the same question, subsequent questions were used as 
guide and followed loosely, depending on when and which topics were raised by participants.  The 
questions were: 
 
Who should have help in society? 
Who is responsible for people in a disadvantaged position? (themselves / us / government / their 
networks of family and friends) 
What do you think should be done to help disadvantaged people? 
How about charitable giving? 
How about events like Children In Need that took place on Friday? 
 
Additional questions about themes that emerged were also asked whenever I wanted to elicit more 
information on a topic.  These were often guided by the comments of participants in other groups.  For 
example, Amy’s phrasing in the Students group inspired a question I later asked in in the Counselling 
group, when Sara mentioned equality of opportunity: 
 
Students group, original line numbers 21 – 23 (see appendix 5) 
 
1 Amy is equality of opportunity fair (.) or is there equality of opportunity? 
2 Ben                [I suppose it depends   [yes 
3 Amy or is (laugh) is it (.) should it be equality of outcome  
 
 
Counselling group, original line numbers 79 and 115-119 (see appendix 9) 
 
1 Sara  [or uh you know equality of opportunity (.) what a joke  […] 
 
And later 
 
2 HL hmm (2.0) hmm (.) so (to Sara) you mentioned then the the phrase 
3  ‘equality of opportunity’ (.) um (.) and- is that what seen as as being (1.5) 
4  important about equality that (.) you’re providing everybody with the 
5  same starting-point or the same opportunities or (.) you know (.) would 
6  you broaden that out to kind of (.) equality of outcome  
 
It is difficult to strike a balance between guiding participants to produce data that will answer one’s 
research questions on the one hand and discouraging them from contributing in ways that have not 
been anticipated on the other.  While the researcher’s agenda inevitably drives some aspects of data 
collection, it should nevertheless be possible for participants to provide unanticipated answers that 
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could be equally informative.  The benefits of ‘off-topic’ focus group talk have been documented (e.g. 
Franz 2011).  However, the literature on focus groups frequently makes reference to the practice of 
guiding participants away from the discussion of ‘irrelevant topics’ (e.g. Puchta and Potter 1999: 317, 
Krueger 1998: 42).  This is a problematic concept in that it assumes that topics that are not anticipated 
by the researcher are ‘irrelevant’ to the research, as Briggs (1984: 23) points out: ‘Mr. [sic] Córdova 
“wandered off the point,” that is, gained control of topical selection’.  Although it is important that 
participants are able to reveal their own framings of the topic without these being dismissed, the 
balance between allowing for unanticipated contributions on the one hand and talk unrelated to the 
topic on the other is a difficult one to strike.  
 
In terms of raising the topics I had hoped participants would discuss, some of the groups were much 
easier to steer than others.  The Students were particularly willing to discuss topics that I was 
interested in exploring at that point in the study, whereas the Amnesty group’s responses frequently 
deviated both from what I had discussed with the other groups and from what I had expected them to 
talk about.  In particular, their primary interest seemed to lie in discussing educational policies within 
Wales and how these led to and reinforced social inequality.  I had expected them to focus more on 
international inequities because of their membership of a group that is primarily devoted to 
challenging sentences and human rights laws in other countries.  My interjections in this discussion 
were therefore more obviously designed to steer the conversation in a certain direction than those in 
other focus groups.  For example:  
 
Amnesty group, original line numbers 278 – 287 (see appendix 7) 
 
1 HL so if we were to kind of broaden it out and say (.) uh I mean I don’t 
2  know if if you would define society as being (.) primarily (.) Welsh or (.) 
3  British or (.) whatever (1.0) but (.) but say if you were to take it (.) it kind 
4  of (.) wider and kind of think about people (.) that you would think of as 
5  being (1.0) disadvantaged (.) in some way I don’t know what sort of  
6  groups you would identify them as but (.) um (.) I don’t know whether- are  
7  there issues other than education (1.0) that (2.5) kind of cause social  
8  inequality? (.) as far as you’re concerned? (2.5) 
 
And later: 
Amnesty group, original line numbers 717 - 729 
 
1 HL     [can I (.) can I sorry reel you back a little 
2  bit again about um (1.0) uh maybe not stressing (laughing) maybe quite 
3  so much on education (.) primarily (.) um 
4 Kim            [(laugh) 
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5 Sam (laughing) we’ve got a bee in our bonnet about that if you’ve noticed 
6 HL      [(laugh)                [um (.)  
7  but (.) um (1.0) I was just kind of wondering (.) if (.) there are kind of 
8  other things that (.) you know I mean (1.0) obviously in our society that’s 
9  quite a- a- an important issue (.) um (.) but also kind of maybe that there 
10  are groups that (.) you know for whom (.) that isn’t even an issue (.) like  
11  the- you know whereas you were saying kind of the people who don’t 
12  have access to healthcare (.) or (1.0) you know even maybe even food (.) 
13  or (.) you know whatever (.) um and (.) you kind of (.) 
14 Tara             [hmm shelter yeah 
 
My own interjections here appeared somewhat hesitant and apologetic.  Although this style is more or 
less natural to me, I was also aware of presenting myself in a way that would minimise the likelihood 
of participants responding to me as a privileged member of the group, which was particularly difficult 
at points where I was attempting to direct the conversation. 
 
These extended questions are a marked departure from those I asked in other groups, for example, in 
the Students group: 
 
Students group, original line numbers 537 - 538 (see appendix 5) 
 
1 HL so (.) you’re saying (.) you know if if everybody had the the wo- the kind 
2  of ‘what can I do?’ (1.0) um what what do you think they could do? (2.0) 
 
Whereas in the extracts from the Amnesty group, I put my questions in a number of ways and hedged 
my contribution heavily (in extract 1: ‘I don’t know’, lines 1-2, ‘kind of’, lines 3-4, ‘I don’t know’, 
line 5, in extract 2: ‘sorry’, line 1, ‘a little’ line 1, ‘maybe’ line 2, ‘maybe quite so much’, lines 2-3, 
‘kind of’, twice on line 7, ‘maybe’, line 9, ‘maybe’, line 12), in the Students group, I quoted one of the 
participants’ contributions and asked them a direct question about it. 
 
There are other important ways in which the focus groups varied, for example in their settings, times 
and in the types of group dynamic that already existed between members, as discussed above.  While 
they were not intended to be identical in terms of the questions I asked, it is worth bearing in mind 
that there were differences in how talk was elicited within the groups when reading and/or analysing 
the data. 
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2.8 Transcription 
 
I transcribed selected extracts of CiN for the first hour and a half of the broadcast.  After repeated 
viewings of the programme, I decided that this 90 minute section would provide an appropriate source 
of examples to analyse in more detail, as many of the extracts shown in this first section are repeated 
later on in the show, and new content, particularly showing beneficiaries, is shown less frequently 
beyond this point.  The hour between 8pm and 9pm also constitutes ‘prime time’ television in the UK 
(TV Licensing 2011), meaning that it is the time that is likely to be viewed by the greatest number of 
people.  I transcribed the show using multiple modes, including screenshots and verbal descriptions of 
nonverbal sounds, such as music and applause.  Consideration of images adds an important dimension 
to the analysis of television or film texts; these media privilege the visual over other modes of 
representation (Chouliaraki 2005: 145). How such multimodal texts are transcribed has an important 
impact on the sort of analysis that can be produced from them (Bezemer and Mavers 2011).  I selected 
what I considered to be representative stills from the range of shots that occurred at given times in the 
programme, rather than those that occurred at regular intervals.  In this way, I paid more attention to 
sections of the programme that I thought were relevant to my research questions (those in which 
beneficiaries and / or fundraisers were represented) than I did to those that were less likely to be the 
focus of analysis (such as entertainment scenes performed in various BBC studios).  This selective 
rather than regular capture of shots allowed me to include what seemed to be important images for the 
analysis, even if these fell between certain intervals.  I also verbally transcribed only the sections of 
the programme that I was interested in analysing in more depth.  As a result of this selectivity, the 
transcript was less likely to be replicable by other researchers, or by myself at another time, than if I 
had transcribed the whole section verbally and reproduced the still images that occurred for example 
at 5 second intervals.  Transcription is always to some extent a selective process, which is led by the 
researcher’s aims and biases in the same ways that analysis is (Coates and Thornborrow 1999).  In 
terms of the CiN data, I gained an impression of the text via multiple viewings, and my transcription 
was guided by impressions I had already gained from the text itself.  My method of transcription 
made this process easier and more time-efficient.   
 
In order to make my analysis on the basis of this transcript transparent, I have reproduced sections of 
the transcript in its original form in my analysis chapters.  Some researchers, while acknowledging the 
importance of analysing images, nevertheless present their visual data by verbally describing scenes.    
Flewitt et al. (2009: 54) argue that the question of whether such a practice is acceptable remains 
unresolved, and point out that the different media for presenting research will dictate to some extent 
whether this decision is in the hands of the researcher or not.  Some journals, for example, do not 
accept pictures, whereas other journals and many books do.  The verbal description of images, 
however, re-imposes linguistic primacy and the resulting information can only be a partial 
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representation of what has been analysed.  Different modes have different affordances (i.e. ways of 
making meaning (e.g. Kress and van Leeuwen 2002: 355)), so visualising verbal data or describing 
visual data verbally inevitably leaves out some of the nuances of the original mode, a process referred 
to as ‘transduction’ (Bezemer and Mavers 2011: 196).  One possible shortcoming of my research 
method is that I did not visually record my focus group conversations and therefore only analysed the 
CiN data multimodally.  However, I felt that this discrepancy would occur in either case, as the type 
of multimodal analysis I undertake in examining the CiN data is markedly different from the analysis 
of gestures, facial expressions and movement of people that recording the focus groups would have 
allowed.   
 
I transcribed all of the focus group conversations in full, using conventions adapted from O’Connell 
and Kowal (1995) (see appendix 3).  These conventions require timing pauses, providing information 
about overlapping talk, and signalling minimal responses.  Such features are not usually relevant for 
discourse analysis of the type I intended to carry out in this thesis, and, as each of the conversations 
took around one hour, this was a relatively labour-intensive activity.  However, I felt that, at what has 
been argued constitutes the first stage in the analytic process (Coates and Thornborrow 1999, Ochs 
1979), it was important to include as much potentially relevant information as possible.  Another 
advantage to transcribing the data in such detail is that it allows and requires the researcher to listen to 
the recordings in detail a number of times.  This results in the researcher becoming acquainted with all 
parts of the data, rather than simply those that initially stand out as being related to the topic she is 
researching.  Whether or not this resulted in a better or more accurate representation of the data in my 
analysis than I would have achieved from transcribing only parts of the conversations, it certainly 
gave me a more thorough understanding of the conversations as a whole.  In the analytic chapters, I 
will keep this detail in the extracts that I reproduce, in order to give the reader as much information 
about the nature and context of each utterance as possible.  This has the disadvantage that the 
resulting transcripts might be more difficult to read (Ochs 1979: 69).  However, in some instances, the 
analysis is informed by the way in which participants performed their utterances.  For example, the 
difference between statements made markedly quietly or with hesitations, and those made loudly, with 
emphasis on certain words, is considered indicative of the degree of certainty or conviction with 
which the participants have chosen to perform these utterances.   
 
2.9 Method of analysis  
 
Many aspects of the method employed were informed by Grounded Theory, an approach in which the 
researcher allows the data, rather than her own agenda, to dominate the analysis (Charmaz 1995).  
Data collection was carried out early in the project.  The literature review was carried out later, and it 
was thus guided by themes identified in the data (1995: 28).  Although focus groups were carried out 
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within a short period of time, some questions asked in later focus groups were informed by themes 
that emerged during the first groups (as discussed above).  Analysis likewise drew on Grounded 
Theory ideas, such as close reading of the data, to develop codes from the data, rather than using 
‘preconceived hypotheses’ to judge which parts of it were relevant for the analysis (1995: 32).  I did 
not code each line of the data, although several close, line-by-line readings of the transcripts were 
carried out in order to ascertain what the most relevant categories seemed to be.  Codes identified 
were then used to revisit extant data, but not to gather more data from participants. I identified codes 
on a number of topics, and found that the overarching narrative behind most of these topics was of a 
description of various types and levels of distance between the donors and recipients of charitable 
action.  After I identified this meta-theme, I revisited the literature and developed a detailed analytic 
framework for isolating a number of aspects of the data, which I outline in the following chapter.  
 
The approach I took in analysing my data was broadly a discourse analytic one.  I chose this approach 
because I assumed that semiotic processes around charitable giving could potentially play a role in 
shaping the distribution of social goods amongst different parties (Gee 1999:2).  In other words, 
encoding charity messages in certain ways is likely to affect the way that people think about, and, 
ultimately, act in relation to the people portrayed in them (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997).  In this 
way, I regard language (and other modes of communication) as political rather than merely 
descriptive.  Critical Discourse Analysis has proven useful for researchers seeking to uncover power 
imbalances between different social groups.  In my study, however, I did not wish to place myself 
firmly on the side of the less powerful group, such as CiN’s beneficiaries, and to advocate for their 
emancipation, which is the explicit aim of some CDA theorists (Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak 
2011: 358).  Although, as stated above, my interest in this thesis is in the ways that disadvantaged 
groups were being represented, what counts as disadvantage is relative and is frequently under 
negotiation, especially in the focus group data.  I therefore wanted to use a method of analysis that 
was capable of responding to this flexibility, and to avoid projecting a fixed agenda onto the data from 
the outset.  
 
Both the CiN and focus group talk data were analysed primarily in terms of discourse analytic 
concepts.  In particular, I drew upon ideas associated with Rhetorical Discourse Analysis (Arribas-
Ayllon et al. 2013).  Rhetorical Discourse Analysis (or ‘RDA’) suggests, rather than prescribes, what 
aspects of language should be focussed on.  The list of possible foci provided by Arribas-Ayllon et al. 
(2013: 57, below) is not exhaustive, and I also used complementary concepts, for example from 
discursive psychology, in my analysis.  Indeed, I agree with Gee (1999: 6) that discourse analytic 
concepts should act as ‘thinking devices’, rather than as constraints.  I made use of the foci RDA 
offered in ways that were useful in interrogating the data, rather than seeing it as a rigid system to be 
followed.  The decision as to which tools were selected as relevant was shaped by the data itself.   
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Different types of analysis not only highlight the importance of distinct features of language, such as 
metaphor or contrast devices, but they also make different assumptions about the underlying 
motivations and discursive goals of the social actors who use them.  In both Rhetorical Discourse 
Analysis and Discursive Psychology, communicators are understood to be impelled to create 
favourable impressions of themselves.  Discursive Psychology (Edwards and Potter 1992) takes the 
courtroom as its prototypical setting.  It assumes that participants are individual actors who are 
motivated to put across convincing versions of events that portray them in the best possible light.  
Similarly, RDA views speakers as people who wish to represent themselves as responsible and 
knowledgeable actors, although its prototypical setting is clinical, rather than legal. 
 
In their proposal of what should constitute RDA, Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2013) focus on ‘accounts’ that 
are provided by speakers in interaction.  After Billig, they see accounts as a pervasive social activity 
(2013: 57), as opposed to viewing them as remedial actions (Goffman 2010 [1971], Buttny 1993, 
Scott and Lyman 1968).  Although these authors are primarily concerned with accounts given by 
individuals, they state that ‘beyond individual actions, accounts reflect culturally embedded normative 
explanations’ (2013: 58).  In other words, what is given and accepted as an adequate account indicates 
what the priorities and normative practices of the society might be, because ‘individuals project a 
version of self that emulates or upholds the standards and competencies of [a] given society’ (2013: 
59).  Van Dijk (1992), for example, draws attention to the use of denial of racism in racist talk as a 
means of creating a favourable impression of the speaker.  Cohen (2001: 59) argues that a knowledge 
of what accounts are acceptable are instilled in individuals as part of socialisation. 
 
Influenced by the work of Garfinkel (1967), Arribas-Ayllon et al. argue that a society’s value system 
is constantly in the process of being produced and reproduced (2013: 79).  This means that an account 
that is initially unacceptable might gradually become acceptable through a process of its being used 
repeatedly or by powerful discourse participants.  Seeing moral discourse as something that is 
constantly in flux and under negotiation means that the findings of a study such as my own might be 
valid only for a limited amount of time.  On the other hand, it also means that the instances of 
communication that I have studied could potentially be part of a process that not only reflects but also 
changes the moral order.  The two key aspects of Rhetorical Discourse Analysis that are relevant to 
the present study are its view of communication as influencing as well as influenced by the society it 
takes place in and its emphasis on the idea that speakers orient to notions of morality.  In my own 
data, I have interpreted both CiN and participants’ communication as attempts to account for their 
stance in relation to others.     
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When analysing the data, I have considered how a number of ‘rhetorical devices’ (Arribas-Ayllon 
2013: 70) were used to create accounts that were projected as valid.  Rhetorical devices are the 
‘analytic themes’ of RDA.  They include:  
 
Character work, which is how people depict others in conversation, in order to provide justification 
for the attitudes and actions they take in regard to them (2013: 69). 
Event work, which means how situations are described in ways that justify certain behaviours, for 
example by describing an event as an exception or as the norm (2013: 69.). 
Framing borrows from Goffman’s (1981:71) notion, referring to a person’s ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ or ‘definition of the situation’. 
Footing is a related concept, in which interactants have a shared ‘ground’, or understanding of the 
nature and purpose of a given interaction.  This shared ‘footing’ can be shifted by a participant in the 
exchange, so that the function of the conversation changes (Goffman 1981: 125).  For example, an 
interviewer might speak about the weather to an interviewee, in which case both people understand 
that the conversation between them is informal.  If the interviewer then signals verbally or otherwise 
that the interview has begun, this is a change in footing. 
Metaphor is a means by which certain ideas are expressed by reference to something else, in order to 
highlight some aspects of the situations and to obscure others. 
Contrast devices are the means by which people explain how they have categorised a person or thing 
in a particular way (2013: 75) 
Modalization refers to the construction of an idea of facticity or probability, for example by use of 
modal adverbs (probably, possibly, definitely), modal verbs (must, can, should), hedges (‘sort of’, 
‘kind of’) (2013: 68) and ‘Extreme Case Formulations’ (Pomerantz 1986), which are expressions 
using words such as ‘all’ or ‘every’ in order to validate a claim. 
Reported speech and constructed dialogue, in which the voices of others are used, either to ‘bolster 
and legitimize [one’s] claim’ (2013: 75) or to offer an alternative view that is presented as self-
evidently ridiculous (2013: 76). 
 
In each of my analysis chapters, I focus on a number of these rhetorical devices, as appropriate to the 
nature of the discourse I select for consideration.  The potential drawback of using this analytic focus, 
as with the use of any investigative lens, is that it draws attention to some aspects of the data and 
omits others.  A further limitation of any qualitative analysis is that its findings are inherently 
subjective (Starks and Brown Trinidad 2007: 1376).  In order to ensure that the analysis produced was 
as rigorous and reliable as possible, I was reflexive about my own role in the process (Finlay 2002).  
In the analytic chapters, I provide extensive evidence for the claims I make, thereby allowing the 
reader to judge for herself the trustworthiness of the arguments presented (Starks and Brown Trinidad 
2007: 1376). 
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Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I have detailed how my research questions have informed my choice to look in detail 
at one charity telethon and to supplement the data generated from it with focus group discussions by 
potential viewers.  I have set out my rationale for studying Britain’s only intra-national media event, 
Children in Need, and for garnering a wide range of potential responses to this programme (including 
the decision not to watch it).  I have also given detailed information about the procedure I used in 
recruiting participants for these focus groups, including the potential ethical implications.  Finally, I 
have presented an overview of Rhetorical Discourse Analysis, my chosen method of analysis, as well 
as my justification for selecting this approach.  In the following chapter, I turn to literature that is 
focused on the topic of representations of others in order to provide an analytic framework for 
addressing my research questions.  
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Chapter 3: Pity, Spectacle and Distance: 
Developing a Framework for Studying Mediated National Giving 
 
In the literature review, I outlined a number of debates that have taken place around charitable giving 
since it was first recorded.  In the present chapter I develop a detailed framework for analysing my 
own data, which is informed by my research questions and by key ideas that have emerged in this 
field.  This chapter therefore represents a shift in focus, away from considering charitable giving in 
general, to looking specifically at how charities communicate their ideas and how people talk about 
the sorts of issues that charities seek to address.  I start by exploring the notion of pity, which 
encompasses several of the key ideas discussed in the literature review, namely: a) the role (if any) of 
emotion in charitable giving, b) the use of money as a form of action, c) the sight of suffering and 
associated ideas about the reliability of representations, and d) the role of group-based identities in 
deciding whom to help.  I then draw on theories from a number of fields in order to develop one 
under-researched aspect of this idea that is particularly salient in the intra-national giving context: the 
concept of distance.   
 
3.1 Pity 
 
Charitable giving has often been linked to notions of pity (Balaji 2011; Barnett and Hammond 1999; 
Littler 2008).  The association between feeling pity and donating lies at the heart of one of the most 
difficult ethical dilemmas for many charities.  There is a great deal of evidence that when we feel pity 
for another person we are more likely to respond by donating money to a cause that might help them 
(Stockdale and Farr 1987).  Evoking pity, however, is often perceived to be at odds with the ideal of 
valuing all people consistently and integrating them into society as equal members (Eayrs and Ellis 
1990), which is an over-arching goal for many charities.  This tension between the need to attract 
funding in the short term and the desire for change in the long-term makes marketing them 
particularly difficult (Stride 2006). 
 
In the context of research on charitable giving, as well as in lay use of the term, pity is often 
understood as an emotional response to witnessing the suffering of another person (Stockdale & Farr 
1987; Hirschberger, Florian and Mikulincer 2000).  In terms of both its emotional and other-focused 
characteristics, pity is sometimes regarded as being similar to empathy, sympathy and even guilt.  
Indeed, some authors use these terms interchangeably (e.g. Batson 2009; Eayrs and Ellis 1990; Lim 
and Moufahim 2015).  What others have seen as setting pity apart from these terms is that, in pity, the 
person feeling the emotion possesses higher status than the person that they feel it for (for a review, 
see Goetz, Keltner and Simon-Thomas 2010).   
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A different understanding of pity was developed by Hannah Arendt (1990 [1963]).  Arendt defines 
pity in opposition to compassion.  While she sees compassion as an emotion, she describes pity, by 
contrast, as a sentiment (1990 [1963]: 84).  Pity, in other words, is what is expressed and thought 
about, while compassion is what is felt.  Arendt also distinguishes pity and compassion from one 
another in reference to their objects.   She argues that, whereas compassion is felt as a response to the 
suffering of individual people, pity is directed at multitudes.  While this may seem like technical and 
inconsequential distinction, for Arendt it is a matter of life and death.  She describes how Robespierre 
glorified feeling for the poor multitudes (pity), whilst losing the ability to feel for individuals 
(compassion) and thus reigned with terror over dissenters, while failing to establish the institutions 
which might ultimately have freed the poor from the shackles of want.  In this way, she argues, pity 
can be cruel (1990: 85). 
 
In this political conception of pity, which has been taken up and expanded upon more recently by a 
range of authors, including Boltanski (1999), Chouliaraki (e.g. 2006) and Vestergaard (2008), pity is 
neither necessarily emotional, nor a question of status.  According to these authors, pity is a mode of 
relating to unfortunate others on a social rather than on an individual level.  This difference is 
signalled by referring to this new conception as the ‘politics of pity’, rather than simply as ‘pity’.  It is 
Boltanski who has both developed the concept most fully, and who has been responsible for 
popularising the idea as a way of framing research about aid, although his own exploration is 
theoretical rather than empirical.  In the following table, I summarise my understanding of Boltanski’s 
definition of pity in comparison with compassion and justice: 
 
Pity, Compassion and Justice as represented in ‘Distant Suffering’ (Boltanski 1999) 
 Pity Compassion Justice 
Urgency Medium – too urgent to consider 
what is just (p. 5), but action is 
not immediately available (p. 8)  
High (p. 8) Low (p. 5)  
Target of the response Groups (p. 6) as represented by 
individuals (p. 11) 
Specific 
individuals (p. 6) 
Individuals or 
groups (p. 4) 
Fatalism High (p. 5) Low Low (p. 4) 
Action required Unclear  (p. 17) Clear (p. 8) Clear (p. 4)  
Distance Far (p. 5) Close  (p. 6) Close (p. 4) 
Emotion High (p. 6) Low (p. 8) Low (p. 5) 
Relationship Looking (p. 1) Doing (p. 6) Judging (p. 4) 
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According to Boltanski, the most salient features of the politics of pity are thus its interest in groups, 
the act of looking at sufferers, the distance between sufferers and observers, and the articulation of 
emotional reactions.   
 
The fact that pity is concerned with groups rather than individuals is what, according to Boltanski, 
makes it political rather than personal.  He notes a contradiction, however, between pity’s concern for 
the welfare of the many (1999:6), and the fact that it is often inspired by viewing not groups but 
individual examples (1999: 11).  This political side of pity is closely tied to the question of distance. 
Boltanski argues that the attempt to unify people across distance is a defining characteristic of 
political systems (1999: 7) and that maintenance of the distance between people is a defining 
characteristic of pity (1999: 5).  Similarly, Arendt states that pity is the opposite of compassion with 
respect to the dimension of distance: whereas compassion abolishes the distance between sufferer and 
viewer (1990:81), pity maintains a distance between them (1990: 87).  Chouliaraki (2006: 2) makes 
the same distinction; while she refers to ‘action [on suffering] that incorporates the dimension of 
distance’ as pity, she suggests that immediate responses to suffering that are witnessed first-hand can 
be described as compassion.  Considered from this perspective, the distinction between pity and 
compassion seems quite straightforward: pity = compassion + distance.  According to this definition, 
research on bystander intervention that has been carried out within psychology (classic studies include 
Darley and Batson 1973, Darley and Latane 1968) would be understood as studies of compassion.  By 
contrast, research from a wide range of disciplines examining either the production or the reception of 
media representations of distant unfortunate others (e.g. Adams 1987, Barnett and Hammond 1999, 
Belk 1984, Boykoff and Goodman 2009, Brunel and Nelson 2000, etc.) would be understood as 
studies of pity.   
 
This straightforward distinction is less easy to maintain when one examines the nature of distance in 
detail.  Boltanski (1999: 17) suggests that there are two key effects that distance has on the 
relationship between spectators and sufferers.  Firstly, it results in a time delay in the interaction 
between them.  Suffering is conveyed to an audience hours and sometimes days after it is witnessed 
by news or charity agents (although in 24 hour news reporting, this is less often the case).  Any 
response from this audience will also take time to reach sufferers.  Secondly, in order to both witness 
and respond to the suffering of others at a distance, viewers must rely upon a chain of intermediaries 
to convey both reports of suffering and the goods and services that might ameliorate it.  As Boltanski 
points out, most often, the form of help requested by charities is therefore monetary, because this 
allows goods and services to be purchased by the charity, and conveyed to those who need them.  But, 
as discussed in the literature review, giving money means that the giver’s intentions are 
depersonalised (Boltanski 1999: 18), and, arguably, that the impact on the giver of the act of helping 
is minimised (Vestergaard 2008: 487).  For these reasons, Boltanski argues that distance results in 
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increased doubt over both the veracity of the reports about sufferers that reach viewers and viewers’ 
ability to influence events, compared to how they might feel about suffering that is close by (1999: 
16). 
 
Both Boltanski and Chouliaraki acknowledge that the dimension of distance that they discuss need not 
be physical.  Boltanski stresses that in societies where suffering is responded to with pity, the 
‘fortunate’ and the ‘unfortunate’ are seen to form distinct groups.  This distinction, however, need not 
always be maintained by physical distance: 
 
The fortunate and the unfortunate can live in the same country without the former seeing the latter, either as the 
result of a kind of physical blindness arising from a subtle separation of the spaces within which they each 
move, that is of their social networks, or, and the two phenomena are commonly mixed together, due to a moral 
blindness, when the discrepancy between their respective conditions creates a gulf that prevents the class of 
‘those who do not suffer’ from forming an idea of the suffering of the unfortunate. (Boltanski 1999: 5) 
 
This recognition that many different types of distance can affect the interactions between members of 
different social groups has been echoed by other researchers across a range of disciplines.  However, 
it is not made clear whether the consequences of distance that are most problematic for Boltanski 
(time difference and the need for intermediaries) still apply in the case of other types of distance.  
Boltanski and Chouliaraki assume that mediated (distant) interactions between viewers and 
unfortunate others are qualitatively different from helping behaviours where bystanders respond (or 
not) to requests for help from people at close proximity.  These authors, as well as others writing 
about mediated giving, tend to conflate mediated giving with giving across distance (e.g. Höijer 2004; 
Kyriakidou 2009; Joye 2010; Olesen 2012).  The existence of mediation between unfortunate others 
and those who view them is understood as being the direct result of the physical distance between 
these groups.  This is a mistake for two reasons: Firstly, mediation often occurs within national 
borders and therefore is not always necessitated by distance.  Rather, it may sometimes be chosen 
deliberately as a means of conveying information.  The effects of this should be explored more fully.   
 
When mediation is chosen over direct communication where direct communication is, in theory, 
possible, it might give ambiguous signals about the distance between the viewer and the viewed.  On 
the one hand, mediated images are associated with viewing from a distance, but, on the other hand, 
media technologies can also seem to minimise the distance between the viewer and the viewed, by 
making distant others appear close.  Secondly, the assumption that mediation is a result of distance 
means that the effects of other types of distance that might exist instead of or alongside physical 
distance are left unexplored.  For example, although social distance (as described in the above 
quotation from Boltanski (1999)) might make interactions between members of different groups 
difficult and infrequent, such interactions are nevertheless still possible without intermediaries (such 
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as the mass media) or time delays.  This does not mean that intermediaries are never used to 
communicate information about a given social group to another group within the same country, or that 
this communication never happens after a time delay.  What it does mean is that this is not 
necessitated by the (territorial and physical) situation.  Although Arendt (1990), Boltanski (1999), 
Chouliaraki (e.g. 2006) and others have indicated an area of enquiry, work on non-physical distance 
in this area is lacking.  This means that there is no existing framework that can be used to examine my 
data in terms of pity and distance.  As a means of developing one, I start by distinguishing different 
types of distance, in order to clarify which aspects of the situation impact on the relationship between 
donors and beneficiaries.   
 
I am not the first to examine the idea that a sense of distance can be enhanced or reduced by means of 
communication.  For example, in order to analyse a Danish telethon for HIV/AIDS sufferers in 
Africa, Olesen (2012) identifies three aspects of the representation of distant sufferers as contributing 
to ‘distance reduction’: emphasising the sufferers’ humanity (for example by the invocation of 
universal experiences, symbols or values), portraying sufferers as innocent, and making it seem that 
action to alleviate their suffering will be effective.  The present context is quite different, however, in 
that physical distance between donors and beneficiaries does not exist to the same extent.  I will first 
consider the types of distance that might exist between beneficiaries and donors with reference to the 
existing scholarly literature, and then consider which types might be relevant in the case of a British 
intra-national telethon like CiN, and how they might be operationalised for analysis of my data. 
 
3.2 Four main types of distance in existing literature 
 
Firstly, there is physical distance (often intercontinental, or international), where the inability of social 
groups to communicate with one another is the direct result of their relative positions across the 
earth’s surface.  This is the kind of distance that has been taken for granted as existing between 
sufferers and witnesses in recent conceptions of pity.  Many charitable interactions happen between 
continents, so that beneficiaries can only be seen via mediated news reports and aid appeals and 
responses are limited to cash donations, which are converted into food, water, medical supplies and 
personnel by charities acting as intermediaries.  Although the number of places without forms of 
media such as radio, television and newspapers has decreased dramatically in recent decades, the 
Internet revolution has still not spread everywhere, with 58% of the world’s population still lacking 
access (West 2015).  The mass media can therefore sometimes be the only means of knowing about 
the problems faced by people in such places.  In the case of physical distance, then, the mass media 
are necessary for communication, although this communication can still differ in the degree to which 
it encourages viewers to experience a feeling of closeness to those they view (Olesen 2012).  
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Physical distance can be contrasted with territorial distance, in which social groups are prevented 
from interacting with each other by the presence of guarded barriers, such as the walls of prisons and 
other closed institutions, military checkpoints or national borders.  Sack (1983: 56) states that 
individuals or groups try to control objects, people, and relationships by creating borders with rules of 
access.  He refers to this as ‘territoriality’.  Although the physical distance between territorially distant 
people is thus not necessarily great, such barriers prevent direct communication without mediation.  
For those who cannot access territorially distant places, knowledge about the people who live in them 
is still reliant on news reports, documentaries, fictional accounts and the accounts and stories of 
people who are able to cross the boundaries either physically or by means of telephone or written 
communication.   
 
In addition to the immediate physical limitations placed on interaction by physical and territorial 
distance, there are other more subtle ways in which communication between different groups of 
people may be curtailed.  Geographers increasingly recognise the existence of social distance (e.g. 
Harvey 2006).  In this case, while different social groups are not technically prevented from 
interacting with each other, they are discouraged from so doing via socio-spatial segregation.  Contact 
between different social groups may be minimised by unequal access to certain places (e.g. having or 
not having the means of buying a house in a sought-after location), and/or the habitual use of 
particular  spaces (e.g. patronising different shops) or modes of transport (e.g. buses as opposed to 
taxis) (see also Thurlow and Jaworski 2010).   
 
A fourth, less tangible form of distance is what Bilandzic (2006: 333) refers to as perceived distance.  
Bilandzic uses the idea of distance metaphorically.  She explores the process by which people’s views 
of others are shaped by representations of them in fictional accounts, such as in films and literature.  
She argues that there are two means by which a feeling of closeness or distance is cultivated between 
viewers/readers and viewed/read about.  The first is what she calls ‘experiential closeness’, which 
occurs when a sense of familiarity with the viewed/read is created in representations that emphasise 
their similarities to the viewer/reader.  In the case of a telethon for a national charity, as in CiN, the 
most salient aspect of shared identity between viewers and beneficiaries is that they are British, or at 
least living in Britain.  My own exploration of experiential distance will therefore focus on this aspect, 
which I now explore in detail, drawing on theories and research about nationalism. 
 
3.3 Experiential distance and nationalism 
 
Scholarly interest in the subject of nationalism is due in part to surprise at the concept’s enduring 
political and emotional potency.  Earlier predictions suggested that cultural changes would have 
rendered it obsolete by now (Anderson 2004 [1983]: 3).  Large-scale migration within and between 
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countries has made communities seem less coherent, and the freedom offered by postmodernity is also 
at odds with the idea of rootedness to place (Newman and Paasi 1998).  Travel has become faster and 
cheaper, and new electronic media facilitate interactions across space (Johnstone 2004: 70).  Of 
course, international travel is only available to the few, and there is a considerable gap between new 
media use in developed and developing countries (Dutta and Mia 2011).  However, the resurgence of 
nationalism appears paradoxical.  It seems that when people become uprooted from their native lands 
their national identity becomes more salient.  The fact that mobility seems to have increased, rather 
than decreased, investment in the idea of one’s nation is one of a number of seemingly contradictory 
ideas or tensions at the heart of nationalistic thinking.   
 
Nationalism rests on the assumption that space can be divided up into clearly-bounded territories.  
This understanding of the world as a set of demarcated areas with different characteristics is given on 
maps and in school geography classes (Johnstone 2004: 66).  The boundaries between these areas are 
correlated with political structures: those of nation-states.  In this way, seeing the world as divided 
into nations seems to be an unmotivated description of political arrangements.  Many have argued that 
the idea of national identity has been naturalised to the extent that it has come to be seen as a 
‘common sense’ understanding of the world (e.g. Billig 1995; Bishop and Jaworski 2003: 247; 
Johnston 2004).  Billig (1995) argues that this sense of normalcy is built upon the continual 
reinforcement of the concept of nations in settings where it goes almost unnoticed, for example by the 
presence of flags on public buildings.  In this way, the idea of nationalism is not presented as an 
ideology to be argued with, but rather as unworthy of attention (1995: 6).  He argues that it is this 
‘banal nationalism’ (1995: 6) which facilitates impassioned forms of celebration and defence of 
national identities.  At such points, nations come to be imbued with visceral meaning, for example as 
‘homelands’ (Sack 1983: 62).  This is a key tension in nationalism; it is made to appear common-
sense and rational, yet it is also designed to evoke strong emotional responses. 
 
The persistence of nationalism in the postmodern age has also been accounted for in terms of a kind 
of nostalgia for rootedness in the local (Entrikin 1991: 7, Johnstone 2004).  Kristeva (1993) argues 
that the radical openness of postmodernity leads some to seek shelter in the ‘family’ of their 
motherland.  Hobsbawm (1983: 4) observes that rapid transformations in societies in general often 
result in a proliferation of new ‘invented traditions’, whereby a sense of the past is constructed.  Many 
of these new traditions take the form of national ceremonies.  Indeed, national identities are 
inextricably tied to a relationship with the past.  National histories are loaded with meaning because 
they are assumed to implicate present citizens (Poole 1999: 72).  The past becomes a site of struggle, 
with different histories having implications for the members of different countries (Heller 2003: 488).  
Ideas about chronology represent a key tension in the concept of nationalism.  Nationalism is a 
relatively modern phenomenon, which is generally traced to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
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centuries (although it is of course impossible to put an exact date on the gradual development of 
nation-states) (James 2006: 232).  However, it gains legitimacy only in the idea of being age-old 
(Anderson 2004 [1983]: 5, Hobsbawm 1983: 13, Poole 1999: 69). 
   
Nationality appears to be ubiquitous in the sense that everyone is presumed to ‘have’ a nationality, 
which they are called on to state, for example, on job applications.  In reality, however, different 
nations hold unique kinds of relationship to their citizens (Anderson 2004 [1983]: 5).  National 
identity can be partially, although not completely, built on a shared language (Poole 1999: 68).  Like 
other forms of identity, such as gender or family, national identity involves a degree of shared 
responsibility which allows the bearer to feel pride for fellow nationals’ achievements, such as 
sporting achievements, and guilt for past events (as indicated above).  Poole (1999) argues that 
national identity draws us into a kind of contract.  While it provides the capacity to transcend our 
mortal limits, by connecting us with past and future generations, it places demands upon us, including 
sometimes the demand to sacrifice our lives.   
 
There is a symbiotic relationship between war and nationalism.  Nationalism provides a cause for war.  
War symbolism, such as cenotaphs (Anderson 1983) and the particular words and phrases associated 
with war (Bishop and Jaworski 2003), reinforce the discourse of nationalism.  Nationalism also 
demands that we assist compatriots over foreigners, even when the latter might have morally more 
urgent needs (Poole 1999: 70).  This is a crucial argument for charity beginning at home: it is 
mutually-beneficial to ensure that the privileges awarded to members of one’s nation are maintained. 
Nationalism, like other forms of identity, involves a drawing of boundaries around certain groups of 
people, some of whom are part of the self and others who are separate from it. 
 
While it is a difficult idea to defend philosophically, nationalism has proven politically powerful.  The 
link between nationalism and capitalism has long been recognised (Anderson 2004 [1983]).  But even 
for anti-capitalist political ideologies such as Marxism, the nation has a key role to play.  Marx 
suggests that global socialism can only come into being through each nation’s proletariats rebelling 
against their own ruling class.  It has been difficult to marshal socialist movements beyond these 
limits (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 13).  Yet, as Gupta and Ferguson (1999: 12) point out, associations 
between places and the idea of ‘home’ are not always advantageous to, and propagated by, those in 
power.  They have been proved to be empowering in anticolonial contexts and in resistance 
movements such as the Palestinian struggles, too.         
 
While Anderson (2004 [1983]) argues that the nation is constructed as an ‘imagined community’ that 
we feel part of, Žižek (1993: 200) reasons that such an act of identification is not enough to account 
for the phenomenon of nationalism.  He suggests that the members of national communities share a 
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relationship not only with each other but with the nation itself, which constitutes a potential source of 
enjoyment, or jouissance (after Lacan 1992 [1959-60]).  It is this fantasy of potential enjoyment 
which is brought into play in arguments about what has been taken away or is threatened by non-
nationals.  Žižek describes this paradox as follows: 
 
It appears to us as “our Thing” […], as something accessible only to us, as something “they”, the others, cannot 
grasp; nonetheless it is something constantly menaced by “them”. (1993: 200)  
 
For Žižek, this Thing is a sense of enjoyment that is organised around specialised community 
ceremonies and myths about its past.  The idea is constantly circulated that jouissance could be 
achieved, if not for the other, who takes away our potential jobs, sexual partners and general way of 
life (1993: 203).  This hypothesis has been proved correct in empirical research.  For example, 
Hanson-Easey and Augoustinous (2011: 252) note that negative constructions of immigration often 
involve unrealistically positive ideas about what the ‘home’ was like before the immigrants arrived.  
This is another key tension for nationalism: it is only in the presence of non-nationals that national 
identity becomes relevant, but these individuals are also held responsible for thwarting the idealised 
nation of the past or future that it is felt would otherwise be the birth-right of its members.    
 
Several alternatives to nationalism have been put forward.  Some argue that different forms of place-
based identity might be considered as being more important than that of the nation.  Nations are just 
one scale of interaction with others, which can be as wide as the global, or as narrow as the extremely 
localised (Watts 1992: 121).  A second alternative, posited within geographical studies, is that the 
traditional idea of the region should be replaced with recognition that membership of place-based 
communities can be voluntary, and therefore that spatial communities sometimes reflect rather than 
influence their members’ ideas (Johnstone 2004: 70). 
 
The link between nationalism and charity media has also been examined in some research.  Even if 
they are raising money for members of another nation, charity media events often encourage viewers 
to become more aware of their shared national identity (Mason 2011).  In international telethons, 
unity between citizens in the donor nation is often emphasised, and their national identity contrasted 
with that of a single recipient nation, although it is usually the donor nation whose identity is the 
primary focus (Driessens et al. 2012: 721).  Donor countries are often depicted in a favourable light, 
as the generous bearers of life-saving gifts, while any less flattering facts about their historical 
political role in relation to recipient nations are obscured (Mason 2011: 97).  The role of nationalism 
in intra-national charity events is as yet unexplored.  This is another significant angle of within-nation 
giving that will be considered in the present study.  Just as in programmes where donor and 
beneficiary countries are different, CiN could also be expected to engage in national identity work, as 
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it operates on a national scale both in terms of its donors and its beneficiaries.  It would, however, be 
expected that the impression of national identity would be complicated by the need to include 
beneficiaries.  In international charity events, being a member of a donor country implies that one 
occupies a position of relative affluence (Mason 2011: 98).  In CiN, in order to justify requests for 
money, Britain will also have to be portrayed as a place of need.  In my analysis I will focus on the 
ways in which viewers are encouraged to see themselves as sharing a national identity with 
beneficiaries, and the use of this identity to encourage giving to fellow nationals over other potential 
recipients. 
 
In this overview, I have highlighted a number of tensions at the heart of nationalistic thought.  They 
are: movement versus stasis, past versus present, reason versus emotion, self versus other, and 
appropriation versus inalienability.  I now return to different theories of distance that might be 
relevant to my study.   
 
3.4 Mediated distance and immersion 
 
The second aspect of Bilandzic’s (2006) ‘perceived closeness’ is ‘mediated closeness’, which marks 
the viewer’s engagement in the narrative.  This sense of involvement is dependent on factors such as 
the skill of the storyteller.  This concept is similar to what others have called ‘immersion’ or 
‘transportation’, in which readers of a given book or viewers of a film or television programme 
become so engrossed in the life of the character/s in these texts that they lose awareness of their own 
lives and become less critical of what they are viewing (Green and Brock 2000: 701).  Although these 
specific terms have not always been applied to representations of suffering others, both ‘experiential 
distance’ (in which the viewed are made to appear similar to the viewer) and ‘mediated distance’ (in 
which the viewer is engrossed in the narrative) are already supported by findings in psychological 
research.  There is extensive evidence that people are more likely to report empathetic feelings when 
they are made aware of similarities between them and suffering others (e.g. Krebs 1975, Davis 1994, 
Houston 1990, Kogut and Ritov 2007)1.  Similarly, representations that are constructed in ways that 
make it easier for immersion to take place are more successful in eliciting donations.  For example, 
when particular individuals are identified, people are more likely to give (Small and Lowenstein 
2003).  Cohen (2001: 168-9) describes the ‘unimaginability’ of certain types of suffering as a 
‘fathomless distance’ between the observer and the sufferer. It is possible, however, that depicting 
others’ suffering in a certain way will make the imaginative leap required to understand it more or less 
easy and likely.  According to Cohen (2001), there are four key ways in which viewer/readers respond 
to a given character when they are immersed in a narrative.  Firstly, they respond emotionally, sharing 
                                                          
1 Batson et al. (2005) contest this, suggesting that feelings of ‘nurturance’, fostered by considering those who are 
dissimilar even in terms of their species, are more powerful motivators for action than perceived similarity. 
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in the feelings of this character.  Secondly, they take on the perspective of that character in terms of 
their thoughts and attitudes.  Thirdly, they partake of the goals or motivations of the character, feeling 
happy when these goals are achieved and frustrated or upset when they are not.  Fourthly, Cohen 
(2001: 256) suggests, viewer/readers become absorbed in the text to the extent that they lose 
awareness of themselves and of their status as observers.   
 
It is this fourth element of ‘mediated closeness’ that becomes problematic when applied to a text like 
CiN.  Viewers’ emotional and cognitive sharing in the lives of sufferers, and especially the wish for 
them to achieve their goals, would be a desirable outcome for charities seeking to garner donations.  
However, the ultimate goal of encouraging viewers to take some form of action, such as to donate 
money, would be hindered if viewers lost the sense of themselves as having a separate role in relation 
to beneficiaries.  For Boltanski, it is the engagement in the lives of suffering others that is ultimately 
important, and this can only happen if their suffering is apprehended as being part of the real lives of 
the viewers.  It is orientation towards action that, he argues, separates the experience of immersion in 
a real story from that of immersion in a fictional one (1999: 153).  Immersion can be fleeting and 
intermittent (Cohen 2001: 250), but, crucially, it entails a degree of removal from reality.  This means 
that viewers who felt immersed in a narrative would be less likely to consider real-life action in 
relation to it.   
 
For the purposes of the present study, therefore, ‘mediated closeness’ will have to be amended in 
order to be a useful analytic concept. In particular, what counts as closeness and distance might need 
to be reversed; distance would result from the suspension of viewers’ reality, and closeness would be 
experienced whenever there was a sense of connection between the reality of the people they observed 
and their own lives.  In other words, closeness would occur when viewers were invited to see a 
beneficiary as someone that they might have a social relationship with, rather than as someone whose 
perspective could replace their own in the narrative.  When engagement that mimics a real social 
connection takes place between viewers and the media personae they watch, it has been dubbed ‘para-
social interaction’, which gives ‘the illusion of face-to-face relationships’ (Horton and Wohl 1956: 
215).  Para-social interaction, however, is built up over time, and results in changes in self-image and 
sometimes behaviour of the viewer (Giles 2002), so it is not applicable to the current context.  
Because my own definition deviates so significantly from Bilandzic’s concept of mediated 
closeness/distance, I will refer to my own analytic concept as representational distance.  In order to 
operationalise representational distance, I will, firstly, seek to understand how realistic depictions of 
suffering others are and, secondly, examine the extent to which viewers are encouraged to respond to 
the suffering of those that they see.   
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3.5 Representational distance: the spectacle of suffering and the possibility of action 
 
When considering how suffering might be made to appear unreal in modern televisual representations, 
Debord’s (2007 [1967]) theory of the spectacle seems pertinent.  The term ‘spectacle’ has been 
defined in a variety of ways in different contexts.  Its dictionary definition describes a show or a 
scene, sometimes with an element of absurdity (Collins Compact English Dictionary 1994: 841).  It is 
defined differently, however, by Debord. For him, the spectacle is ‘a social relation between people 
that is mediated by images’ (2007 [1967]: 1).  In other words, images replace reality.  Like 
Baudrillard’s (1981) ‘simulacra and simulation’, Debord’s ‘spectacle’ is a concept that is meant to 
define the condition of the society as a whole, rather than to describe isolated events.2   
 
Both Boltanski (1999) and Chouliaraki (2006) draw upon the theory of the spectacle in order to 
explain how some images do not hold meaning for viewers and therefore fail to motivate them to take 
action.  I will now explore this idea in more depth, before focusing on theories that might help to 
conceptualise the extent to which viewers are oriented towards actions that could ameliorate this 
suffering.  The idea of the spectacle is invoked by Boltanski because pity, he argues, involves looking 
at suffering (1999: 3).  In order to be able to observe someone else’s suffering, that suffering must be 
made visible in some way (1999: 8).  For Boltanski, the sight of suffering presents the viewer with a 
moral dilemma (Boltanski 1999: 20).  She is torn between acting to ameliorate the suffering she sees 
and acting as she did before seeing it.  Doing the latter means she must accept the sense of guilt which 
comes with choosing to watch, but not respond to, what she sees.  This is, however, not the only 
moral problem for the viewer, according to Boltanski.  The strong emotions that viewing suffering can 
elicit (fascination, horror, interest, and excitement (1999: 21)) mean that watching others in distress is 
also a potential source of enjoyment (1999: 105).  This visual aspect of contemplating the suffering of 
others is one of the most problematic aspects of the politics of pity.  It encourages us to look from a 
distance, instead of acting, and to respond to what we see in the short-term, rather than examining 
what lies behind it (1999: 3).   
 
Although we can, and often do, often witness suffering face-to-face, the age of television has made 
the practice of looking at suffering particularly prevalent.  While visible examples of suffering such as 
street homelessness are still present in Western society today (Gerrard and Farrugia 2014), many of 
the images of suffering that many people experience are presented to them by the mass media, 
                                                          
2 Debord’s (2007 [1967]) and Baudrillard’s (1981) work can be classified as ‘post-aesthetic’.  The aesthetic 
movement separated aesthetic domains such as art from those of science, technology and finance, for example.  
Post-aesthetic thinkers, such as Heidegger, Nietzsche Debord and Baudrillard, do not view art as separate from 
life (Babich 1989: 3).   
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particularly in media events at times of crisis (Kyriakidou 2015: 216).  This alters the form of the 
message.  On television, in particular, images are privileged over other forms of representation 
(Chouliaraki 2005: 145).  It therefore follows that a society in which the relationship between 
sufferers and non-sufferers is highly mediated will to some extent make a spectacle of suffering.  
 
Whereas Debord’s (2007 [1967]) idea of the spectacle is all-encompassing, the term ‘spectacle’ has 
also been applied to specific phenomena by scholars such as Kellner (2003) and Schirato (2007). The 
latter is more similar to the dictionary definition of spectacle and its everyday use.  However, what 
unites these two quite different understandings of spectacle is the belief that spectacles are somehow 
tied to the values of the society that produced them.  For Debord and Baurillard, the society-wide 
spectacle is the manifestation of capitalist society’s values (Debord 2002: 1); they believe that 
capitalist concerns seep into social relations, transforming them into transactions.  For scholars such 
as Kellner, specific media spectacles are also worthy of study because they, too, embody a society’s 
belief systems (2003: 2).   
 
Like Kellner (2003), Chouliaraki (2005) applies the term ‘spectacle’ to specific instances of mass 
media, rather than to the society that produced them as a whole.  She (2005: 275) argues that 
televisual depictions of crises involving different types of human actor vary in the extent to which 
they appear spectacular.  For example, she suggests that images of the Iraq war shown on news 
programmes presented the scenes of suffering from a distance, devoid of both sufferers and 
perpetrators, which therefore encouraged viewers to be emotionally detached from the imagery of 
violence by erasing its human consequences (2005: 274).  She argues that other reports of suffering, 
by contrast, over-emotionalise the suffering of certain groups or figures (2005: 274).  This means that 
certain types of sufferers are made to seem more important than others in the mass media, even in the 
event that neither is excluded from representation.   
 
Boltanski (1999) uses the term ‘spectacle’ throughout his book Distant Suffering but does not explore 
the concept in detail.  He suggests that the mediated, pictorial nature of information received about 
distant suffering makes it easier for viewers to dismiss it.  Drawing on the idea of simulacra and 
simulation (Baudrillard 1981), he argues that widespread disillusion about the idea that reality can be 
represented in the mass media has resulted in mediated images of suffering being mistrusted and 
ignored.  It is no longer an issue of criticising false representations (as Debord’s notion of the 
spectacle implies), Baudrillard argues, but of recognising the loss of referentiality altogether.  
Representations are no longer understood as referring to anything but themselves.  It is this sense of 
doubt, over not only whether the representation is accurate but also whether the represented is in fact 
real, Boltanksi argues, that allows the spectator of mediated suffering to escape her guilt (1999: 176-
7). 
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Chouliaraki (2006: 50) takes issue with Baudrillard’s (1981) thesis that the form of images takes 
precedence over their content.  She argues that exclusively focusing on the mode of appearance gives 
an impoverished view not only of the relations of power that are hidden behind an image, but of the 
image itself, which is ‘not exhausted in its surface form’ (2006: 52).  In other words, images should be 
interpreted in light of the social meanings that they carry, rather than simply as decontextualized 
pictures.  She argues that other modes, such as language, also add to and interact with the meanings 
with which a given image is imbued.  It stands to reason that images are effective and commercially 
valuable in the capitalist system because of their provenances (Kress and van Leeuwen 2002: 355), 
and the connotations and myths (Barthes 2009 [1957]) that they carry.   
 
The difference between the spectacle and non-spectacle has also been theorised in relation to 
unmediated images of suffering.  Debord insists that the society of the spectacle necessarily includes 
privation and poverty, although it may attempt to disguise it (2002: 10).  By contrast, Gerrard and 
Farrugia (2014: 8) interpret the phenomenon of homelessness as a chink in the armour of the 
spectacle.  They argue that the spectacle, as understood by Debord, is at odds with images or instances 
of poverty and suffering.  There is, they argue, a clash between the images and relations of consumer 
capitalism and the reality of suffering, which is made visible, for example, in street homelessness.  In 
this way, the reality of living poverty is experienced as a deviation from the norm of sanitised 
capitalist spaces, such as shopping malls.   
 
For my own analysis, I will leave aside questions of spectacle as a pervasive social phenomenon, as 
my data would not be sufficient to explore such a concept and because, as I will argue in chapter 6, 
my focus group participants discuss different images and narratives as having differing levels of 
reality.  I also reject the use of the term ‘spectacle’ as a descriptor of events such as CiN because this 
interpretation involves treating such media events as a whole and therefore does not allow for analysis 
that distinguishes between the levels of spectacularity that seem to be present at different points.  I 
define ‘spectacle’ as the separation between images and reality, as signalled in each of my data sets, 
particularly in relation to sights of suffering.   
 
I argued above that, by contrast with Bilandzic’s ‘mediated closeness’, which is created when 
viewers’ real lives recede into the background when immersed in a narrative, representational 
closeness should be seen as having been created when the lives of the viewed were made to seem 
tangible and therefore alterable.  Having examined the first aspect of what I have termed 
representational distance (i.e. the extent to which the lives of sufferers appear as real), I now move on 
to explore the second aspect: the extent to which action on suffering is represented as possible.  
Assessing this will mean, firstly, examining what sorts of actions are presented and, secondly, the 
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extent to which these action appear to have an impact on the lives of sufferers.  In order to explore the 
latter, I draw on Barthes’ (2009 [1972]) concept of myth.  Barthes argues that, in addition to the 
denotative and connotative levels of meaning associated with signs, some carry an additional, 
ideological level of meaning (2009 [1972]: 138).  This ideological or ‘mythical’ meaning is 
constructed to serve the interests of the most powerful members of a society.  If actions taken to 
ameliorate suffering are to be understood as truly connected to the lives of sufferers, then there should 
be a straightforward relationship between these actions and outcomes.  However, the connection of 
additional meanings to such acts would imply a more donor-focused representation of action, in which 
the distance between donors and beneficiaries would be maximised.    
 
Drawing distinctions between different types of distance helps to understand the processes that bring 
about these distances, and how they might be measured in relation to my data.  It has already been 
recognised, however, that some of these types of distance overlap and / or interact with each other.  
Social distances, for example, are manifested in and entrenched by the arrangement of physical 
locations (Harvey 2006).  Places also affect our relationship with mass media.  The further away we 
are from phenomena, the more reliant we become on media representations of them (Blommaert et al. 
2003).  Conversely, how we interpret media stories is affected by the attitudes of people in our social 
networks, which, in turn, are commonly shaped by the communities in which we live (2003: 324).  It 
is therefore to be expected that other types of distance will also interact with each other, so that, for 
example, physical distance and experiential distance are both likely to result in increased social 
distance.  This is not a reason however, to collapse any of these distinctions, as they are nevertheless 
separate phenomena, which, for analytical purposes, I will keep separate.  I now consider these types 
of distance in relation to my own data. 
 
3.6 Analytic foci: social, experiential and representational distance 
 
The children who are typically classified as disadvantaged by CiN are resident in all parts of the 
country, albeit in differing proportions.  Likewise, potential donors are not limited to a particular 
geographical location.  This means that the lack of interaction between them is not a result of physical 
distance.  Few, if any of these children (and none of those who are shown in the programme) live 
permanently in closed institutions either, so their separation from potential donors is not a matter of 
territorial distance.  Any distance between these groups of people is likely to be of the social variety, 
in the sense that the donors and recipients may belong to different social groups that have limited 
interaction with each other.  In terms of the narratives that are presented about disadvantaged groups 
in programmes like CiN, experiential and representational distances are also important factors.  
Indeed, as mentioned above, it seems likely that these three forms of distance might eventually 
interact with one another, so that, for example, groups that are socially close will be more likely to 
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represent each other as experientially close, and representations that encourage representational 
closeness to others might result in increased social closeness in the future.   
 
Each of the types of distance above is analytically important because it can affect the relationships 
between people.  What makes social and perceived (experiential and mediated / representational) 
distance different from physical distance in this respect is that these types of distance are always 
produced by people.  This means that these types of distance are constructed in response to the 
relationships between people, as well as having an effect on these relationships.  Physical distance 
can, of course, also be a means of control, as when people are forced into exile or not allowed to 
immigrate.  This type of distance is, however, not necessarily a human construct.  My own analysis 
will therefore consider distance as both productive of and potentially produced by other factors, such 
as mediation.  In the following chapters, I consider social, experiential and representational closeness 
in turn, examining the effects of each type of distance on the relationship that is discursively created 
between viewers of and beneficiaries to CiN, both in the programme itself and by its potential 
viewers. 
 
Chapter summary 
 
At the start of this chapter, I identified the concept of pity as a key idea in the critical study of charity 
discourse.  The idea unites some of the key themes identified in the literature review, i.e. emotional 
responses, monetary donation, visibility and the role of group-based identities in deciding whom to 
help.  While, as I indicated, this idea is frequently referred to in studies of portrayals of and responses 
to international suffering, it has not yet been applied to the intra-national giving context.  This means 
that it has only been used to discuss giving at a physical distance, and so the relationship between pity 
and other types of distance has been left unclear.  In order to address this gap in knowledge, I set out 
to build a framework that would allow me to examine the concept of distance in my own data.  I 
concluded that social, experiential, and representational types of distance are most likely to play a 
role in the relationship between CiN’s beneficiaries and its potential viewers.  In the analytic chapters 
that follow, I examine my data in terms of each of these concepts in turn, in order to gain a better 
understanding of how this relationship is constructed, and to develop the concept of pity for use in the 
intra-national giving context.    
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Chapter 4: Social Distance 
 
In the previous chapter, I developed a theoretical framework for analysing my data.  As I outlined, 
pity, a central concept in charitable giving, has been reconceptualised in literature on mediated giving 
as a form of compassion that comes about specifically when there is a distance between sufferers and 
those who witness their suffering (e.g. Chouliaraki 2006).  Despite Boltanski (1999) stating that this 
distance need not be of a literal, physical nature, subsequent research has largely studied situations in 
which sufferers and viewers were in different countries and often different continents.  In order to 
evaluate the usefulness of pity as a concept in the context of charitable giving within a country 
however, it is necessary to consider alternative conceptions of distance.  ‘Social distance’ is an 
intangible yet important means by which members of different groups are discouraged from 
interacting with each other via the separation of the spaces they habitually occupy (Harvey 2006, 
Jaworski and Thurlow 2010).  Social distance can be understood as being maximised when members 
of different social groups are kept separate from each other, and minimised when they frequently 
come into close contact.  In the present chapter, I apply the concept of social distance to my own data, 
focusing on instances from both charity media data (the 2011 broadcast of BBC ‘Children in Need’) 
and focus group talk where members of different social groups are represented as either sharing 
spaces with or using separate spaces from each other.  In the former, I focus specifically on the 
separation or integration of donors and beneficiaries.  In the latter, I examine the concept of social 
distance as discussed in the focus groups more broadly.  
 
4.1 Social distance in Children in Need: the separation of places and people 
 
In CiN, different places are used for different purposes, which has the effect of separating groups of 
people from each other.  I interpret this as the representation of social distance between these groups 
for the following reasons:  Firstly, the different places shown are not physically distant from one 
another.  Secondly, the viewer is not made aware of any means by which people are materially 
prevented from entering any of the places that are shown in the programme, which means it is not a 
case of territorial distance, either.  While it is quite possible, for example, that fundraisers would not 
be allowed to enter some of the centres that beneficiaries use, and that beneficiaries would not be able 
to enter some of the studios shown in the programme, any such inhibitions are implicit.  
 
There are a number of different types of location in the show and these are generally associated with 
different sets of actors in relation to the charity.  Switches between location types and the activities 
associated with them are marked by a range of visual and verbal features, which create boundaries 
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between them.  When the presentation is about to shift from one place to another, presenters signal 
the change by changing tense, in phrases such as ‘that was brilliant… now’ (presenter Alesha Dixon 
at 19 minutes).  They also shift their footing (Goffman 1981), by switching from addressing co-
present individuals to addressing the audience or the camera.  These shifts of footing are realised in 
the presenters’ changes in gaze and their use of personal pronouns.  Boundary-marking graphics, 
such as CGI representations of the show’s mascot ‘Pudsey bear’, are also frequently used between 
shots showing different places.   
 
By recognising such signals, I was able to identify different kinds of places represented in the show 
and to group them into a limited number of place types, which I categorise as follows: fundraising 
places (where fundraisers, who are presented as representatives of the programme’s viewers, are 
shown), the studio and other entertainment settings (where television presenters, entertainers, and the 
studio audiences appear), and beneficiary places.  The latter can be further broken down into 
problematic places (where suffering children and families are seen), and therapeutic places (places 
that ameliorate this suffering for these families).  In the following section, I focus on each of these 
different types of place in turn, giving examples of the imagery used to portray them and considering 
the social actors that appear in them.   
 
Because this chapter concerns the representation of people and places as similar to or different from 
each other, I draw on discursive devices that are used to delineate people and events.  In the CiN 
data, I focus on the visual framing (Goffman 1981: 71) of different places, i.e. the ways in which 
they are defined by the presence or absence of particular features.  In the focus group data, I explore 
a similar concept: the ‘event work’ (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2013: 69) carried out by speakers, or the 
description of situations in particular ways in order to justify attitudes and actions taken in relation to 
them.      
 
Fundraising places 
 
The main aim of the CiN programme is to raise money.  This means that even entertainment items and 
celebrity challenges could theoretically be classified as ‘fundraising activities’.  Under this heading, 
however, I categorise only the parts of the programme where the explicit efforts of non-celebrities to 
raise money for the charity are shown.  Fundraising vignettes usually take place at the site of the 
sponsored activities and are often pre-recorded, showing events that have taken place before the live 
broadcast.  These are the places where ‘we’, the viewers, are positioned; they are often described by 
presenters as being ‘in your area’ (25:51).  These sections are used to create the impression of a 
community of fundraisers across Britain, magnifying the scale and impact of the event.  The following 
frames illustrate how these places are typically visually represented in the show.  Frames 4.1-3 are 
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taken from the first general fundraising vignette in the show.  Frame 4.4 is from a more specific type 
of vignette, which focuses on activities in schools across the country. 
 
4.1 - 28:26 4.2 – 27:09 
4.3 – 27:01 4.4 – 23:25 
 
As exemplified in frames 4.1 – 4.3, from the show’s first fundraising vignette, the places that are 
displayed as the site of fundraising activities are often archetypal community spaces that appear in 
villages, towns and cities across the country, including high streets (4.3) and football grounds (4.2).  
These community spaces, like the schools shown in the second vignette (4.4), are common across the 
UK and therefore make fundraising scenes seem generalizable to other localities.  This helps to build 
the impression that viewers are socially and experientially close to the fundraisers in the sense that 
both groups share similar places and experiences.  It also suggests that these activities are happening 
in a vast number of locations across the country.   
 
The schools update vignette also creates the impression of multiple interchangeable locations.  Frame 
4.4 accompanies presenter Terry Wogan’s introduction to the ‘schools update’ section.  It depicts still 
images of fundraising activities carried out in the four schools to be shown in this clip, pictured from a 
distance.  The circles encompassing each of these four schools are uniformly sized and randomly 
placed and thus are represented as being equal to one another (Kress and van Leeuwen 1996: 81-88).  
This shot appears before each of the schools’ particular fundraising activities are shown, with the 
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circle representing the school to be viewed next growing in size until it occupies the whole screen.  In 
their shape and colour, these four circles themselves are also presented as having been chosen at 
random from the multi-sized, multi-coloured dots behind them.  In this way, the visual representation 
suggests that the clips that are shown in this section should be regarded as exemplary of a large 
number of schools across the UK, any one of which could equally have been singled out. 
 
In many cases, before fundraising places are introduced, live ‘local area’ celebrations are shown.  
Montgomery (2007: 64) suggests that in news bulletins reporting ‘from the field’ is used to give an 
enhanced impression of facticity by displaying the sights and sounds of the event.  In CiN, the display 
of live celebrations also provides evidence of widespread participation in the event.  Some of the 
fundraising participants are present in these places, and they are often asked to tell the presenter about 
their activities and how much money they have raised.  In the London and South East England version 
accessed for this research, these celebrations take place in paid-entry commercial venues that are used 
for leisure activities (such as Winter Wonderland, frame 4.1).  The association of these places with 
leisure activities indicates the tenor of the fundraising as a form of entertainment.   
 
The visual features of these sites, including their modality, will be discussed in chapter 6.  For now, it 
is worth noting that extracts showing fundraising sites are commonly pre-recorded (sometimes with 
live introductions) and that they show members of the public who engage in the task of raising money 
for the show, rather than those who donate.  As a whole, fundraising sites are presented as being 
unexceptional.  It is implied that the scenes shown are representative both of viewers’ localities and of 
other fundraising sites.   
 
The studio 
 
The studio is the site that appears between all other places within the programme (other entertainment 
locations, fundraising places and beneficiary places).  It is the only place where the entertainers and 
consumers of the show are united.  In terms of the social actors who appear in these settings, celebrity 
presenters and performers are shown most often, and a studio audience is also present, although its 
role is restricted to providing reactions to events in the form of laughter and applause, in lieu of the 
home audience.  In other words, the purpose of ‘ordinary people’ in this setting is to display 
satisfaction with the show, as well as to provide a sense of collective participation (Clayman 1993: 
110).   
 
Frames 4.5 – 4.8 show the studio’s diverse visual presentation and its different functions of 
celebrating (4.5), introducing (4.6), summarising (4.7) and entertaining (4.8).   
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4.5 – 01:11 4.6 – 01:54 
4.7 – 22:51 4.8 – 17:25 
  
As can be seen in these frames, a frequent focal point in this setting is the studio screen.  As in news 
broadcasts, this monitor performs a range of functions, but its main role is the representation of 
images from other places.  The studio unites the depictions of other sites, appearing before and after 
all other types of place, except other entertainment studios, which sometimes appear directly before 
fundraising locations.  Like the increasingly elaborated news studio, CiN’s studio is a complex 
presentation space (Montgomery 2007: 193).  Its role, however, is not only to represent but also to act 
as a counterpoint to other representations.  It is what Montgomery (2007: 77) refers to as a ‘deictic 
zero point’; a fixed point, from which the places to be reported on can be ventured into.  
 
In the following example, the ‘X-Factor’ talent show runner-up Olly Murs provides the conclusion to 
a vignette about a specialised nursery for blind children.  In the following shot, the studio is shown, 
and presenter Alesha Dixon delivers a gloss of the vignette, and gives a further invitation to donate, 
before Terry Wogan joins her to introduce the next section about fundraising in schools. 
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Extract 1 – Transcript Including the Studio Screen (see appendix 4) 
 
1 22:44 
 
Olly Murs: (to camera) it’s been great to 
watch their music sessions (.) and (.) and see 
all the fantastic work that Dorton Nursery 
does for these kids (.) to help them develop 
their sight (.) but (.) we need more money 
(1.0) so please pick up the phone (.) and 
donate on oh three four five seven (.) double 
three (.) double two (.) double three (1.0) 
and we can help all these lovely children out 
(1.0) thank you (4.0) 
Silence 
2 22:51 
 
Alesha Dixon: (to camera) ah it’s a 
wonderful place isn’t it (.) and thirty pounds 
pays for half a day there (.) and other 
projects like it (1.0) you saw how much Ella 
loved it (.) so please help us fund more 
spaces for children like her (.) the number to 
call? is oh three four five seven (.) double 
three (.) double two (.) double three (1.0) 
thank you 
 
3 23:07 
 
  
4 23:09 
 
Terry Wogan:  thanks Alesha (1.0) now we 
need to say (.) a lot of thank yous (.) to a lot 
of people tonight because frankly (1.0) 
without you (.) we’re nothing 
Alesha Dixon: exactly 
Terry Wogan: and I want to start with some 
people (.) who don’t get nearly enough 
praise (1.0) those of you (.) all over the 
United Kingdom (2.0) who go to school 
 
5 23:25 
 
 Music: 
Maroon 5 
‘Moves like 
Jagger’ 
Children 
screaming  
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6 23:35 
 
Alan Dedicoat V/O: In Tywyn it was fancy 
dress foaming fun for the pupils of Llanegryn 
primary (.) as the teachers paid to have their 
cars cleaned (4.0) 
Music: 
Maroon 5 
‘Moves like 
Jagger’ 
Children 
screaming 
 
In this instance, the studio is only performing a linking function; no entertainment performances take 
place in it, and it is shown only as the site of the programme’s presenters, who conclude, comment on, 
and introduce other sections of the programme.  The studio appears for only 30 seconds, but this 
section marks a clear separation between the representation of beneficiaries in frame 1 and fundraisers 
in frame 5.  This means that no connection is made between the figure sought by Dorton Nursery (2) 
and the figure raised by Ysgol Llanegryn (6).  In frame 2, Ella (the principal subject of the beneficiary 
vignette) appears in the screen to the left of the presenter, with words that summarise information 
from this vignette: ‘£30 half day at nursery’.  This image then gradually fades – it is just visible in 
frame 3, but invisible by frame 4.  It is replaced by multi-coloured dots floating on a black 
background.  Here, as at many other points in the show, the studio mediates between beneficiaries and 
benefactors in a way that makes them appear otherwise unconnected.   
 
It is also in the studio that the combined total raised by all fundraisers until that point is revealed at 
many points in the show (as seen in extract 2), removed from the places of its potential impact.   
 
Extract 2 – Decontextualized Fundraising Total (see appendix 4) 
 
1 31:44 
 
Alesha Dixon: Now with that fantastic 
amount raised it may just be time for 
our very first total of the night (.) what 
do you think everyone? 
 
Alesha Dixon: Let’s see where we’re at 
Terry Wogan: Well (.) I’m very glad that 
you’ve reacted in this way (1.5) because 
that’s exactly what we’re going to do (.) 
(shouting) give you the ongoing total 
even at this early stage (.) 
 
 
Audience cheers 
(5 seconds) 
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2 32:37 
 
let’s have a look (.) at the total raised (.) 
so far  
 
 
 
 
Drumroll, 
audience 
whooping 
3 32:40 
 
Terry Wogan: four million,  Audience 
cheering, 
celebratory music  
4 32:44 
 
three hundred and sixty-four thousand, 
four hundred and eleven pounds 
Audience 
cheering, 
celebratory 
music, 
pyrotechnics 
shooting on the 
stage  
5 32:50 
 
That’s the most we’ve ever raised at 
this early stage  
 
 
 
In frame 3, the total appears in the middle of the screen, from which the presenters have stepped away 
(shown in frame 2).  The amount raised is presented as the cause for visual and auditory audience 
celebration, but is not linked to beneficiary need.  Verbally, the figure is compared only to the 
previous year’s total, rather than to a target in terms of funding specific projects. 
 
The studio, then, operates as a presenting location, from which other sections of the programme are 
ventured into, and against which they are contrasted.  However, it is important to note that the 
different areas and people represented either side of it are not brought together in the studio, but kept 
separate from each other by it.     
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Problematic Places 
 
Under this heading, I classed the places that beneficiaries are to be shown in before their admission to 
a place that helps alleviate their suffering.  As I will discuss below, not all beneficiary vignettes 
feature such problematic places.   Often, however, the problems experienced by families or children 
that are helped by Children in Need are presented as being linked to their occupation of certain places. 
  
 
4.9 – 48:39  
 
4.10– 63:11 
 
 
4.11 – 08:31 
 
4.12 – 08:28 
 
Narratives accompanying images of such places emphasise the problems the children face, such as 
low income or isolation.  They are thus signalled as problematic places.  For example, frame 4.9 
occurs with a narrative about social housing and low-income families, and frame 4.10 is linked to a 
narrative about social isolation.  Negativity is also signalled through multimodal features such as 
slow-paced music. 
 
The following extracts are verbal introductions to problematic places.  In extract 3, television and 
radio presenter Zoë Ball introduces a school breakfast club in the area of Littlehampton, pictures of 
which (including frame 4.9) appear simultaneously with her voiceover.   
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Extract 3 
 Zoë Ball V/O: it’s seven in the morning (1.0) and all over the country (.) families are starting their 
day (5.0) you take it for granted don’t you (1.0) get the kids dressed (.) feed them breakfast (.) do 
the school run (2.0) but it’s not like that for everyone (4.0) one in five families in the UK are living in 
poverty (1.0) and sadly (.) some of the kids in those families (.) are going without breakfast 
 
In this extract, frame 4.9 is linked to the idea of ‘poverty’.  Although neither the high rise itself nor 
the other shots that appear before or after it showing the sorts of scenes that are visible in areas of 
deprivation (vandalised playgrounds, rubbish) are explicitly linked to the problems faced by the 
beneficiaries shown in this vignette, they are used to illustrate them.   
 
What is particularly striking in this introduction is the presentation of the fact that some British 
children live in poverty as unknown to viewers.  The situation faced by these children is contrasted 
with what is presented as the more familiar situation of not living in these conditions.  The use of 
‘you’ here signals the projected sharedness of the situation described.  By contrast, when describing 
poorer families, a more distant and authoritative stance is taken.  Statistics are given (‘one in five’), 
and personal indexicals are used that distance the speaker from the people she is referring to (‘some 
of the kids in those families’)3.  These features are typical of what Edwards and Potter (1992) refer 
to as ‘empiricist accounting’, in which ideas are expressed in a way that is typical of scientific 
discourse.  Facts are presented as unequivocal, a form of language linked to the attempt to create 
rhetorically persuasive arguments (1992: 154).   
 
The viewers are addressed in a way that suggests they are not part of the 20% of families described 
and they are also assumed to be ignorant of these people’s situation.  This creates the impression that 
poverty is a problem that is detached from the lives of viewers and is only knowable through media 
representations such as CiN’s.  At the same time, the presentation of images such as frame 4.9 
presents a paradox: viewers are expected to be able to decode what such shots signify (poverty, 
social housing), whilst apparently having no level of prior knowledge of, or interaction with, such 
places. 
 
In extract 4, television presenter Lorraine Kelly introduces a child called Melissa.  During this 
introduction, she is pictured sitting in a dark room with a black background.  Following this 
introduction, Melissa is shown in her home (frame 4.10). 
 
  
                                                          
3 For a discussion of how the word ‘those’ can refer to people at differing degrees from the deictic centre, 
depending on context, see Adetunji 2006: 178. 
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Extract 4 
Lorraine Kelly: it’s a harsh reality (.) that some children’s disabilities mean (.) they will rely (.) on 
help from family or carers (.) for their whole lives (1.0) for them to enjoy a sense of freedom and 
independence (1.0) can seem (.) impossible (2.0) I want to introduce you to a young girl called 
Melissa (.) and a Children in Need project (.) that has transformed her life (.) and that of her family 
 
In this extract, children’s disabilities are not presented as unknown, but the fact that this often results 
in their lifelong dependence on others is presented as ‘new’ information.  Halliday (1970) argues that 
information that the hearer is not expected to know is likely to appear after what he is expected to 
know in the clause structure.  In this case, the phrase ‘some children’s disabilities’ appears before 
what this means in terms of their dependence on others.  While some viewers may have experience of 
similar disabilities, using a specific example (in this case Melissa) means that some aspects of the 
situation can be presented as if they are not formerly understood by the viewer.  The use of third 
person pronouns here also indicates that the children described are not represented as forming part of 
the audience, which would be referred to as ‘us’, or ‘we’ (Harwood 2006: 355). 
 
In both extracts 3 and 4, the presenters provide interpretations of the situations they are introducing to 
viewers – these are ‘harsh’ realities and ‘sad’ situations.  Aslama and Pantti (2006) suggest that 
monologue is frequently used in reality television shows because it allows for emotional content to be 
portrayed in a uniquely authentic-seeming way.  Goodman and Barnes (2011) argue that the 
relationship between celebrities and development charities (what they refer to as ‘the star/poverty 
space’) is predicated on the idea that celebrities represent authenticity as well as expertise.  In other 
words, they provide a sense of the familiar and reliable for situations that are unfamiliar and 
unknown.  The use of celebrities in CiN to provide an emotional gloss on the representation of people 
and places within the UK thus suggests that beneficiaries are distant from or unfamiliar to the viewer 
in ways that the celebrity herself is not. 
 
The potential consequences of presenting upsetting realities as unfamiliar will be explored in chapter 
6.  For now, it is worth noting that problematic places and the people who occupy them are verbally 
and visually signalled as unknown to viewers outside of their representation in the show.     
 
Therapeutic places  
 
In most vignettes about CiN’s beneficiaries, the children, and sometimes their families as well, are 
admitted to a centre that appears to address some of their problems.  These centres take a number of 
forms, from before-school breakfast clubs for children from low-income families, to nurseries 
specialising in the treatment of specific medical conditions.   I use the term ‘therapeutic places’ 
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because, while these places appear to effect positive changes, their role is often not to reverse the 
principal problems faced by these families and children (such as disabilities, poverty or bereavement), 
but rather to provide temporary or partial relief from them.   
 
Table 1 summarises some features of the beneficiary vignettes that occur in the first three hours of the 
show (just before the switch-over to BBC 2, during the BBC news broadcast on BBC 1).  This time 
frame was selected both because it constitutes the time in which ordinary viewing is interrupted on 
BBC1 and because after this time several of the vignettes are repeated.   
 
The classification of items 1 and 9 as beneficiary vignettes is debatable, as vignette 1 is a collage of 
vignettes that occur later in the programme, and vignette 9 is a clip taken from a BBC documentary.  
These two examples also lack some of the features that are common to all others, such as the inclusion 
of a celebrity.  Of the eight unmistakable beneficiary vignettes, specific centres feature in seven.  This 
feature occurs with the same regularity as the familiar trope of showing individual children to 
represent the many children affected by a particular issue.     
 
As summarised in table 1, in most cases the centres presented do not address the most problematic 
part of the children’s lives.  For example, these centres’ remits are not to correct disabilities (vignettes 
2 and 4) or health problems (vignettes 6 and 7), but to provide temporary relief from some difficulties 
associated with them, such as relief from loneliness.  
 
Huxford (2001: 667) argues that one of the chief functions that the presentation of places serves in 
journalistic practice is to ‘illustrate and instantiate abstract issues’.  In these instances, the 
therapeutic places represent a range of activities that are performed in them and the changes in the 
lives of their users claimed in the voiceovers.  Like fundraising spaces, they are presented as 
examples of similar centres, which provide relief from other forms of suffering. 
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Table 1: Beneficiary Vignettes for First 3 Hours 
 
 Time Child Problem Centre Role of 
centre 
Celebrity Celebrity 
Involvement 
1 8:53-9:51 
(58 sec) 
Many, 
unspecified 
- - - - - 
2 19:05-
22:51 
(3 min 46 
sec) 
Ella Disability, 
visual 
impairment 
Dorton 
Nursery 
Light 
therapy, 
specialist 
massage, 
music 
group 
Olly Murs 
(pop singer / 
X Factor 
contestant) 
Meets family, 
goes to centre 
3 48:19-
50:58 
(2 min 39 
sec) 
Unspecified Poverty / 
not being 
fed 
breakfast 
Launchpad 
breakfast 
club 
Provides 
breakfast, 
and 
possibly 
emotional 
support 
Zoë Ball 
(former 
Radio 1 DJ) 
Goes to town, 
helps in centre 
4 62:01-
65:41 
(3 min 40 
sec) 
Melissa Learning 
disability 
The Yard 
Adventure 
Centre 
Learning 
life skills, 
art, etc. 
Lorraine 
Kelly (TV 
presenter) 
Intro and outro 
only 
5 1h 29 (89)- 
1h 31:59 (3 
mins) 
Hayley / 
James, Casie 
/ Tyler, 
Natalie, 
Suzie 
Poverty No centre 
shown 
(Buttle 
Trust) 
- 
(provides 
emergency 
grants to 
families) 
Jessie J, 
Tulisa, Matt 
Cardle (pop 
singers, 
talent 
contest 
winners) 
Speak on behalf 
of children  
6 1h 40:07- 
1h 44:07 
(4 mins) 
Harry Health 
problems, 
including 
cerebral 
palsy  
Steps Centre Education 
centre for 
children 
with motor 
disorders 
Jo Joiner 
(actor - 
Tanya 
Branning in 
Eastenders) 
Meets family, 
goes to centre, 
goes into studio 
to testify about 
her ‘first-hand’ 
experience 
7 2h 03:04 – 
2h 08:21 (5 
mins 17 
sec) 
Elliot Died of 
leukaemia 
Claire House Hospice, 
support for 
families 
Daniel Craig 
(actor) 
Intro and outro 
only 
8 2h 19:20 – 
2h 23:27 (4 
mins 7 sec) 
Will Brain injury 
as result of 
car accident 
Splash Play 
Centre 
Play centre Gary Barlow 
(pop singer) 
Intro and outro 
only 
9 2h 38:17- 
2h 43:16 (4 
min 59 
sec) 
A selection 
of children 
from a BBC 
documentar
y called 
‘Poor Kids’ 
Poverty - - - -  
10 3 h 0:48-3 
h 5:03 (4 
mins 15 
sec) 
Brett Died on train 
track – link 
made to 
drug abuse 
KPC Youth 
Centre 
Preventati
ve 
measure 
for others 
Alesha Dixon 
(former pop 
singer, TV 
presenter) 
Meets Brett’s 
family, goes on 
streets with 
social workers, 
and to centre 
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In the following frames, visual presentations of therapeutic places are shown.  These frames are taken 
from three different beneficiary vignettes, and display: an activity centre for children with learning 
disabilities (frame 4.13), a before-school breakfast club (discussed above) (frame 4.14), a nursery for 
children with disabilities (frame 4.15), and a light therapy room for children with visual impairments as 
part of this nursery (frame 4.16). 
 
 
 
4. 13 - 64:47 
 
4. 14 – 49:51 
 
4.15 – 22:44 
 
4.16 – 21:28i 
 
The children’s or families’ entry into therapeutic places is always signalled as a transformative event 
in the narrative, in the sense that the change of place also marks a significant change in their lives.  
The places themselves are often described as having extraordinary properties, which allow them to be 
the agent of change in the child / family’s life.  For example, the nursery shown in frame 4.15 is 
described by the presenter as ‘life-changing’ for the family featured, and the play centre in frame 4.13 
is described as having an ‘unique atmosphere’ that facilitates learning. 
 
In some ways, the description of centres as having special properties echoes the attempt in the 1970s 
and 1980s to overcome stigmatising language when referring to persons with disabilities by using 
terms such as ‘special’ and ‘exceptional’ (Longmore 1985: 421).  Longmore points out that the use of 
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such terminology is problematic because it maintains the idea of a distinction between people with 
disabilities and others.  In CiN, this distinction is represented not only linguistically but spatially; 
children with ‘special’ needs are not only labelled as deviating from the norm but are also represented 
visually as occupying different, ‘special’ places.  The idea that certain individuals should be placed in 
institutions and separated from the rest of society is historically a troubling one.  For example Foucault 
(1986: 25) cites care homes, psychiatric hospitals and prisons as examples of places of ‘deviation’, in 
which people whose behaviour differed from the norm were placed. He saw such places as becoming 
more numerous towards the end of the twentieth century.  Decisions about where to place certain 
groups of people, he argued, were a question of classification of these people as those that should be 
close to or distant from one another (1986: 23).   
 
However, the use of place as a means of controlling access to these services is not necessarily 
ideologically-driven (Sack 1983).  There are methodical and disinterested reasons for collecting 
resources at certain locations (Harvey 2006: 69).    Furthermore, the therapeutic sites that appear in 
CiN are temporary, and the complete segregation of these individuals is not advocated.  Nevertheless, 
these specialised sites are for children with particular problems and their families and carers only.  
They do not provide the opportunity to interact with members of society who are not co-sufferers.   
 
This is arguably not just an issue of representation, however.  If projects that are based in specific 
centres are often funded by CiN, then showing these centres simply enhances the potential donors’ 
understanding of these projects.  But even if we accept that these projects are typical of the type of 
work funded by CiN, the programme does not call upon viewers to be more accepting of 
disadvantaged individuals, including those with disabilities, in society, but to support their existence 
elsewhere.   
 
Summary of findings in section 4.1 
 
It is clear that Children in Need presents different places as being linked to activity types.  These 
activities involve different actors.  While the studio contains an audience, entertainers and celebrity 
presenters, different celebrities appear with children and families in the vignettes that show 
beneficiary places.  Non-celebrity fundraisers are shown at fundraising events in their own local 
areas.  Beneficiaries generally only appear in problematic or therapeutic spaces; on the few 
occasions that they appear in fundraising spaces it is because groups from the latter are also taking 
part in fundraising activities.  This representation of different groups in distinct places has the 
potential to naturalise the separation of these groups in society. 
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In rhetorical terms, the marked visual differences between the fundraising places, beneficiary places 
and the studio present them as being categorically different from one another (Arribas-Allyon et. al 
2013).   In this way, the programme reinforces the idea that mediators are needed to negotiate between 
the people in them.  The needs of the sufferers and the efforts of the viewers cannot be reconciled 
without the charity.  The show becomes the focal point for both sets of people, and viewers and 
beneficiaries are encouraged to feel socially distant from one another. 
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4.2: Social distance in the focus group data: extreme physical proximity 
 
In this section, I explore the idea of social distance as represented in talk in the focus group data.  As 
discussed above, social distance is what occurs when different social groups fail to interact with each 
other because they occupy different places, or the same places at different times, without this being 
enforced.  The idea that interaction between different social groups is minimised in this way is 
discussed both implicitly and explicitly at many points in the focus group data.  It seems that, for these 
speakers at least, issues of social inequality are inextricably tied to the differential use of place.  
Participants explicitly refer to patterns of spatial segregation, for example brought about by a lack of 
housing in London and a lack of jobs elsewhere (Amnesty group).  They also discuss how the practice 
of using catchment areas to determine access to schools creates and entrenches socioeconomic 
differences within towns (Amnesty group and Charities group).   
 
Furthermore, different focus group participants also report having different levels of contact with the 
people they identify as being disadvantaged within Britain.  The Office group identify people that 
they see outside their workplace in a relatively poor ward in Cardiff as disadvantaged, although they 
note that these people use the place in different ways from themselves.  Specifically, these people are 
seen around the area during work hours, dressed in sleepwear, while the group members themselves 
watch them from inside while at work.  Members of the Charities group present themselves as having 
in-depth knowledge of issues of disadvantaged people based on close professional, but not personal, 
relationships.  The Academics, by contrast, often use reports from other people that they know to talk 
about the subject of social inequality, and report feeling distanced or insulated from these issues.  This 
data suggests that viewers of CiN might feel somewhat separated from members of other social 
groups before they have watched the programme. 
 
I have chosen the extracts below to illustrate and further examine the idea of social distance as 
represented in this data because they run counter to CiN’s representation in which social differences 
are mapped onto spatial differences.  In both extracts presented below from the Charities and the 
Office group, what I will call ‘formulations of extreme proximity’ are used to highlight a difference in 
circumstances.  In other words, at these moments, focus group participants represent people with 
different circumstances as occupying contiguous places.  These formulations indicate that physical 
closeness is not necessarily related to occupation of different places for these speakers.   
 
In the following extract, from the Charities group, the boundaries that are set between the official 
areas of support and areas without official support are highlighted.  These boundaries are described 
explicitly as not coinciding with real differences of circumstances for residents, however. 
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Charities group, original line numbers 1084 – 1105 (see appendix 8) 
1  Penny yeah the (.) Communities First (.) funding is (.) um given out depending on (.) the results 
2  from the WIMD Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (.) if you’ve ever taken or if you’re 
3  ever bored (.) and you take the time to look at specifically (.) where Communities First 
4  areas were because I work in Adamsdown which is a very small ward in Cardiff (.) spilt 
5 Mary        [hmm 
6 Penny into five sub-wards  
7 Mary oh wow 
8 Penny        [only three of which qualify for Communities First (.) and you get to the point where 
9  (.) one side of a street qualifies and the other side of a street  
10 Mary    [yeah 
11 Nicola    [yeah 
12 Penny doesn’t 
13 Nicola it’s like Flying Start as well isn’t it for the children  
14 Penny                [exactly it’s with um (.) school catchment areas 
15 Nicola //yeah 
16 Mary //yeah 
17 Penny        [so if you fall on (.) the wrong side of a street (.) you are not entitled to the support 
18  (.) in uh officially (.) not entitled to the support (.) I think there’s a lot of workers that (.) 
19  bend the rules (1.0) and I’m sure you find this with ((your own)) 
20 Mary       (laughing) [yeah 
21 Penny the the (.) there are ways and means to do it (.) but officially yeah (.) you live on  
22 Mary  [as they should do (indistinguishable) (laugh)  
23 Penny (.) number thirty-two and you can’t get the help that number thirty-one gets 
 
In this extract, the assessment by Communities First of need based on address is criticised.  However, 
like the policy itself, this criticism is based on the premise that people in the same localities have the 
same experiences.  The assumption that people who occupy similar places have shared circumstances 
is described as being the basis for deciding who gets support (lines 1-4), and also for suggesting that 
the boundaries set in these circumstances are not workable (line 9 onwards).  While official support 
ends at a specified boundary, Penny suggests that the residents’ need for support does not necessarily 
change at this point.  Rather than discussing examples from the centre of each type of area, Penny 
draws attention to the borders between supported and unsupported areas, where the circumstances of 
occupants are more likely to be similar.  Penny also creates the impression that Communities First’s 
methods are overly technical.  She does this by providing detailed, potentially boring (line 3), 
information about it (lines 3-8). 
 
Penny repeatedly invokes the idea of neighbours whose support needs are assumed to be similar in 
order to highlight the idea that such boundaries are not practical (lines 9, 17, 23).  Pomerantz (1986) 
observes that when people provide accounts of their views or actions, they often do so by using 
formulations such as ‘all the time,’ ‘everybody,’ or ‘no one’ (1986: 228).  She refers to these as 
‘Extreme Case Formulations’, or ‘ECFs’.  These formulations are used to defend the legitimacy of the 
 
 
91 
 
speaker’s stance.  Although Penny does not use this type of ECF, she nevertheless uses several 
formulations relating to extreme proximity (‘one side of a street… the other side’ (9), ‘the wrong side 
of a street’ (17), ‘number thirty-two… number thirty-one’ (23)) to emphasise her point.  Like ECFs, 
these statements take an idea and push it to its logical limits.  They seem to function to defend 
Penny’s opposition to the rigidity of the assessment, and to provide support for her decision to ‘bend 
the rules’ (line 19) accordingly.  Nicola likens the phenomenon Penny is describing to another 
government scheme in which these processes also occur (line 13).  Other speakers support these 
statements by means of minimal feedback.   
 
In some of the other focus groups proximity is also discussed in relation to social distance.     By 
contrast to Penny’s argument in the extract above, in the following extract, from the Office group, 
Helen contends that differences in socioeconomic status do correspond with residence on opposite 
sides of a street.  Helen argues that it is these differences that endow members of different social 
groups with differing attitudes to an issue affecting a local resident.   
Office group, original line numbers 266 – 275 (see appendix 6) 
1 Helen you’ve got a road (.) running through where I live (.) and one side is (.) 
2  private housing (.) and the other side is (.) supported housing (2.5) and (1.5) 
3  you know i- it’s a case of (.) uh an attitude towards an individual we were 
4  talking about (.) where (.) there was an article in the local paper (.) and I 
5  know for a fact that on one side of the road all the people were saying 
6  ‘(gasp) this (.) whatever happened (.) is disgusting he- uh shouldn’t have to 
7  put up with that and (.) the uh government’s all wrong and they- he should 
8  be getting this and he should be getting that’ (.) but on the other side of the 
9  road probably everyone who opened that newspaper would be sitting there 
10  saying (.) ‘well if he doesn’t like it he should get a job’ (laugh) you know (.)  
 
Here, proximity is used to contrast what are represented as two different communities of practice.  
Communities of practice are defined by Eckert (2006: 683) as groups of people who unite because of 
a shared interest or position, which inform their members’ responses to the world around them (Eckert 
2006: 683)).  The contrast between the group that supports the individual in question and the group 
that is more critical of him is emphasised by depicting these communities as residents of the same 
area, separated only by a road, but different in terms of whether or not they own their own homes.  
Helen contrasts the reactions of these groups by using constructed dialogue that she attributes to their 
members.  Whereas the first group is depicted as reactionary, as expressed in their paralinguistic 
respiration (line 6), the second group is described as having a relaxed physical posture (‘sitting there’, 
line 9) and responding in a more considered way.   
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The contrasting views of these different groups are also represented with differing degrees of 
certainty.  The ECF ‘all’ (line 5) is used to describe the level of uptake of the opinion attributed to 
people who live in supported housing.  Knowledge of the views of these people is also represented 
using markedly high modality (‘I know for a fact’, lines 4-5).  The views of the group who live in 
private housing are described with lower modality (‘probably everyone’, line 9). This difference has 
the effect of making the views of the people in supported housing appear more fixed and extreme than 
those of the people in private housing.   
 
In this extract, the cause of the link between peoples’ differing views and the socioeconomic 
differences between them is left unclear.  While it is likely that the personal circumstances of 
residents influence how they interpret the situation, it is also subtly suggested that these people’s 
attitudes might be the source of the difference in their circumstances.  While those in supported 
housing are portrayed as blaming external sources for the difficulties people might face (lines 6-8), 
those in private housing are portrayed as advocating personally taking responsibility for them (line 
10).  The implication therefore is that those in private housing are those who tend to take more 
responsibility for themselves in general. 
 
The commonality between the above extracts is the speakers’ use of formulations of extreme 
proximity.  Similarly, in the Amnesty group, the school catchment area system is discussed using 
formulations of extreme proximity.  Sam describes the difference between the school he attended and 
the better school ‘next door’ (original line number 86).  This motif is echoed by Tara around 10 
minutes later, when she argues that investment is needed to address catchment area-related failure of 
schools, with the aim of making underprivileged children’s opportunities equal with those of ‘the 
lucky kids in the school next door’ (line 210).   
 
However, I would contend that the fact that proximity is evoked to emphasise difference in each of 
these instances indicates that these situations run counter to expectations.  The expectation is that 
people who live adjacent to each other will have access to similar levels of support from government 
schemes, will belong to the same community of practice, will have similar socioeconomic 
circumstances and will have similar experiences of education.  What each of these examples 
demonstrates, then, is an underlying assumption that people who are geographically close to one 
another will have some level of shared experience.  In tension with this assumption is the recognition 
that, in many instances, this is not the case, because sometimes even next-door neighbours may have 
irreconcilably different experiences. However, in each of these instances, social groups whose 
experiences diverge nevertheless have some level of contact with, or at least the ability to be in 
contact with the other group.  Despite the disparity of their situations, people in these groups are not 
reliant on mass media in order to experience one another.  Rather, contrasted groups appear side-by-
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side in their desire for services (government support, education, healthcare), but with unequal access 
to and attitudes towards them.   
 
In terms of the politics of pity, the focus group data examined here indicates that the ability for the 
fortunate and the unfortunate to meet face-to-face does not in itself make other bodies such as 
charities obsolete.  This introduces a complication into the politics of pity as described by Boltanski 
(1999).  Boltanski (1999) sees the unfortunate as looking towards the fortunate to ameliorate their 
suffering, and these two groups as being irreconcilably different from one another.  However, the data 
examined in this chapter suggest that in the case of an intra-national charity, this distinction might not 
be so clear.  For example, neighbours may have unequal access to some services, while being 
otherwise similar in terms of their circumstances.  While the fortunate may regard the unfortunate 
from socially distant (but physically close) positions, both groups may be looking to a third party, 
rather than to each other, to redress the differences between them.  Furthermore, it is clear that 
‘disadvantage’ has several facets.  For CiN this broad term is used to cover poverty, health conditions 
and tragic life circumstances, such as the death of a family member.  It is therefore quite possible that 
viewers who are ‘disadvantaged’ in one area of their lives as defined by CiN will still donate to the 
charity.  For example, a family on a low income who have able-bodied children might fundraise or 
give money.  Equally, individuals who are not disadvantaged in some areas might receive support 
from the charity.  For example, children of families who have favourable physical and financial 
circumstances might access the services it supports in politically volatile areas in Northern Ireland (as 
shown in chapter 5).  If the fortunate and the unfortunate are not naturally distinct then the fact that 
some charities create the impression of difference between them is particularly significant.         
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explored how social distance between groups is represented in CiN and in focus 
group discussions.  In CiN different social groups in relation to the charity (givers, beneficiaries, and 
celebrity supporters) are represented in physically separate places.  Viewers are primarily positioned 
in fundraising places, which are common and familiar.  By contrast, those who the charity might 
benefit appear in problematic and therapeutic places, which are represented as unknown to viewers 
both in the use of celebrities to present and interpret them and in terms of what these celebrities say.  
The studio and, in particular, its screen, marks the boundaries between different types of places.  This 
adds to the impression that these places, and by extension their occupants, would be irreconcilably 
distinct without the use of intermediary agents such as CiN to unite them.   
 
Meanwhile, the focus group discussions reveal an underlying investment in the idea of social distance 
between different groups and the social similarities that are likely to exist between those that occupy 
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the same place.  However, these differences may be enforced by government initiatives that seek to 
redress them, such as Communities First, and disparities of situation may occur on a much smaller 
scale than is suggested in CiN. 
 
Taken together, my findings suggest that the idea of social distance has an impact on the way that 
different groups can (or not) interact with each other in UK society.  This type of distance might 
account in part for the belief in the usefulness of third parties such as charities as intermediaries when 
those in one social group seek to tackle issues faced by those in another.  While, on the whole, 
viewers and beneficiaries are presented as socially distant from one another in CiN, in the following 
chapter, I address how its portrayal of experiential closeness/distance complicates this picture.  
 
  
 
 
95 
 
Chapter 5: Experiential Distance 
Because charitable interactions often occur between continents, there is usually a great physical 
distance between donors and beneficiaries.  This, it has been argued by many scholars, transforms the 
nature of the interaction between those who suffer and those who seek to help them from compassion 
into pity (Arendt 1990, Boltanski 1999, Chouliaraki 2006).  In my own framework, however, I 
suggested that different types of distance might have a similar impact on these exchanges.  These 
distinct types of distance form the basis of my enquiry in each of my analysis chapters.  In the 
previous chapter, I explored how social distance is reflected and reinforced in both sets of data 
through the representation of different people in separate places. In the present chapter, I explore a 
second type of closeness/distance: the degree to which sufferers are portrayed as being similar to 
viewers.  Bilandzic’s (2006) theory of ‘perceived distance’ is a means of conceptualising the ways in 
which people are encouraged to feel more or less involved in narratives about others.  It is comprised 
of two different elements.  The first is a feeling of similarity with the depicted people felt by those 
who view them.  It is this aspect, which Bilandzic calls ‘experiential closeness’, that I will examine in 
this chapter.  The second is a sense of immersion in narratives about the lives of others, regardless of 
the degree to which they appear to be similar to the viewer/reader.  I will explore this aspect in 
chapters 6 and 7.   
 
In CiN, there is one aspect of identity that is taken as shared across viewers and beneficiaries: British, 
or UK nationality.4  The intended audience of CiN, and everyone who appears in it, may vary in age, 
gender, race, and class, but all live within the UK.  It follows that understanding how national 
identities are represented, taken up and / or contested is key to examining the degree to which CiN 
and its potential viewers are encouraged to invest in the idea that they are experientially close to its 
beneficiaries.  I begin this chapter by revisiting and expanding upon theoretical understandings of 
nationalism that were introduced in chapter 3, focusing on national identity in particular and its 
potential consequences in the context of charitable giving.  I then turn again to the data, first exploring 
CiN’s presentation of national identity and then examining the discussions about this topic in the 
focus groups.   
 
  
                                                          
4 In fact, CiN supports projects within Northern Ireland, but its presenters often use the terms ‘UK’ and ‘Britain’ 
interchangeably, an error that has also been reported to occur in BBC News programmes (Lewis et al. 2008 
:16) 
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5.1 Nationalism and charity media 
 
As a charity only for UK-based children, CiN’s remit is defined in terms of this scale.  Although it is 
not unusual for telethons to either fundraise or to donate on a national scale (i.e. for one nation by 
another nation, e.g. Berg 2005; Mason 2011), it is relatively rare for a telethon to fundraise from and 
for the same area.  On a practical level, a national remit might be administratively easier.  However, 
both in form and content, the programme at the very least reinscribes the idea that national boundaries 
are valid. 
 
As outlined in chapter 3, although the term ‘nationalism’ is often associated with patriotic fervour and 
right-wing politics, it also applies to softer, less noticeable, expressions of ideas about national 
character and the requirement to prioritise the needs of one’s compatriots over those of other nations 
(Billig 1995).  Nationalism rests on a set of assumptions about the division of space, politics and 
identity.  However, many of the ideas and assumptions that are linked to national identity appear 
somewhat contradictory. I suggested that there were five key tensions in nationalism: 1) naturalness / 
ubiquity versus contingency; 2) reason versus emotion; 3) past versus future and present; 4) self 
versus other; and 5) movement versus stasis.  Firstly, nationalism assumes that there is a natural 
relationship between people and the spaces they live in, which inevitably imbues them with a sense of 
national identity (Johnstone 2004: 66).  This relationship is seen as ubiquitous, in that everyone is 
assumed to have a national identity (Anderson 2004 [1983]: 5).  In reality, however, nationality is 
based upon political units of different sizes, with clearly defined and enforced borders, within which 
people have quite differing relationships to their nation.  For example, for some people their 
subcultural identity might be primary, while for others their national identity is more significant 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 7).  Secondly, seeing the world as divided into nations is taken as a 
rational, common sense understanding of the world (Billig 1995, Bishop and Jaworski 2003: 247). But 
the nation is also imbued with personal and emotional meanings, as when, for example, one’s nation 
is referred to as one’s ‘homeland’ (Sack 1983: 62).  Thirdly, our national identity is promised as 
something that will outlive us, which is why we are in some cases willing to die for it (Poole 1999: 
70).  However, it also implicates us in the achievements and failures of fellow nationals from the past 
(1999: 72), which is why past events are often hotly contested by nationalists.  Fourthly, national 
identity, to an even greater extent than in other forms of identity, ultimately requires the bearer to 
privilege the needs of his compatriots over those of outsiders (Poole 1999: 70).  In this way, it is 
concerned with other national selves.  On the other hand, as with most other forms of identity, it is 
defined only in opposition to other identities.  In other words, there could never be a whole British 
world (Anderson 2004 [1983]: 7).  Finally, nationalism is predicated on the idea that people are to 
some degree static across time, although this requires ignoring mass migration and natural history.   
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Yet it is only when citizens move, or engage with members of different nations in other ways, that 
their national identity becomes relevant.  Across all of these dimensions, nationalists emphasise an 
idea of closeness with other nationals, and, sometimes only implicitly, distance from others. 
 
Anderson (1983) argues that one of the key ways in which people are made to feel closer to fellow 
nationals is by their sharing of simultaneous experiences such as reading national newspapers 
(Anderson 2004 [1983]: 7).  This practice is now less pervasive than in the earlier part of the twentieth 
century in particular, but cinema and television can be seen as providing other ways in which 
‘imagined world[s]’ (2004 [1983[: 35) (both fictional and non-fictional) can still be consumed, and 
with even greater simultaneity.  The norm for a great deal of broadcast television’s time has been for 
these shared experiences to take place at the national level (Richardson an Meinhof 1999: 9).  More 
recently, the proliferation of television channels, as well as the increased accessibility of internet 
entertainment, have resulted in a more separate, ‘radically privatised’ viewing experience (Turner and 
Tay 2009:1).  But this means that rare one-off live events (Marriott 1996: 69) are able to utilise their 
status as a departure from the norm of more fragmented cultural experiences.  CiN is a major 
television event.  It is broadcast live across the UK for an entire Friday evening on a major television 
channel and, in 2011, reports about the show’s success appeared in many British newspapers, 
including The Guardian, The Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph.  Using this format allows CiN to 
attract viewers seeking a communal experience, as  it acts as a point of contact between them and 
other Britons.  In this way, it generates a temporary community, which might strengthen viewers’ 
shared feelings (Olesen 2012: 100).   There is evidence to suggest that local television news, for 
example, is used by people seeking a form of social interaction (Rubin, Perse and Powell 1985).  
CiN’s live nature is repeatedly mentioned during the broadcast, although many of its features are pre-
recorded, with only studio and live local fundraising sections appearing to be aired in real-time.  In 
this way, it encourages viewers to feel that they are partaking in a national event, rather than simply 
watching a programme. 
 
The content of CiN also contributes to nationalist discourse by presenting a certain image of the UK.  
According to Bishop and Jaworski (2003), nationalistic ideology is perpetuated not only in media 
texts expressly dealing with nationalism, but also in other types of communication.  The sort of 
nationalism that is utilised in entertainment programmes, such as sports, can appear harmless and 
apolitical, but it constitutes a form of ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig 1995) that keeps the idea ready for 
utilisation at other, more consequential, points in time.  CiN gives a particular impression of what the 
UK is like, defining its national character as generous and identifying what the country’s gravest 
problems are.  By disregarding all problems outside of the UK, it also suggests that it is both possible 
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and appropriate to address the UK’s problems in isolation.  Both its remit and its portrayal of the UK 
contribute to a wider discourse about whether or not charity should end at national borders.5 
 
Experiments have indicated that making a shared national identity salient makes individuals more 
likely to donate (Levine and Thompson 2004), although programmes in which donors and 
beneficiaries occupy the same country are rare in practice.  In international charity events, being a 
donor country indicates a relative level of affluence (Mason 2010: 98, Olesen 2012: 100).  But, in 
CiN, in order to justify requests for money for its citizens, the UK also has to be portrayed as a place 
of need.  While a shared national identity might be a source of empathy, the separate roles of 
beneficiaries and donor-viewers necessarily imply differences of situation, if not of character, 
between members of the same nation. 
 
The features that I pay particular attention to in analysing the extent to which CiN and the focus group 
discussions indicate experiential closeness are those which posit certain kinds of relationships 
between people.  In particular, I examine contrast devices, pronoun use and metaphors.  I also discuss 
‘event work’ in relation to a section of the CiN data which, I argue, goes beyond the creation of 
experiential closeness in its evocation of a sense of a British national community.  Contrast devices 
are defined here as a means of explaining categorisation, particularly of social actors, by opposing one 
thing, person, or group with another (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2013: 74).  They are thus an important way 
of accounting for beliefs about who should be included in or excluded from certain contexts.  Pronoun 
use also is an important element of accounts about moral decisions, particularly in regard to 
interpersonal relationships (2013: 76).  Studies have shown that using different pronouns leads people 
to think and behave differently to one another.  For example, random words paired with ‘us’ are rated 
as more pleasant than words paired with ‘them’ (Perdue et al. 1990).  Inclusive plural pronouns such 
as ‘we’ and ‘us’ have also been found to increase people’s perception that their relationships are close 
and high in quality (Fitzsimons and Kay 2004).  
 
Metaphors can both reveal and affect understanding.   Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory (CMT) posits that linguistic metaphors index cognitive processes.  They argue that 
mappings between the ‘target’ (thing to be understood) and ‘source’ (agent of understanding) domains 
occur not only in expression but also in understanding.  They view the linguistic expressions of 
metaphors as being secondary to the cognitive mappings they reveal (Lakoff 1993: 203).  According 
to this theory, then, the metaphors that participants use in the focus groups might provide an insight 
into their thoughts. 
                                                          
5 The UK is, of course made up of four constituent nations: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  In 
this analysis, I interpret the UK as the primary unit of national identity, as this was the scale on which it 
primarily appeared in both sets of data. 
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More recently, Cameron et al. (2009) have proposed a ‘discourse dynamics’ approach to metaphor.  
They understand language as a situated activity, in the sense that what gets said is influenced by the 
situation.  Utterances are understood as being affected both by what else has been said and by 
speakers’ apprehensions of how what they say will be perceived by those present.  Metaphors are 
therefore not seen as pre-existing tools that can be utilized in talk, but as means of expression that 
come into being in the act of speaking itself.  When common metaphors are found to be shared across 
speakers and contexts, they are described as having been ‘stabilized’.  Stabilized metaphors are 
understood to be the result not of cognitive mappings that are shared across individuals, but as ways 
of speaking and understanding phenomena that have come about through repeated use (2009: 67).   
 
Although Cameron et al. accept the CMT premise that ‘metaphor reveals something of how people 
think and feel’ (2009: 63), they argue that the role of language in metaphor has been unduly 
downplayed.  Both approaches suggest that the repeated use of particular metaphors affect thinking, as 
well as reflecting it (2009: 68).  If we accept that metaphors can shape people’s understanding of 
social concepts, then their use in discourse about others can potentially change people’s 
understandings of, and eventually, reactions to, members of these groups.  Over time, metaphors that 
are repeatedly used can come to be understood as a ‘natural’ way of talking about certain issues.  In 
the analysis that follows, I will draw upon Cameron et al.’s (2009) approach to metaphor, exploring 
not only the mappings between target and source domains that appear in the data, but also how 
metaphors are sometimes tentatively introduced and then expanded upon in the conversations, and 
how they are rejected or reconfigured by other speakers.  
 
5.2 Prioritising compatriots 
 
Following Arribas-Ayllon et al. (2013), I assume throughout this thesis that both the producers of CiN 
and the focus group participants are involved in providing justifications of some kind for their actions 
and / or stances.  In terms of CiN, I presuppose that there will be an attempt to account for donation 
requests.  Different justifications appear at different points during the show.  Before and after 
entertainment scenes, the norm of reciprocity is invoked: the show has provided entertainment, and 
something is requested in return.  In beneficiary vignettes, the show provides justification in terms of 
the assumed greater needs of recipients compared with those of viewers, as I discuss in section 5.3.  In 
the present section, I examine another kind of justification: accounts for prioritising CiN’s recipients 
over those of other charities, particularly international ones. 
 
In both extracts 1 and 2, presenters Alesha Dixon and Terry Wogan introduce segments of the 
programme that have been filmed away from the studio: a beneficiary vignette and a fundraising 
 
 
100 
 
vignette.  They focus the audience’s attention on the purpose of raising money, providing two types of 
account for their requests.  Firstly, they justify making a demand for charitable donations in a 
challenging economic climate in terms of the acute needs of recipients, and secondly, they provide 
reasons for supporting this charity over others.     
 
Extract 1 
8:02 
 
Alesha Dixon: wow what a line-up (.) and 
we’re all here for one reason (.) to help 
children in need across the country= 
Terry Wogan:=yeah= 
Alesha Dixon: =one thing we really need to 
tell you (.) every penny is spent right here in 
the United Kingdom   
Terry Wogan: yeah (.) now we know that (.) 
times are tough (.) perhaps this year (.) more 
than ever (.) but of course (.) sadly (.) that’s 
when the most vulnerable members of our 
society feel- feel it the most (1.0) that’s why 
your help (.) is desperately needed (.) now I 
know you’ll do your bit (1.0) you always do 
(1.0) so please (.) just have a look at what 
we’re trying to achieve (1.0) and how a 
simple act of kindness (. ) from you (1.0) can 
change children’s lives 
Silence in 
background  
 
Extract 2 
25:51 
 
Alesha Dixon: everywhere you look (.) 
people are pulling together for Children in 
Need (1.0) and the great thing (.) is that all 
the money raised (.) helps children in this 
country (1.0) later on (.) children all over the 
UK (.) will be coming together for an 
incredible musical performance in aid of this 
year’s appeal (1.0) let’s hear about that (.) 
and everything else that’s been happening in 
(points at camera) your area (.) for Children 
in Need (.) two thousand and eleven  
 
 
  
 
In both extracts 1 and 2, presenters provide rationalisations for prioritising this charity in particular.  
These justifications focus on the intra-national aspects of the charity: the fact that the money will be 
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given exclusively to citizens of the UK, and the opportunity for viewers to be assimilated into a 
national community of fundraisers by donating money.  The charity exclusively helping children in 
the UK is emphasised as a ‘great’ thing (2).  No reason is provided for this, however.  This lack of 
justification suggests that viewers are expected to already understand the benefits of helping only 
nationals.  Alesha Dixon’s statement that all funds raised stay within the UK also contains many 
points of emphasis: it is ‘really’ important, the money is spent ‘right’ here and includes ‘every’ penny.  
This suggests that this aspect of the show is expected to appeal to the audience.  It also implies that 
this scope is exceptional, in that this group of people is not usually prioritised in this way.  Although 
no other types of charities or care providers are mentioned, this sets up a dichotomy between CiN’s 
focus and those of other organisations.  Billig (1991: 44) argues that all ‘arguments’ are inherently 
counterarguments to another position, which is sometimes left implicit.  In this instance, the charity 
defines itself in opposition to those bodies for which UK citizens are not the priority.  
 
These clips also offer viewers a sense of communal identity.  The first person plural pronoun is used 
both inclusively (referring to both the presenters and producers of the show and its viewers) and 
exclusively (referring only to the former) in these figures.  Using pronouns inclusively (‘what we’re 
trying to achieve’), according to Fitzsimons and Kay (2004), should cause viewers to feel closer to the 
presenters.  Many of the uses of ‘we’ in this instance, however, are ambiguous; it is unclear whether 
the viewers are included in or excluded from the group of people mentioned.  For example, in extract 
1, Alesha Dixon’s phrase ‘we’re all here for one reason’ could be interpreted as referring only to those 
in the studio, or also to those watching at home.  Terry Wogan primarily refers to viewers as ‘you’ 
(and also uses the possessive determiner ‘your’).  This is an exclusive use of the second person 
pronoun in the sense that a distinction is made between the people addressed and the addressor.  This 
means that a sense of distance between Wogan and CiN’s viewers is created that does not exist when, 
for example, ‘we’ is used inclusively.  There are, however, other possible advantages to addressing 
viewers directly.  Brunyé et al. (2009) found that texts that use the pronoun ‘you’ make it easier for 
readers to imagine themselves participating in the narrative they were reading.  Addressing viewers as 
‘you’ therefore may make it more likely that they will imagine themselves in the terms in which they 
are described.  In this case, they might be more likely to view themselves as donors and therefore be 
more likely to donate.  Furthermore, Wogan implies a sense of familiarity with viewers by displaying 
his apparent knowledge of their values and behaviour (‘I know you’ll do your bit (1.0) you always 
do’, figure 1).  ‘You’ also potentially refers to all viewers, and therefore serves to emphasise the idea 
that they constitute one community of people concerned with the health and happiness of the UK’s 
children.  In these clips, pronouns are thus used in ways that maximise a sense of community, both 
between the givers themselves and, to a lesser extent, between givers and presenters.  This inferred 
solidarity is predicated on a shared experience of watching the show and a shared geographical 
location (the UK).  
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5.3 Beyond accounting for national giving: Children in Need and the Imagined Community  
 
The show’s attempts to create a sense of national community are also sometimes made explicit.  
Extract 3 is taken from the end of the first hour of the broadcast.  In it, the audience is shown the 
preparation of an entertainment feature that will appear slightly later in the programme.   This feature 
will involve children singing in unison in a number of choirs in different locations across the UK that 
will be linked up by digital technology. In the previous chapter, I showed how beneficiaries and 
donors appeared separately in the show and were also presented in different places.  The following 
clip provides a rare exception to this rule of separation.  In this instance, both choirs that are and are 
not funded by CiN are united in the task of fundraising for the charity.  This multi-choir performance 
therefore gives beneficiaries as well as other children the opportunity to contribute to the charity.  
However, the inclusion of beneficiaries in the task of fundraising does not seem to be the primary goal 
of this exercise.  Instead, the unity of diverse groups of children is used to symbolise the potential 
unity of Britain more broadly.  In this introductory clip, the forthcoming performance is framed both 
as a potential personal victory for choirmaster Gareth Malone and as evidence of the achievement of 
accord across Britain. 
 
Extract 3 
 Time  Visual Verbal Audio 
1 57:23 
 
Alesha Dixon: Children in Need is that time 
of year when people come together to do 
extraordinary things for the nation’s children 
(.) this year (.) choir guru Gareth Malone has 
stepped up for his toughest challenge yet (.) 
Terry Wogan: hmm 
Alesha Dixon: two and a half thousand kids 
singing (.) live (.) this is his story 
 
  
2 57:48 
 
Sara Cox (v/o): charismatic choir master 
Gareth Malone 
Dramatic, war-
themed music 
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3 57:51 
 
A series of shots of Gareth 
and of children singing, 
including some audio of 
children singing 
is on a mission to bring the country together 
like never before he’s already successfully  
turned the most unlikely singers into 
seasoned performers but could his next 
challenge be a step too far? 
 
4 58:12 
 
creating a nation-wide choir to sing in unison 
live via satellite tonight for Children in Need 
 
5 58:17 
 
A series of shots of UK 
locations   
Malone: Getting choirs to sing at the same 
time all over Britain (.) is going to be a huge 
technical challenge (.) and a huge musical 
challenge 
Music: Ellie 
Goulding – 
Starry Eyed 
6 58:24 
 
Series of shots of Gareth 
driving and walking, and of 
some choirs  
v/o: Gareth has travelled the length and 
breadth of the country in search of singing 
groups to take part in this national sing-
along 
Music: Ellie 
Goulding – 
Starry Eyed 
7 58:30 
 
Gareth: hello Devon! 
Children cheer 
 
Music: Ellie 
Goulding – 
Starry Eyed 
8 58:33 
 
Gareth to choir(s) (v/o): we’re going (.) all 
over the country looking for groups to join 
us (.) and we’re wondering whether you’d 
like to be part of that (.) on the night  
 
 
Music: Ellie 
Goulding – 
Starry Eyed 
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9 58:39 
 
Choir (shouts): yes Music: Ellie 
Goulding – 
Starry Eyed 
10 58:43 
 
Gareth: yay! Woo! Gareth ‘high 
fives’ choir 
members   
… 
11 59:05 
 
Sara Cox (v/o): this singing group was 
formed within Omagh to promote peace 
within a shattered community 
 
 
Choir sings: ooo 
sweet child of 
mine 
12 59:14 
 
Gareth Malone: what they do u- is is (.) 
exactly what this is about it’s about bringing 
people together through singing  
 
… 
13 59:44 
 
Series of shots of children 
in choirs, and of Gareth 
Malone speaking to camera 
Gareth Malone (v/o): getting choirs together 
(1.0) when you’re (.) six hundred miles apart 
(1.0) is really tough 
Music: upbeat 
harp playing 
(Florence and 
the Machine) 
 
14 59:49 
 
Series of shots of choirs in 
practice 
Sara Cox (v/o): as the choirmasters hold fort 
all around the country Gareth will be based 
at TV centre conducting the national event 
Music: upbeat 
harp playing 
(Florence and 
the Machine) 
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15 60:00 
 
joining him in the studio are the Big 
Performance Choir (.) ten nervous singers 
he’s been transforming into confident 
performers (1.0)  
 
16 60:07 
 
 Boy sings: true 
love of mi:ne 
Audience 
cheering 
17 60:11 
 
they’ll be kicking off this special 
performance for Children in Need Avril 
Lavigne’s keep holding on  
 
 
 
Choir sings: 
keep holding 
o:n 
… 
18 60:52 
 
 
 
 
 
Gareth Malone (v/o): it’s a community 
project it’s completely un-auditioned  
Gareth sings in 
exaggerated 
way: 
papapapapa 
and he gets 
choir to sing 
after him 
19 60:58 
 
that’s what this whole thing’s about it’s 
about bringing people together  
 
20 61:02 
 
Sara Cox (v/o): with a choir of up to three 
thousand people 
Upbeat music  
21 61:04 
 
and the performance only moments away 
can Gareth pull this off? 
Upbeat music 
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22 61:10 
 
this is far and away the biggest thing I’ve 
done (1.0) no question  
 
… 
23 61:18 
 
Gareth Malone: yes there’s potential for it to 
go wrong (1.0) but there’s great potential for 
it to be (.) amazing  
 
24 61:19 
 
 Audience 
cheering  
 
In this clip, the ‘event work’ (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2013, 69) carried out by presenters couches the 
creation of a choir in terms of an opportunity to build a national community.  The idea that the 
purpose of assembling this choir is to unite people is explicitly mentioned at several points (frames 3, 
12, 19).  This is reinforced by other references to choirs apparently performing such a role for their 
members: choral singing is described as a being capable of transcending entrenched political conflicts 
(11-12).  There is an interesting tension at work here.  On the one hand, Britain is depicted as a unit 
that can be mobilised for a particular cause.  On the other hand, it is represented as naturally more 
fractured.  Saying that Britain can be ‘[brought] together’ (frame 3) implies that this state of 
togetherness does not usually exist.  The point that the unity created by this project was difficult to 
achieve is repeatedly made.  In this relatively brief clip (3 and a half minutes), the term ‘challenge’ is 
used five times, by three different speakers.  This theme is sustained throughout the clip, with Malone 
summing up the clip by highlighting the element of risk (22), which appears to be central to the 
categorisation of the event as a daunting but worthwhile task.   
 
The event is also described as exceptional in scope.  It is referred to as unprecedented (‘like never 
before’, frame 3), ‘huge’ (frames 5) and demanding (frame 22).  The number of children involved is 
both explicitly mentioned (frame 1) and emphasised by using fast-moving montages of them that 
make them appear numerous, even though some groups appear more than once (for example those in 
frames 9 and 20).  The choir is described as being exclusively national (5), but it is later referred to as 
‘universal’ (58:54 in original transcript).  The great distances involved in uniting the choir are 
mentioned and several cities are listed (58:46 and 58:47 in original).  This sense of scope is reinforced 
in the visual channel by the depiction of Gareth Malone travelling between locations, both by car and 
 
 
107 
 
on foot (frames 5 and 6, and 60:35 in original).  This enhances the verbal narrative, which describes 
the UK as if it is almost too large to be the site for collective action.  
 
Gareth Malone is foregrounded as the protagonist in this narrative.  In the introduction to the clip, it is 
referred to as his ‘story’ and as his ‘challenge’ (frame 1).   His own feelings in relation to the project 
are also foregrounded (61:11 in original).  He is portrayed as being responsible for creating a sense of 
national unity.  This is reinforced by the arrangement of shots, which alternate between views of the 
choirs and Gareth Malone.  For example, in frames 20-21 (61:00 – 61:07 in original), there is a 
montage of different choirs, but these are bookended by shots of Malone.  In this way, Malone is 
depicted as a necessary catalyst in creating the choir’s unity.  While collective action is lauded in this 
clip, it is still Malone, as the facilitator of this action, who is credited with bringing these actors all 
together.   
 
It is likely that many members of the audience will be familiar with Malone’s project to form the 
Military Wives choir, which was aired on the BBC during November 2011.  The single produced 
from the project later went on to reach Christmas Number One in the UK.  The description of 
Malone’s CiN challenge also carries militaristic overtones.  It is described as a ‘mission’ (frame 3), 
with choir masters ‘hold[ing] fort’ (14).  The multi-instrument, dramatic band music played at the 
beginning of this clip (2-4) also enhances this impression.    
 
This theme can be traced throughout the show, for example in the phrase ‘pulling together’ in extract 
2, and ‘do your bit’ in extract 1, which is associated with wartime in Britain (Ayto 2010).  The 
relationship between nationalism and war has been repeatedly stressed in the scholarly literature.  
Nationalism provides a cause for war (Poole 1999) and, conversely, war symbolism incites 
nationalism (Anderson 2004 [1983]: 9, Bishop and Jaworski 2003).  Memories of past wars are 
particularly potent sources for the construction of national identity.  Wars that appear to present one’s 
national citizens in a favourable light tend to be evoked more than unsuccessful or unpopular 
campaigns (Noon 2004).  In America and Britain, World War II is generally remembered as a ‘good 
war’ (Bostdorff 2003), which is often used to justify later conflicts, such as the ‘war on terror’ (Noon 
2004: 341). 
 
War metaphors can be seen as supporting a nationalistic understanding of the world by contributing to 
the representation of different nations as being in conflict, which lends strength to the notion that they 
are naturally distinct (Bishop and Jaworski 2003: 251-3).  War metaphors appear in a broad range of 
contexts; they have been used to describe business in media discourse (Koller 2004), cancer in a range 
of texts (e.g. Marshall 2011), and sporting events in the mass media (Jansen and Sabo 1994, Bishop 
and Jaworski 2003).  They have also been naturalised as a way of talking about the internal struggles 
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in mental illness literature (Szasz 1998: 107), and a range of social ills, including poverty (Brauer 
1982).  Whereas many war metaphors revolve around making an enemy of something undesired (e.g. 
poverty, illness), others lack a specific opponent (e.g. in business).  Some are used as a schema for 
understanding complex phenomena (e.g. complex international relations, business data), whereas 
others, such as those used in sports reporting are more playful.    
 
It is this playful use of war metaphors that seems most relevant in the context of CiN.  Indeed, the use 
of war metaphors in language can be understood as a form of war play.  The link between war and 
play is long-established.  While educators have warned against some potentially negative impacts of 
war-based play on children (Levin and Carlsson-Paige 1987), it has also been suggested that the lines 
between simulated and real war have also become blurred to the point that war is sometimes 
experienced by soldiers as play (Baudrillard 1995).  In CiN, the use of war metaphors introduces a 
third concern.  War is understood as an unproblematic concept, whose primary effect is to unite, 
rather than to separate people, much less to kill the enemy.  References to war appear primarily in 
sections of the programme devoted to building an idea of a national community. As in all metaphors, 
some aspects of war, such as united effort and collective strength, are utilised, while other aspects, 
such as genuine threats to safety, are obscured.   The comparison of the creation of a national 
children’s choir with a war mission presents the idea of war as unproblematic.  Britons are promised 
the same sense of camaraderie that their ancestors enjoyed, but without the distressing aspects that 
necessitated this.  This sanitised concept of war is facilitated by the fact that recent wars with UK 
involvement have all taken place in distant locations.  War is thus associated with a particular time in 
British history, rather than a present threat.   
 
In terms of experiential distance, the sense of shared national identity between donors and 
beneficiaries that is constructed in extract 3 is likely to make viewers feel closer to their compatriots.  
It might also make them more likely to donate (Levine and Thompson 2004).  Furthermore, donors 
and beneficiaries are depicted as not only similar in their shared Britishness but also as sharing the 
project of creating British unity in a way that collapses the boundaries between them.  Significantly, 
this message of collective action takes precedence over other aspects of the performance that is being 
prepared for.  The aim of raising money is mentioned by Malone to the children themselves (60:46 – 
60:48 in original), but never in the voiceover, whereas the uniting goal is mentioned repeatedly to the 
audience (frames 1, 3, 12 and 19).  In terms of the theory of nationalism, in this clip, an idea of shared 
history is constructed in order to justify the present action.  Specifically, a romanticised notion of 
uniting in a war effort is invoked in order to make the task of caring for British children seem 
desirable.  It should also be remembered that nationalism always implies a distinction between the 
compatriot selves and those outside of the nation.  In this clip, as in the show as a whole, only the 
UK’s children are shown and mentioned, so that everyone appears to be included.   
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5.4 With us, but not one of us: shared national points of reference as contrast devices  
 
The uniting element of nationalism that builds a sense of experiential closeness is, however, not the 
only element of national identity drawn upon in CiN.  As I mentioned in the framework chapter, 
regardless of the extent to which experiential distance is collapsed by highlighting the shared national 
identity of viewers and beneficiaries, it is necessary that these groups are differentiated from each 
other in order to justify the request for help that is made.  This is achieved by creating a contrast 
between the idea of an expected or normative UK citizen and a person who might benefit from 
donations. In figures 4 and 5, references are made to the conditions of normal British children in order 
to highlight the need for help.   
 
Extract 4 
1 19:12 
 
Olly Murs: this is Ella (.) and she’s four Acoustic guitar music 
2 19:14 
 
years old (1.5) and (.) she’s just started 
school like other four-year-olds (2.0) 
but um (1.0) things (.) are a little 
different for Ella   
Acoustic guitar music 
3 19:20 
 
Camera pans photograph 
Olly Murs V/O: Ella was deprived of 
oxygen at birth (2.0) it left her 
severely disabled (.) she can’t walk (.)  
Acoustic guitar music 
4 19:25 
 
Camera pans photograph 
or talk (1.0) she’s fed through a tube 
in her stomach (.) and (.) she’s 
partially-sighted  
Acoustic guitar music 
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In the introduction to the clip shown in extract 4, Olly Murs refers to the standard age for beginning 
education in the UK.6  This allows for a contrast to be made between Ella, who suffers with severe 
disabilities, and the average UK child of her age.  Both Ella and the average UK child will be starting 
school aged four, but their divergent experiences of this milestone event highlight Ella’s difficulties.  
The inclusion of earlier photographs of Ella, particularly in her incubator, also encourages the 
comparison between Ella and other British children, whose baby photographs would typically not 
include specialist medical equipment.  This contrast between the average British child and the CiN 
beneficiary seems quite straightforward.  There is a tension, however, between constructing a 
particular idea of normalcy for children in the UK in order to highlight the difference between the 
norm and the experiences of CiN’s beneficiaries and using this as a means of encouraging viewers to 
relate to beneficiaries whose experiences are different from their own.  This conflict is more marked in 
the following extract, in which Zoë Ball introduces a before-school breakfast club for children from 
low-income families.  
 
Extract 5 
1 48:19 
 
 Guitar and 
string music  
2 48:20 
 
Zoë Ball V/O: it’s seven in the morning (1.0) 
and all over the country (.)  
Guitar and 
string music 
3 48:24 
 
families are starting their day (5.0) Guitar and 
string music  
Background 
noises of food 
preparation and 
talking 
4 48:28 
 
you take it for granted don’t you (1.0) get 
the kids dressed (.) feed them breakfast (.) 
do the school run (2.0) but it’s not like that 
for everyone (4.0) one in five families in the 
UK  
Guitar and 
string music 
Background 
noises of food 
preparation and 
talking 
                                                          
6 The compulsory starting age is 5 in Britain and 4 in Northern Ireland, but different provisions for 
pre-school are available in England, Wales and Scotland (The Education Website 2016) 
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5 48:37 
 
are living in poverty (1.0) and  Guitar and 
string music 
6 48:39 
 
sadly (.) some of the kids in those families (.) Guitar and 
string music 
7 48:41 
 
are going without breakfast  Guitar and 
string music 
 
The ‘you’ addressed by Zoë Ball in frame 4 seems to refer to a parent for whom providing breakfast 
for his or her family is unproblematic.  Yet in emphasising the prevalence of poverty in this clip, the 
idea of the normative UK family as not being poor is destabilised.  If one in five families lives in 
poverty, they form quite a large proportion of the UK’s population.  The definition of ‘poverty’ in 
frame 5 is also kept vague.  In reality, this figure refers to ‘relative poverty’, which is a comparative 
rather than absolute measure; it is defined as having a household income below 60% of the median 
(Jin et al. 2011: 39).  In the same way that this figure is calculated by comparison to the norm, it is by 
reference to an idea of normalcy that this clip gives an impression of what poverty is.  In the visual 
channel, this contrast is constructed by alternating images that are similar to and different from the 
norm.  While the first shots (frames 1 and 2) appear unfamiliar, the action of slicing an apple, 
particularly in combination with the verbal description of starting the day preparing breakfast (frame 
3), seem familiar.  Frame 4 is a combination of the familiar and the unfamiliar, with the seemingly 
normal action of food preparation appearing in an unusually institutional setting for a family 
breakfast. 
 
Drawing contrasts between relatively affluent UK families and CiN’s beneficiaries highlights the 
needs of the latter.  Beneficiaries are not compared with those of less affluent countries, but words and 
phrases that are associated with international poverty, such as those in charity appeals, are used to 
describe the situations of the children depicted.  Zoë Ball’s voiceover for clip 5 concludes as follows: 
 
it’s simple really (1.0) to feed more kids they need more staff (.) which they can’t afford projects like 
this need our help (.) more than ever because like it or not (.) without them (.) some children right 
here in Britain (.) would be going hungry 
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The phrase ‘going hungry’ in this context invokes the idea of children in developing or war-torn 
countries, with whom images of starvation are more commonly associated (Burman 1994).  Although 
both sets of children might be at risk of malnutrition, the ‘hunger’ they experience is likely to be 
different in some important ways.  However, the comparison is not made between the differing 
experiences of ‘going hungry’ these two sets of children might face.  The structural causes of the 
relative poverty CiN’s beneficiaries face and the many associated problems that lead to child hunger 
are also left unexplored.  Organisations funded by the charity are presented as the only barrier 
between these children and the hunger they would otherwise face.  The phrase ‘right here in Britain’ 
that appears in this clip is used repeatedly in the show.  The proximity of fellow nationals is 
emphasised in this prepositional phrase, which suggests that physical (and possibly experiential) 
closeness to these people makes their situation particularly objectionable.   
 
In these clips, then, an idea of normative relative affluence is used as a contrast to highlight the 
problems faced by some of the UK’s children.  Despite the suggestion that some of these problems are 
widespread, the families who face them are still constructed as lying outside of the norm.  Loaded 
terms that are used to describe chronic problems in developing countries, such as poverty and hunger, 
are used to infer similarity between the UK’s hungry children and those elsewhere by evoking the 
familiar discourse of foreign aid.  On one hand, this emphasises the seriousness of problems such as 
malnutrition.  On the other, it precludes examination of the causes of and longer-term solutions to 
these problems, so it is helpful only to the extent that it might encourage viewers to give to CiN.  The 
comparison favours UK children, whose problems are portrayed as equally serious as those faced by 
children in developing countries, but who are closer to home.  While these portrayals ignore the fact 
that some of the world’s children might face more acute problems, they also fail to address the 
problem of relative poverty in the UK. 
 
In sum, in CiN a particular construction of British or UK national identity is used, which acts as both 
a unifier of and a divider between donors and beneficiaries at different points.  CiN is silent on 
anything outside of the UK and makes comparisons only between different types of its citizens.  The 
argument that fellow citizens should be prioritised over people elsewhere, which is encouraged by its 
nationalistic way of framing a range of otherwise unrelated entertainment features, is implied rather 
than stated explicitly.  As I will show in the following section, this is a key point of difference 
between my two data sets when considering experiential distance.   In the focus group data, the 
question of whether only the needs of other nationals or those with the most morally urgent needs 
elsewhere (Poole 1999: 70) should be addressed was frequently a point of discussion, even though it 
was never initiated by the moderator.  This is a central concern within charitable discourse in the UK, 
in the academic literature as well as in the mass media (e.g. Moral Maze 2013).   
 
 
113 
 
 
5.5 Temporal closeness: Britain in 2011 
 
In the CiN data, other countries are never explicitly mentioned.  Disadvantaged children in the UK are 
compared with other children in the UK who are not.  While certain phrases used evoke a sense that 
these children’s situations are similar to those of children who need international aid, there is no 
acknowledgement of the UK as comparatively developmentally advanced.  In the focus groups, by 
contrast, the discrepancy between the needs faced by Britain’s relatively poor and the needs faced by 
the absolutely poor in developing countries is used to argue that those elsewhere are too experientially 
distant to relate to.  In particular, a specific turn of phrase is used by a participant in the Academics 
group and by another participant in the Amnesty group: ‘Britain in 2011’.  This phrase appears to 
encapsulate the idea that the standard of living in Britain is expected to be higher than elsewhere. 
 
In the following extract from the Academics group, Vera responds to a comment from Joe about the 
mediation of suffering.  She contrasts common responses to mediated depictions of suffering with 
reactions to local suffering.  She argues that different frames should be used to understand each type 
of suffering, as conceptions of suffering are related to expectations.  In the extract below it, from the 
Amnesty group, Tara frames charitable work as an egotistic positioning act, rather than as altruism.  
She suggests that CiN is part of a culture in which the just allocation of taxes is being replaced by 
voluntary giving.  In both instances, the expectations of British citizens encapsulated in this phrase 
implies a sense of experiential closeness to other Britons and distance from those elsewhere. 
 
Academics group, original line numbers 276 – 295 (see appendix 10) 
1 Vera yeah (.) because in a way it’s (.) easier for us to understand the sort of (.) local  
2  inequalities and sufferings because (2.0) well (.) in in some ways if if we kind of  
3  think that we are more like (.) those people (.) who don’t have what we have (.)  
4  HL                    [hmm 
5 Vera rather than people in far distant places who (.) we don’t really know what  their  
6  expectations are and (.) how they themselves view (.) their lives (.) what kind of  
7  what could they reasonably expect (.) um and what extent I mean there’s no 
8 Jess         [hmm  
9 Vera question that- about their suffering but (.) kind of what are they comparing  
10  themselves with and what (.) at what level is that suffering kind of (2.0)  
11 HL   [hmm 
12 Vera conceptualised you know it’s (.) whereas people in our society (.) um (.) you kind  
13  of (1.0) uh (.) I don’t know um (1.0) I suppose what I’m getting at is who who’s  
14  defining the the inequality and uh er what what’s how does it relate to (.) to to  
15 Jess                 [hmm 
16 Vera different groups of people (.) so (.) um (1.5) and what might- what might you  
17  reasonably ex- expect (1.5) to to have (.) in (.) Great Britain in twenty eleven (.)  
 
 
114 
 
18  what sort of quality of life would you reasonably expect to have (.) as as a citizen  
19  of the UK and then (.) what (.) might you expect in in other places (.) it’s kind of  
20  um (.) you know (1.0) so 
 
 
 
Amnesty group, original line numbers 513 – 530 (see appendix 7) 
 
1 HL um (1.0) when you say about uh (1.0) you know we’ve kind of moved away from  
2  this idea of (.) helping other people (1.0) um (.) being a positive thing (.) do you  
3  think we still do as a society have any interest in helping other people (1.0) how  
4  about charitable giving for example  
5 Tara                 [ye:s but it’s not (.) it’s not from a perspective of that’s  
6  (.) the (.) the bedrock of society (1.0) it’s more like (.) ‘well I’m in a position to s-  
7  help somebody out because they’re in a w- (.) in a (.) you know in a tragic (1.0)  
8  or in a (.) vulnerable situation (.) and it might make me feel good because I can  
9  (1.0) donate or sponsor somebody’ (.) it’s not because it’s the right (.) thing to do  
10  as a society (.) I mean uh one of the things that really annoys me is Children in  
11  Need (.) I loathe it as a charity (2.0) why on earth to we have to have it? 
12 Bill             [sure   [sure 
13 Bill sure 
14 Tara why (1.0) isn’t my money as a taxpayer going (.) to those causes in the UK by all  
15  means (.) children in need (.) elsewhere (.) you know fine (.) but how come those 
16 Bill      [sure  
17 Tara things are still not (.) done properly in Britain in two thousand and eleven (.) it’s  
18  a scandal 
 
In the Academics group’s discussion Vera places Britain at the highest end of the scale of 
expectations she evokes.  This is reinforced by her referring to the year, indicating that she expects the 
passage of time to bring about a steadily increasing standard of living.  She also refers to the 
hypothetical British person as a ‘citizen’, a term that is associated with membership of a developed 
community.  In using the terms ‘Great Britain’ and ‘the UK’, she evokes an outsider’s perspective of 
the country, from which it is viewed as the pinnacle of quality of life expectations.  In the Amnesty 
group, part of Tara’s justification for her standpoint comes from her depiction of Britain as a place in 
which certain needs should not exist.  The idea of ‘Britain in two thousand and eleven’ is presented as 
being incompatible with this sort of need.  The use of the word ‘Britain’ again signals an outsider’s 
perspective (as opposed to ‘here’, ‘in our country’, or ‘where we live’). The word ‘still’ (line 17) 
implies a time scale on which Britain in 2011 is lagging behind with regard to its rightful position.   
 
What the phrase ‘Britain in 2011’ evokes in each of these cases is a sense of experiential closeness to 
people in Britain.  Fellow Britons share not only a spatial, but also a temporal “location”; 2011 is 
assumed to mean the same thing for them as it does for these speakers.  Below, I examine another 
means by which Britons are described as experientially closer than others in the focus group data.      
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5.6 Evolutionary metaphors 
 
As stated above, in many of the focus groups a central theme of dispute is whether Britons should 
respond to global needs or only to those of British citizens.  In some of these discussions, the process 
of subjugating other nations is likened to the competition between different species in the process that 
brings about evolution.  Nations are likened to species as they compete to pass on their cultural rather 
than genetic inheritance.  Participants in both the Students and Office focus groups use the idea of 
nature and evolution to defend the idea that solving British problems should be prioritised at the 
expense of foreign aid, or contribution to international loans for foreign governments.  In the 
following extract, from the Office group, Helen uses a number of biological metaphors to make her 
case that Britain’s position of relative wealth should be protected. 
 
Office group, original line numbers 399 – 439 (see appendix 6) 
1 Helen    [I mean (.) I do (.) I do have issues with  
2  (.) a lot of what’s going on on the on the global economy and everything now  
3  because (2.0) I’m old-fashioned (.) i- in order to help somebody else you’ve got 
4  to be strong enough to pick them up (.) and I don’t think there’s anything to be  
5 Eve    [hmm 
6 Helen gained by completely weakening the Western economies (.) and (1.5) taking any 
7  kind of power off them (.) because (.) all that’s happens is that they’ll get  
8  dragged down and there’ll be nobody strong enough to help anybody else then  
9 Eve     [hmm   [yeah 
10 Helen (.) because (.) at the end of the day economies are money-making machines?  
11  (2.5) and that money how it gets distributed then gets into morality and the rest  
12  of it? (2.0) is it is it fair that (.) somebody has a baby and sees it die the next day  
13  (.) uh uh I don’t know whether that comes under fairness 
14 HL            [hmm 
15 Helen I don’t (.) you know you can’t (.) because uh (.) f- fair to me (.) i- is something 
16  you make a conscious decision about (.) somebody someb- somewhere makes a  
17  decision (.) that to the person that comes off worst is an unfair decision I don’t  
18  think (1.5) I don’t think (.) the massive ecosystem of the world then is something  
19  that’s subject to ‘fair’ 
20 HL right 
21 Helen coming back to the zebra again (.) the zebra doesn’t wake up one morning think 
22 Fern  [hmm 
23 HL         [hmm 
24 Helen ‘it’s really not fair I wanted to be a lion’ (.) you know because (.) that’s (.) it’s not  
25  a decision you’ve got to make (.) it’s not a (.) it’s not a decision (1.5) we can (.)  
26 Eve  [yeah 
27 Helen make when we’re born whether we’re born in (.) a mud hut (1.0) with no clean  
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28  water or or in the palace (.) of a house in (.) Westminster or something (1.5) so 
29 Eve      [hmm 
30 Helen (3.0) I don’t know I think fairness is a different thing (1.5) and I I don’t think (1.5)  
31  (louder and quicker) we can have a sense of fair play and a sense of conscience  
32  (2.5) that makes us do charitable stuff (2.5) i- it’s when it comes down to ‘is the  
33 Fern                [yeah 
34 Helen world fair?’ no it’s not because it’s an organic thing (1.5) it’s not fair that (1.0) 
35 Eve   [no 
36 HL               [hmm 
37 Helen slugs get trod on (.) he never hurt anyone (.) you know (laughing) do you know  
38 Eve             [yeah   (laugh) 
39 Helen what I mean 
40 Eve yeah 
41 Helen it’s just the way it is 
 
Helen starts this section of talk by accounting for her position by referring to herself as ‘old-
fashioned’ (line 3).  While this might appear to deprecate herself and her argument, it actually 
contributes to the presentation of her views as having an easily-comprehensible, common-sense logic.  
She initially describes different countries as people, whose economies are bodies that can be strong, 
and heavy (lines 3-4).  This bodily metaphor unfolds into a broadly biological one as Helen’s 
argument develops.  She likens the disparate circumstances of citizens born into developed or 
developing countries to the differences that come about as a result of being born as members of 
separate species (21-24), and describes the world as ‘organic’ (34) and as an ‘ecosystem’ (18).  In this 
way, she sets up a dualism between nature and civilisation.   
 
In lines 1-30, Helen’s metaphor describes not only others but also ‘us’ as animals.  The mappings 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980) in this metaphor can be described as follows:  
 
Developed countries’ citizens = lions 
Developing countries’ citizens = zebras 
Relative level of development = place in the food chain 
Lack of control over economic circumstances = lack of control over one’s place in the food chain 
 
What cannot be mapped in this metaphor is the human capacity for reason and the ability to transcend 
animal urges.  The human capacity for integrity and intelligence are restricted to a limited set of 
actions (31-32). 
 
In line 37, however, Helen begins to use another metaphor along the same lines.  This time, the less 
fortunate people she has described (those living in mud huts) appear as slugs, and the more fortunate 
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Westerners, or perhaps Western economies, appear as a human that tramples them.  Lakoff and 
Turner (2009: 167) argue that idea of a ‘Great Chain of Being’ continues to exert a considerable 
influence on conceptions of our place in the world.  This theory holds that humans are superior to 
animals and so naturally dominate them, and that similar structures of superiority and dominance exist 
within groups of both animals and humans.  All levels of being conform to the rules of the entire 
cosmos, so that certain humans using brute force to overcome others is interpreted as an extension of 
their essentially animal natures.  When applied to castes, social classes, or races of people, those in 
relatively powerful positions can not only justify their position as part of a natural law (2009: 209), 
but can also sometimes persuade others that to attempt to subvert this state of affairs would be 
doomed to failure and morally wrong (2009: 210). In both of Helen’s metaphors, lower domain 
animals are mapped onto people in foreign countries, and those higher in the food chain are mapped 
onto ‘us’.  As with the idea of the great chain, the implication of this analogy is that less powerful 
groups should not object to their position. 
 
What is significant about this stretch of talk from the point of view of the discourse dynamics 
approach to metaphor (Cameron et al. 2009) is that Helen’s metaphor becomes more stable and 
elaborate as the discussion progresses.  In line 21 (‘coming back to the zebra again’), Helen draws on 
a metaphor she used earlier in the conversation.  A few minutes before this stretch of talk, Helen 
explains her opinion that unfairness is ‘defined by’ those experiencing the less favourable situation, 
by saying ‘because if you’re a zebra it’s not fair that lions eat you if you’re a lion it’s more than fair’ 
(original line number 286).  This comment receives support in terms of minimal feedback from both 
Fern and Eve, but is not developed further at that point.  Helen’s metaphor explicitly expresses people 
born in different countries as different species of animal (lines 21 – 41, original line numbers 419 - 
439).  Later on in the discussion, Helen refers back to this argument again when she simply says 
‘zebras and lions’ (original line number 930) in response to Eve talking about people’s differing 
perceptions of fairness.  This appears to be an instance of a metaphor being used tentatively initially, 
but becoming more stable during the course of a conversation. 
 
In the Students group (see original line numbers 82 – 134), Dave makes a similar case and also uses 
biological terminology to express this.  When Amy introduces the idea that some nations exploit 
others, Dave refers to this state of affairs as ‘the natural order’.  He suggests that in the absence of 
British imperialism, other powerful countries would have stepped in and gained similar advantages.  
Amy argues that societies have developed past the need to exploit others.  She applies the term 
‘evolved’ to the development of cultures, which challenges Dave’s application of the biological 
metaphor only to the base instincts of humans.  Dave counters this by stating that ‘human nature will 
get in the way’ of attempts to implement non-exploitative policies.   In this instance, terms linked to 
evolutionary theory are used differently by these speakers.  The metaphorical reference is again made 
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tentatively at first, but, unlike in the Office group, it is not reinforced to the point where biological 
terms can be used to represent people without further explanation.   
 
In both of these instances, human nature is depicted as consisting of dual forces: animalism on the one 
hand, and integrity and / or reason on the other.  While the latter is represented as being the source of 
civilised ideas of worldwide ‘fairness’, the former is seen as being manifested in the battles that are 
played out between nations.  By selecting organic metaphors, both Helen and Dave emphasise what 
they describe as the most influential aspect of this dualism: animal instinct.  The urge to self-protect at 
the expense of others is seen as inevitable and the desire to transcend this as unrealistic.  This idea of 
unavoidability is used by both speakers to account for their lack of desire to attempt to change the 
existing state of affairs.   
 
Although ‘the Great Chain of Being’ is an ancient idea, which has been linked to religious 
conceptions of human stewardship of other beings and deference to a god, it also overlaps 
considerably with certain aspects of evolutionary theory, in which more complex beings are seen as 
dominating simpler beings lower down in the food chain.  Darwin’s take on the supremacy of certain 
races was influenced by his own cultural conditions, and his beliefs were more nuanced than the 
scientific racism that drew on his and other similar theories (Shields and Bhatia 2009: 113).  But when 
it has been applied to human society, Darwinian theory has tended to be (mis)construed in a way that 
has served the interest of those in positions of relative power (2009: 116).  It seems that recent 
presentations of evolutionary theory might lead people to associate it with selfish and racist 
interpretations of the world, despite the range of more positive inferences that might be drawn from it, 
such as the overwhelming genetic similarity between humans and the importance of altruism to the 
survival of a species (Brem et al. 2003: 183).  It is also important to bear in mind that the influence is 
not unidirectional; popular conceptions of our place in the world can also influence scientific theory 
(Shields and Bhatia 2009). 
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5.7 Nation-states as contrast devices 
 
As well as the striking use of evolutionary metaphor discussed above, there are also more subtle ways 
in which speakers in the focus groups reinforce the idea that nations are the primary unit for the 
redistribution of resources.   When discussing possibilities, both positive and negative, for social 
policies, comparisons are repeatedly made with other nation-states.  The names of nations or 
continents are often used to embody certain ideas in relation to society.  For example, in the Students 
group, America is given as an example of poor civic engagement despite the high rate of volunteering 
there (original line numbers 973 – 981).  France is used to explain the idea of good government 
provisions for veterans, as evidenced by the lack of need for the assistance of charities such as Help 
for Heroes (394 – 400)7 and Britain is described as a relatively democratic country, carrying a range 
of privileges (899 – 904).  Similarly, in the Office group, a comparison is drawn between Britain, in 
which certain amenities are taken for granted, and ‘Third World countries’, in which there might not 
be shops such as ‘Tesco’s around the corner’ (line 347) and some people live in houses made of 
‘twigs and mud’ (line 349).  However, Britain is also portrayed as a place with its own problems, with 
some participants arguing that its people aren’t in a position to help those elsewhere, as discussed 
above.  Indonesia and Africa are referenced in relation to charitable giving as places one might choose 
whether or not ‘to worry about’ (589 – 593).  Somalia is given as an example of extreme deprivation, 
with ‘women walking for days…with children dying’ (lines 624 – 627).  The idea that UK citizens 
should be prioritised is therefore not contingent on them having greater needs.8   
 
In terms of experiential distance such descriptions are complex.  On the one hand, other countries are 
repeatedly used to create a contrast against which to describe current conditions in the UK.  Swathes 
                                                          
7 The fact that France and Germany do not have ‘Help for Heroes’ or similar charities is interpreted in the 
Counsellors group, by contrast, as evidence of the greater responsiveness of British people to challenges such 
as poorly provided-for veterans than their mainland European counterparts (original line numbers 1405 – 
1417).    
8 The Charities group tends to focus on local issues, so global comparisons are made less regularly.  However, 
America is given as a bad example in terms of its lack of access to free healthcare (lines 708 – 718).  In the 
Counselling group, different countries are mainly mentioned in reference to their citizens’ capacity for cultural 
assimilation on migrating to the UK, or their tolerance of UK culture for UK ex-pats.  Australia is presented as 
an example of a country with a better immigration policy than Britain’s, for the fact that they ‘don’t let 
anybody in’ (lines 1246 – 1248).  Saudi Arabia is used to illustrate the idea that British ex-pats are sometimes 
required to adopt the customs of their host country (1107 – 1114).  For one speaker in particular, such 
examples demonstrate the UK’s excessive lenience towards foreigners in comparison with countries.  In the 
Academics group, Hong Kong is discussed as an example of city in which a particularly unequal society is 
evident (lines 42 – 47).  Sweden, on the other hand, is seen as exemplifying egalitarianism (47 49).  In the 
Amnesty group, Scandinavian societies are also described as the ‘least stratified’ (lines 147 – 150) having high 
rates of taxation but also high levels of government investment in services.  African and South-East Asian 
countries are mentioned as having extreme social problems due to the lack of free universal healthcare (lines 
293 – 296).  Like in the Students group, America is described in negative terms because its government is seen 
to focus on philanthropy in order to compensate for a lack of provision of state services (746 – 757).  One 
speaker also advocates secular schooling and describes this as a ‘French system’ (105 – 108). 
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of people are homogenised, which Coupland describes as a common strategy of ‘othering’ (2010: 
248).  On the other hand, the comparison of these policies highlights the contingency of cultural 
conditions, and the attempt is made to imagine other possibilities for Britons. 
 
There are some interesting similarities between the ideas of countries as expressed by members of the 
different focus groups.  Although in certain cases areas bigger or smaller than national ones are 
referred to (Hong Kong, Scandinavia, and Africa), the names of individual countries are the most 
common form of reference.  In the following extract, from the Amnesty group, Sam shows an 
awareness of this form of comparison:   
 
Amnesty group, original line numbers 762 – 774 (see appendix 7) 
 
1 Sam good thing (.) I mean I’m not saying ‘yes we should have more of that’ 
2  because I think (1.0) you know I mean uh I I remember s- seeing 
3  something some Republican senator said you know (.) ‘imagine how 
4  when Obama got elected it’s like waking up in a nightmare and finding 
5  yourself in Sweden’ (1.0) you know Eur- if he’d said that to Europe you’d 
6  think ‘oh wow fantastic’ our economy’s   
7 Tara        [fantastic (.) yes 
8 Sam become Sweden and that’s (1.0) what we aspire to in America that’s  
9 Tara             [yeah  [great   
10 Sam (1.0) seen as you know one step away from China or Russia (1.5) you  
11 Tara           [awful          [yes 
12 Sam know (1.0) and I think  
13 Tara (laugh) (1.5) but         [I mean that’s an interesting comparison because 
14  actually why (.) why there’s a huge tradition of philanthropy in the States is 
15  you’ve got tax relief 
 
 
In this section of talk, Sam describes the relationship between one’s desire to emulate styles of 
administration in certain countries and one’s political affiliations.  This example is unusual in that in 
all other instances (referenced above) the countries referred to are described as if they were universally 
regarded as desirable or undesirable, whereas Sam explicitly addresses the contingency of these 
viewpoints.  On the one hand, linking other countries to arguments about political possibilities can be 
interpreted as a straightforward result of different governments pursing different policies.  On the other 
hand, it demonstrates how the apparent political leanings of a government, or former government, can 
become a shorthand for representing the political life of its country’s people.  It is not clear whether 
the ‘we’ who aspire to having an economy like Sweden’s refers only to the other speakers present 
(who, as members of the same activist group might be assumed to share a political standpoint to some 
extent) or to Britons as a whole, and his mention of Europe adds weight to this interpretation.   
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Interestingly, while this ‘we’ views the high taxes and investment in services exemplified in Sweden 
as positive, the communism nominally associated with China and formerly associated with Russia are 
taken as self-evidently a step too far.  Knowledge of what type of political system each of these 
countries has is required to decode this conversation.  It is taken as given that the other participants in 
this discussion will possess this knowledge. 
 
The similarity between Sam’s discussion in the extract above and the other examples of comparison 
between Britain’s social policies and those of other countries summarised at the beginning of section 
5.7 is that, when talking about many kinds of social problems, references to other countries are made 
in order to ground political ideas in reality.  This practice is widespread in the groups and it is clearly 
regarded by participants as a normal feature of this kind of discussion in that it is never questioned.  
While this practice allows for alternatives to be imagined, it largely draws upon the existing structures 
of nation-states and therefore places limitations on what alternatives can be imagined.  
 
Taken together, the focus group data evidences a broad range of stances towards UK or British 
national identity and the prioritisation of the needs of compatriots over those of others.  A sense of 
experiential closeness to fellow nationals is achieved when participants create a sense of spatial and 
temporal sharedness of context by using phrases such as ‘Britain in 2011’ and evolutionary metaphors 
that map members of their nation onto members of the same species.  On the flip side of this, 
experiential distance from non-nationals is maximised when speakers use other countries as contrast 
devices to compare UK policies and problems with those elsewhere.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have used the concept of nationalism to discuss experiential distance.  Experiential 
distance (Bilandzic 2006) refers to the extent to which viewer/readers are encouraged to see 
themselves as being similar to the people that are presented to them in media and other texts.  In CiN, 
the fact that both viewers and beneficiaries reside in the same country is used to create a sense of 
shared experience and identity between them. Its viewers are encouraged to feel experientially close 
to its beneficiaries to the extent that they are made aware of this shared identity.   
 
However, as I argued above, these concepts did not map onto one another neatly.  Firstly, even though 
the show creates a strong sense of national community at many points, there are other points at which 
the different roles of donors and beneficiaries are highlighted.  To a certain extent, this emphasis on 
the difference between these groups is one that is necessary for any charity requesting help: donors 
must be made to feel that their own position is preferable to that of beneficiaries.  In CiN, presenters 
address ‘you’ always as a potential donor rather than as a beneficiary.  Similarly, in clips about 
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beneficiaries, shared cultural points of reference such as the UK’s school starting age and national 
morning rituals are used as a point of contrast between viewers’ and beneficiaries’ experiences.  
Secondly, when viewers and beneficiaries are represented as one united group, such as in the creation 
of a UK-wide children’s choir, the shared project of constructing a national community appears to go 
beyond the point of creating a sense of closeness between these groups.  Instead, it creates a selective 
impression of historic and contemporary Britain that favours the interests of some people over those 
of others. 
 
While CiN is silent about other nations, the focus group data serves as a reminder that creating 
experiential closeness based on a shared national identity comes at the cost of distancing non-
nationals.  Both the metaphors used by focus group participants and their references to ‘Britain in 
2011’ emphasise experiential closeness to nationals and distance from people elsewhere.  This 
distancing of out-group members is common to other forms of identity.  Relating to others based on 
shared gender, age range or practices risks further alienating those who do not have these 
characteristics.  The alternative to this is to attempt to identify with all humanity equally.  This moral 
ideal is undercut when the world is perceived as dangerous (McFarland and Brown 2008: 46).  
Helen’s concern in the Office group that helping members of other nations will ‘drag’ Western 
economies down is an example of such a fear.  In CiN, comfort and security is provided by 
membership of the UK community, even if this community experiences some problems of its own.  
While never mentioning overseas charities, it plays on some people’s existing concerns that the UK’s 
own needs are being overlooked.   
 
Many of the apparently nationalistic features of CiN’s presentation of the UK can be explained in 
terms of the desire to distinguish the cause from other charities, particularly those whose recipients 
are overseas.  This has long been a concern about charitable giving.  Dickens, for example, drew a 
character in Bleak House whose dedication to foreign causes was linked to her inattentive treatment of 
her own children.  This character continues to be cited in debates about foreign aid (Moral Maze, 
2013), despite the substantial advances in UK welfare since then.  CiN’s use of terms associated with 
foreign aid such as ‘poverty’ in relation to the UK’s children reinforces the idea that foreign aid is 
something the country can ill-afford.  The use of such ambiguous terminology also fails to fully 
explore problems associated with relative poverty and the impact of political policies on these 
children.    
 
The naturalization of metaphors is of particular concern when they negatively affect our 
understandings of other groups, for example in media discourses on immigration (El Refaie 2001: 
368).  Referring to immigrants as ‘animals’, for example, can have negative impacts on how they are 
subsequently treated (Santa Ana 1999).  In the primary metaphor discussed in this chapter, non-native 
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others are mapped onto animals of a lower order than compatriots are.  This understanding of the 
world seems to draw upon both evolutionary theory and the idea of a ‘Great Chain of Being’.  Both of 
these ideas have historically been used to justify the subjugation of other peoples or races (Shields and 
Bhatia 2009: 116, Lakoff and Turner 2009: 212). 
 
Charitable giving, like war and immigration, is a site for the assertion and contestation of nationalistic 
views.  All concern the allocation of resources and therefore involve establishing who should be 
entitled to how much of the available assets.  While some progress has been made in addressing race 
inequalities within Western countries, the failure to fully recognise non-nationals as fellow citizens 
with the same rights is likely to be a driver for world inequalities.  Although the nationalism that 
pervades the discourse discussed here is subtler than that seen in other contexts such as sport, it 
nevertheless has important ramifications in this setting.  It may also contribute to a wider stock of 
background knowledge that can be utilised elsewhere (Billig 1995).   
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Chapter 6: Representational Distance  
Part 1: Spectacle 
In the last chapter, I examined how what Bilandzic (2006: 344) calls ‘experiential closeness’ can be 
used to create a sense of unity between those depicted in texts and the people who consume them.  
Bilandzic argues that people are more likely to relate to (and therefore to experience a feeling of 
closeness to) people that are depicted as being similar to themselves.  I discussed this idea in relation 
to national identity, which was shared between Children in Need’s viewers and its beneficiaries.   
 
In this chapter, I depart from Bilandzic’s (2006) model and focus on my own concept of 
‘representational distance’.  As I discussed in chapter 3, ‘experiential closeness’ was one half of 
Bilandzic’s broader notion of ‘perceived closeness’.  The second part of ‘perceived closeness’ is 
‘mediated closeness’, which is similar to the concept of ‘immersion’.  This refers to the way in which 
the reader of a given book or viewer of a film or television programme becomes engrossed in the life 
of the character/s in these texts to the extent that they become less aware of their own lives (Green and 
Brock 2000: 701).  Immersion, I argued, is in opposition to the sort of engagement that Boltanski and 
others suggest would be likely to make viewers engage in the lives of suffering others.  I therefore 
suggested that what counts as closeness and distance should be seen in direct opposition to that 
suggested by Bilandzic: closeness is experienced whenever there was a sense of connection between 
the viewer’s lived reality and the lives of the observed.  In order to make the distinction between what 
Bilandzic (2006: 337) calls ‘mediated closeness’ and my contrasting conception of closeness clear, I 
have called the latter ‘representational closeness / distance’, as it relates to the level of reality with 
which representations of others (both in talk and in texts) are imbued.  
 
In order to operationalise representational closeness / distance, I will seek to understand a) the degree 
to which representations of suffering others are made to seem consistent with viewers’ experience of 
reality, and b) the extent to which viewers are oriented towards actions that could ameliorate this 
suffering.  In the present chapter, I focus on the former.  I refer to the idea of the spectacle, as 
explored in chapter 3, to examine the extent to which televisual representations of suffering are 
experienced as real or as unreal.   I take ‘spectacle’ to mean the separation between images and 
reality.  I therefore consider two central questions: 1) in CiN, whose lives are represented as being 
most ‘real’? and 2) in the focus groups, do alternative ways of knowing about suffering seem more or 
less reliable than images seen in such televisual representations? 
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Answering the first of these two questions involves first operationalising the idea of reality.  For 
Debord (2002 [1967]), reality is concealed in the spectacle.  For Baudrillard (1984), it no longer 
exists.  In terms of CiN, however, I am more concerned with how differing levels of reality are 
presented to the audience at different points.  One way of assessing this is to consider the visual 
modality of images; another is to examine their authenticity.  In relation to language, modality 
generally refers to the level of probability with which the producer of an utterance imbues his or her 
statement.  For example, one understands something different from a clause containing the modal 
verb ‘must’ to one with ‘might’ (Sulkunen, Pekka and Törrönen 1997).9  This idea has been taken up 
by Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 159) in relation to the semiotics of visual images.  They suggest 
that the same function is performed in images by a range of ‘modality markers’, which indicate how 
realistic or reliable the producer is suggesting the image is.  These markers can be imagined as a range 
of scales running from low to high. They include colour saturation, differentiation and modulation, as 
well as the presence or absence of background features (contextualisation), and the representation of 
detail.  At a point around 2/3 along these scales lies a maximally ‘naturalistic’ representation.  At the 
extreme ends of each of these scales the level of projected reality is reduced.   
 
Images with maximal naturalistic visual modality, Kress and van Leeuwen (1996: 159) suggest, are 
those that are closest to what we might see with the naked eye.  However, modality also differs across 
contexts, so that, for example, images with undifferentiated colour, which include representations of 
what cannot be seen by the naked eye, such as cells, are understood as having high modality in 
scientific textbooks (1996: 170).  But even for contexts in which closeness to what can be seen with 
the naked eye appears to be the criterion for deciding whether an image is maximally real, the 
affordances of the most commonly used technology for representation at a given point (e.g. 35mm 
colour film in the 1990s) imposes limitations on what a social group considers realistic (1996: 163).  
This means that some features that might formally make images appear more realistic, such as the 
ability to view pictures in three dimensions in holograms, can sometimes have the reverse effect if 
people are not accustomed to them, by seeming ‘more than real’ and therefore drawing attention to 
their artifice.  It is the interplay of these various visual modality cues that creates an overall 
impression of the projected truth value of an image (1996: 168).  
 
El Refaie (2010) suggests that the concept of ‘authenticity’ is a more productive way of examining the 
truth value of images than visual modality.  Drawing on examples of autobiographical comics, she 
suggests that the sense of truthfulness that some of these texts create cannot be captured by Kress and 
                                                          
9 Halliday (1976) differentiates between ‘modality’, which he argues is part of the interpersonal metafunction 
and ‘modulation’, which is part of the ideational metafunction.  As Sulkunen and Torronen (1997: 48) explain 
this, for Halliday, the ‘must’ in ‘John must be worried’ is a marker of high modality, whereas the ‘must’ in ‘you 
must build a gazebo’ is part of the meaning of the clause itself, rather than of the speaker’s disposition to it. 
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van Leeuwen’s modality markers (2010: 169).  The notion of authenticity, as used by El Refaie, 
foregrounds the relationship between the image and its producer (2010: 170).  This is also how van 
Leeuwen views authenticity: as ‘a special aspect of modality, concerned more with the moral or 
artistic authority of the representation than with its truth or reality’ (2001: 396).  It is primarily 
concerned with the degree to which the narrator of a tale tells his or her own truth.  The viewer can 
come to accept the style of the drawings on the artist’s terms, rather than comparing it with her own 
perception of reality.  Like in Bilandzic’s concept of mediated closeness, when reading or viewing 
another’s authentic experience, referents of ‘reality’ can recede into the background, as the reader 
becomes immersed in the narrator’s world.  In the present context, however, it is the relationship 
between the image and the world of the viewers that is at stake, rather than that between the image 
and the world of the producer.  In other words, it is high visual modality, rather than high authenticity, 
that is more likely to orient viewers to action.   
 
When analysing CiN, it is important to take into account not only the way that sufferers are 
represented but also the wide range of other images that are presented to viewers.  In addition to 
vignettes that show the children the charity supports there are also fundraising scenes, entertainment 
items and a dazzling television studio.  Pictures of celebrity performers are central to the show’s 
visual identity.  It is images of these individuals, rather than those of sufferers, that are most often 
circulated in other media.  ‘Children in Need 2011 in Pictures’ features that appeared on the BBC, 
The Guardian, and The Times websites, for example, showed celebrity performers and some 
fundraising efforts, but did not include any images of beneficiaries.  The juxtaposition of these very 
different types of image is likely to impact how scenes of suffering are likely to be interpreted.  Rather 
than assuming that all images are experienced as unreal by viewers, I examine the extent to which 
different images project different levels of realness.  When considering the focus group data, I also 
examine what sort of evidence comes to be regarded by speakers as (more) believable, if televisual 
images are not regarded by speakers as reflecting reality.   
 
6.1 The differing modality of scenes of suffering and celebration in CiN  
 
In the first analytic chapter (chapter 4), I detailed the different places that are represented in CiN and 
explained that these tend to separate the different types of actors (celebrities, beneficiaries, 
fundraisers, viewers) who appear in them.  In the following section, I explore the visual representation 
of each of these types of places, paying particular attention to the differing degrees of projected 
reality, or modality, that they are imbued with.  Although each setting is represented by a wide range 
of images, it appears that features that relate to Kress and van Leeuwen’s (1996) ‘modality markers’, 
such as the inclusion or exclusion of background details, and the use of colour and light, differ 
between these settings in uniform ways.  On a number of scales, the studio, for example, appears to be 
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represented with lower modality than the problematic settings.   Patterned differences between these 
features encourage the viewer to interpret them differently.   
In the table below, two representative examples of each type of setting are presented for comparison.  
These images were selected from my multimodal transcript of the programme (see appendix 4).  In 
table 1 in chapter 4 (page 85), I detailed the children shown, the problems they faced and the centres 
they attended in beneficiary vignettes for the first 3 hours of the programme.  Of these ten vignettes, 
six were focused on individual children, and the other four either involved groups of children, or did 
not give details of the children helped.  In the table below, I have chosen stills from one of each of 
these types of vignette (problematic and therapeutic settings), as well as the two other types of places 
identified in chapter 4: fundraising settings and studio / entertainment settings.  The beneficiary 
vignettes chosen were clips 3 and 4 from the table on page 85, as there was no problematic setting 
shown in clip 2 and clip 1 was a montage of different children that would be shown later in the 
programme and these were therefore the earliest suitable clips.  I used images from the same clips 
(images 1 and 5 and images 2 and 6 were from earlier and later points in the same vignettes), so that 
they could be compared.  In each case, the frames chosen are representative examples of the 
sequences they were extracted from in the transcript in terms of their subjects and features, although, 
as I explained in chapter 2, the individual shots chosen for the transcript were those I judged as being 
significant (showing changes of scene, for example, rather than using time changes that would have 
produced many images of one camera shot).  In particular, I chose the images below because they 
were characteristic of these places in terms of their modality.  Original times are given below the 
images for comparison with the original transcript.  Below, I discuss how the visual features of these 
four different types of setting confer these images with differing levels of modality.   
  
 
 
128 
 
Table 2 
Problematic settings 
  
Image 1 (49:09) Image 2 (63:26) 
Fundraising settings 
  
Image 3 (24:10) Image 4 (27:01) 
Therapeutic settings 
  
Image 5 (49:51) Image 6 (64:06) 
The studio 
  
Image 7 (10:46) Image 8 (17:25) 
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As I outlined above, for Kress and van Leeuwen (1996), an optimally realistic shot would be fairly 
(but not maximally): contextualised (showing background features) and detailed (including many 
features of represented participants, such as pores or strands of hair) (1996: 165-6).  In terms of 
colour, it would display moderately modulated (many shades), saturated (bright colours at one end 
and black and white on the other) and differentiated (showing many colours, as opposed to 
monochrome) hues (1996: 165).  Each of the images that represent the fundraising and therapeutic 
settings (images 3, 4, 5 and 6) fulfil these requirements.  These images have what Huxford (2001: 56) 
calls a ‘candid’ style (i.e. a style which lays claims to truthfulness by lacking features such as ‘staged’ 
composition and the noticeably high image quality associated with professional shots).  Although the 
children in frame 3, for example, have clearly been arranged for the camera, some children are cut out 
of the shot, and some of those who are in shot are not looking at the camera.  All four of these shots 
include background details, such as doors, walls and windows.  These contextual features make these 
settings appear not only realistic but also recognisable as the sorts of spaces that might be occupied by 
viewers: a school hall (image 3); a high street (image 4); community centres (images 5 and 6).  As 
would be expected for candid camera shots, a wide range of colours appear in them (the exception to 
this variation resulting from the children’s uniforms in images 3 and 5).  Each of these shots seems to 
have been taken in natural light, so these colours are modulated by light and shade.  In terms of the 
majority of Kress and van Leeuwen’s modality markers, these images can thus be categorised as 
having high modality.    
 
A slight deviation from this rule occurs in terms of the brightness of these images.  Pictures from both 
problematic (images 1 and 2) and therapeutic (images 5 and 6) settings sometimes have lower 
modality than, for example, those representing fundraising settings, because they show marked use of 
low (problematic) and high (therapeutic) lighting, as exemplified by images 2 and 6, respectively.  
This appears to reinforce the bad → good shift in the narrative that accompanies the transition of 
sufferers from problematic places to therapeutic places.  This shift is also emphasised by changes in 
the tempo and key of background music, from slow-placed and melancholic acoustic music, often in a 
minor key, to faster and more upbeat electronic music.  Forceville and Renckens (2013: 160) suggest 
that the metaphorical use of dark for bad and light for good is a common device in feature films, 
although these meanings are context-dependent.  Familiarity with such tropes means that viewers are 
likely to interpret emphasised dark or light scenes as a representational choice, rather than as a feature 
of the setting, which makes it seem less realistic.  In turn, this lighting also affects the modulation of 
colour in these settings, making it slightly ‘flatter’ than the shots that have more naturalistic lighting.  
The colours are slightly more muted than would be naturalistic in problematic settings, and slightly 
more saturated than naturalistic in therapeutic settings.  The reason for these differences appears clear 
when considering their combination with narratives about the beneficiaries’ lives.  As mentioned in 
the first analytic chapter, entrance to ‘therapeutic places’ is signalled in verbal, audio and visual 
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modes as a transformative event, and the pattern of representation in dark and then light images 
appears across examples as an additional signifier of this change.   
 
These differences, however, are less conspicuous than the difference between the studio and all other 
types of setting.  Even at a glance, the stark contrast between the visual features of problematic, 
fundraising and therapeutic settings and the studio is noticeable.  For example, the images of the 
studio (7 and 8) have markedly higher colour saturation than appears in shots from other places.  
Likewise, while the contextual features that appear in all three non-studio settings seem naturalistic, 
the studio, by contrast, is shown with extremes of either shallowness (image 7) or depth (image 8).   
 
The constantly changing graphics on this screen further highlight the artificiality of the setting.  
Similarly, the perspective in frame 8 is unlikely to be accessible to someone present in the audience, 
as it appears to have been taken from higher up.  The extreme depth shown in this shot is afforded by 
the particular features of the television studio.  The combination of these extremes lowers the 
naturalistic modality of the representation of this setting.  These differences, however, are a result not 
only of different representational styles but also of the settings themselves.  The studio’s background 
colour and lighting are unlikely to be replicated in everyday settings.   
 
The question of contextualisation is slightly more complicated.  All three non-studio settings appear to 
show similarly high levels of contextualisation in the individual shots.  But, whereas problematic 
places in particular are highly contextualised by showing a number of location shots, and giving 
verbal references to place, fundraising places appear less specific.  This is in keeping with the 
generality of fundraising settings, as discussed in chapter 1. The studio is given a concrete context 
visually and verbally in the introduction to the programme.  The setting, in the BBC Television 
Centre, is shown from the outside.  However, in terms of the visual features, this space appears 
decontextualized, as specific features of the setting are obscured with screens and lighting.  The 
screen in front of which the presenters stand in image 7 occludes the features of the room that might 
otherwise be seen behind it.  This means that images in this setting exclude background detail.  This is 
not true of all entertainment settings, however.  While some features, such as a special edition of 
dancing competition show ‘Strictly Come Dancing’, appear in settings similar to that of the CiN 
studio, each of the programmes featured is located where the programme is set.  This means that, for 
example, a dance routine performed by the cast of popular soap opera EastEnders takes place in the 
urban square that is used to represent one in a London borough in the show.  In this way, 
entertainment settings are less homogenous than other settings, but some form of studio is shown 
between each representation of beneficiary and fundraiser settings.  Thus, television studios are 
juxtaposed with other settings and appear as a point of contrast visually.    
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Taking these images in isolation, the studio setting appears to have low modality, appearing fantasy-
like, whereas fundraisers’ and beneficiaries’ settings seem more ‘real’.  The highest modality can be 
found in fundraising settings, which are displayed most naturalistically.  It is the studio that appears 
‘hyper-real’ when contrasted with each of these settings.  However, as Kress and van Leeuwen point 
out, modality is defined in relation to a given genre (1996: 161).  What is interpreted as ‘realistic’ in 
one type of text is quite different from what is in others.  In the same way, programmes such as CiN 
might therefore have their own standards for what counts as normal and realistic.  The CiN studio, 
while being represented in what might seem to be low modality images, is presented as the norm 
within the programme.  As well as being shown for the longest time and most frequently of all the 
different types of places, the studio is also used to frame other settings, appearing before and after 
them (except in beneficiary vignettes, where problematic settings appear directly before therapeutic 
settings).  In the same way that the high street setting is constructed as a norm against which the 
reality of homelessness appears as an anomaly (Gerrard and Farrugia 2014), the CiN studio can thus 
be interpreted as a norm against which images of reality appear hyper-real.  In other words, the 
presentation of the ‘fantastical’ studio as the normal setting means that images of beneficiaries appear 
as deviations.  However, it is not only suffering people but also people raising money for them who 
are contrasted with the glamour of the studio in CiN.   
 
The studio / ‘real life’ setting split here echoes the role of studios in news programmes (Montgomery 
2007: 193).  While fundraising and beneficiary vignettes appear as ‘reports’ on the activities of the 
charity and its supporters in the field, the studio is the site from which information is ‘presented’ to 
the viewers (2007: 77).  The different temporal and spatial locations of CiN’s reports and 
presentations, as well as their visual features, support this interpretation.  News reports, like CiN’s 
vignettes about beneficiaries and fundraisers, are often pre-recorded and are marked by a candid 
camera style of visual representation.  By contrast, in both CiN and news programmes, the live studio 
setting is marked by technological and visual precision, where a range of camera angles are utilised 
and picture quality is high.  These genres differ, however, in terms of the events that take place in the 
studio.  Whereas news studios feature presenters who soberly anchor reports from outside the studio, 
CiN’s studio is the locus of light-hearted celebratory activities.   
 
In terms of representational distance, what is of chief importance is the degree to which viewers are 
encouraged to interpret the situations of potential beneficiaries as having a similar level of reality to 
that of their own lives.  What really matters, therefore, is how much beneficiary settings possess the 
same presentational features as those of potential viewers.  In CiN, as discussed in chapter 4, potential 
viewers are represented as being placed in the position of fundraisers.  This means that, in order to 
portray beneficiaries in a way that would make them seem maximally ‘representationally close’ to 
viewers, the key visual features of beneficiary settings would have to be similar to those of fundraiser 
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settings.  In CiN, this is the case.  In terms of most of the features examined, beneficiary places are 
represented in the same way as fundraising places.  This suggests that representational distance 
between givers and beneficiaries is minimised by CiN.  This sense of shared reality between viewers 
and beneficiaries is reinforced by both beneficiary and fundraising places being represented with high 
visual modality, defined as similarity to what can be seen with the naked eye (Kress and van Leeuwen 
1996: 159).  I will now turn to potential viewers’ interpretations of charity telethons’ presentation of 
sufferers.   
 
6.2 Interpreting the spectacle of suffering and celebration 
 
While CiN presents beneficiaries as being representationally close to potential donors, it is possible 
that viewers’ interpretations of the reality of sufferers’ lives might be quite different.  The show can 
only successfully minimise representational distance to the degree that viewers feel that beneficiaries’ 
lives are real.  In order to examine this, I introduce just one extract that is particularly noticeable in 
terms of the discussion of charity media events’ representation of reality in the focus group data.   
 
In the Academics focus group, participants talk about charity telethons and their apparent ability to 
‘create (.) astonishing amounts of money’.  CiN was given as an example of this type of fundraising, 
which was described as a ‘lazy’ way to clear one’s conscience.  I asked the group whether they had 
watched it, and one of the participants (Jess) said that she couldn’t ‘bear it’.  The following section of 
talk comes after a brief discussion of the programme between Jess and Vera, in which Vera described 
the programme as ‘formulaic’ and Jess said it was ‘horrible’.  Jess contrasted CiN with earlier 
instances of entertainment-related giving, such as George Harrison’s Concert for Bangladesh and Live 
Aid, which she described as ‘more spontaneous’ and stemming from a sense of ‘personal conviction’.    
 
Academics group, original line numbers 1106 – 1135 (see appendix 10) 
 
1 Joe the- (.) they (.) what do you call them (.) the people who benefit anyway are  
2  (1.0) largely out of the picture 
3   
4 Jess yeah and it’s that (.) that that mismatch between the actual poverty and  
5  suffering and the terrible things that are going on (1.0) juxtaposed in the same 
6 HL           [um hmm 
7 Jess evening with all these people doing really stupid things (1.0) that I find (.)  
8  distasteful (.) I think (.) and or or wrong somehow 
9   
10 Cath     [I don’t think it’s intentional at all (1.0) but  
11 Jess                     [no 
12 Cath because of the juxtaposition that’s kind of (1.0) what’s left with the watcher  
13 Jess              [yeah 
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14 Jess yeah (.) yeah (2.0) and they’ll probably go and talk about (.) the person lying in  
15 HL    [hmm 
16 Cath       [and 
17 Jess the bath of baked beans rather than (.) the images of (.) suffering that they s- I  
18 HL                        [hmm 
19 Jess mean what what do you bring away from something like that (1.5) ‘well I gave 
20 HL           [hmm 
21 Jess money to so-and-so to live in a (.) to to to lie in a bath of baked beans’ 
 
 
In explaining why they have chosen to disengage from telethons, both Joe and Jess cite antipathy 
towards what they describe as the jarring combination of depictions of need and of extravagance in 
these programmes (lines 5-6).  Jess articulates her disapproval particularly strongly, using moralistic 
terms such as ‘distasteful’, and ‘wrong’ (line 8).  For her, the problem with this state of affairs is that 
it threatens to change what people who view suffering on television will talk about to others.  Jess and 
Joe’s criticisms focus on visual representations.  In particular, they criticise the fact that ‘picture[s]’ 
shown on such programme exclude sufferers (line 2), and that ‘images’ of suffering are ignored (line 
17).  In other words, the celebratory aspect of the programmes is seen as altering the way that 
beneficiary vignettes are interpreted.  Images of celebration are only read as ‘distasteful’ when they 
immediately follow images of suffering.  The latter, although they are described as quite different 
from those of celebration, are nevertheless still labelled as ‘images’ (line 17).  This suggests that 
beneficiaries remain representationally distant from viewers; they are not perceived as real people but 
merely as pictures of people. 
 
So it is not just the content and presentation of beneficiary vignettes that suggest to the audience 
whether and how this information should be received and acted upon.   At least for some viewers, the 
juxtaposition of these clips with the other settings and activities in the show also shape the way that 
potential beneficiaries are related to.  In the case of CiN, the brevity of beneficiary vignettes (on 
average 3 minutes, 40 seconds – see page 85), and the easy resolution of problems that appear at the 
point when donations are received, are combined with depictions of frivolous entertainment.  It 
follows that the audience receives the message that the suffering of children and families in the 
programme can be engaged with in a temporary and superficial way.  It encourages viewers to 
experience suffering as part of the spectacle, and foregrounds the enjoyment of fundraisers.  This 
means that the representational distance between viewers and sufferers is increased.   
 
In the extract presented above, participants discuss different types of representation within charity 
telethons.  In the following section, I examine how such representations are interpreted in comparison 
with other ways of knowing about disadvantaged people.  
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6.3‘Hidden’ places of suffering 
 
As I set out at the beginning of the chapter, representational closeness depends on viewers feeling as 
much as possible that suffering others share their own reality and, therefore, that they will be able to 
take action to ameliorate that suffering.   As I examined in chapter 4, the presenters introduce scenes 
of suffering as if they are unfamiliar to viewers.  I did not, however, suggest that this representation of 
beneficiaries’ situations as unknown indicated that they were portrayed as being less real.  As 
examined above, visually the beneficiary settings are presented with similar features, and with a 
similar degree of modality, as fundraising settings, which is where the viewers are encouraged to 
picture themselves.  In the following data extracts from the focus group discussions, however, a 
complicated relationship between viewing mediated representations of suffering and understanding 
(investing in, comprehending, apprehending) the reality of that suffering is revealed.  In these 
extracts, media representations of victims are compared with other ways of knowing about the 
suffering of others. 
 
As discussed above, both Boltanski (1999) and Chouliaraki (2005) believe that the sight of 
suffering has become part of a ‘spectacle’, partly because it has been produced by the media as a 
commodity.  While Gerrard and Farrugia (2014) see suffering as part of the reality that disturbs 
and reveals the simulacra (Baudrillard 1984), Boltanski understands suffering as part of a 
constructed spectacle (1999: 176).  This contradiction between pre- and post-aesthetics 
interpretations might be due to the fact that these writers are considering different types of 
suffering: suffering as presented by the media on the one hand and unmediated suffering on the 
other.  For scholars as much as for others, interpreting mediated suffering might be quite a different 
experience from interpreting suffering witnessed face-to-face (so their theoretical insights on 
suffering might be informed by the data they consider).  In my own data, the picture is more 
complicated, partially because I take both media representations of suffering and talk about 
experiences of others’ suffering in general into account.  The idea that personally-witnessed 
suffering is ‘real’, and mediated images of suffering are ‘unreal’ appears in some of the accounts 
provided by the focus group participants, echoing the seemingly contradictory views of Gerrard 
and Farrugia and Boltanski.  I analyse these extracts by drawing on the Rhetorical Discourse 
Analytic rhetorical device of ‘event work’ (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2013: 11),  examining how a 
person or phenomenon is characterised in order to explain actions and attitudes taken in relation to 
them. 
 
In many of the focus group participants’ accounts, visible suffering is contrasted with hidden 
places of suffering.  Participants not only suggest that certain enclaves of suffering are unknown to 
the wider public, but they also portray such sites and sufferings as unknowable.   In the following 
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extracts, participants draw a distinction between the suffering that they have seen in media 
representations and those that they know about through other means but that are not reported in the 
mass media.  Participants’ accounts indicate that their mistrust of media representations causes 
them to question the veracity of the reports about suffering that they see.  It also makes them 
wonder whether other forms of suffering may have been missed out.  The following extract is from 
the Academics group.  It comes much earlier in the discussion than the extract discussed above.  In 
it, participants discuss representations of suffering, for example in the first Live Aid broadcast for 
Africa in 1985. 
 
Academics group, original line numbers 99 – 117 (see appendix 10) 
1 Joe  I think with more reflection (.) people thought that (.) 
2  you know poverty isn’t (.) simply (1.5) what you see through the lens of 
3  (.) the TV and (1.0) uh (.) you know in in (.) underprivileged Africa and 
4  India and uh other places but (.) but it’s in pockets (.) all around you 
5 Jess yeah and it’s more or less hidden I think as well I mean it’s very visible in 
6  Africa isn’t it because of of the (1.0) um (.) not visible to us because we  
7 HL     [yeah 
8 Jess go there but because (1.0) of the campaigns and the kinds of things we 
9  find out about on the television and the newspaper there are images 
10  (1.0) um (.) there’s the news (.) um (.) so we’re very aware of that I think 
11  whereas I think (.) we’re a uh (.) well I have a friend who’s a (1.0) 
12  community (.) paediatrician who works up in the valleys and she says 
13  that they’re one of the (.) most deprived and poverty-stricken areas 
14  she’s ever come across in the UK (1.5) um (1.0) you know so right on our 
15  doorsteps but uh whether (1.0) it’s very (.) visible like Joe said (.) people  
16 Joe            [hmm 
17 Vera       [yeah 
18 Jess (.) sleeping on the streets or whether it’s kind of hidden in a place that  
19  nobody really goes to  
 
In this stretch of talk, both Joe and Jess distinguish between ‘hidden’ suffering and ‘visible’ suffering.  
They contrast mediated images of faraway places, which form part of the ‘visible’ suffering, with 
places of suffering within the UK, which become ‘invisible’ through not being reported in the mass 
media.  Jess argues that suffering in Africa is something that we are ‘aware of’ (line 10), but when she 
recounts professional knowledge of poverty in the UK, accessed through her social network, she 
presents this information as being ‘hidden’ from others (line 18).  In Jess’ account, traditional 
understandings of distance and knowledge are thus subverted, so that the distant becomes known, and 
the proximate becomes unknown.   
 
Traditionally, people have tended to share knowledge with people living or working in close physical 
proximity to themselves, so that communal knowledge has been found in shared spaces (e.g. Morgan 
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2004; Tagliaventi and Mattarelli 2006).  This link between places and opinions has also been found to 
work the other way around, in that people with certain ideas and opinions tend to gather in particular 
places, such as Silicon Valley (Harvey 2005: 85).  More recently, these so-called ‘knowledge 
networks’ based on interpersonal interaction have been seen to be less significant, as people 
increasingly use internet-based technologies, and advances in travel technology have meant more and 
easier movement of people and knowledge.  Non place-based ways of interacting have thus to some 
extent transformed the way that knowledge is shared and spread (Crevoisier and Jeannerat 2009).  The 
relationship between place-based transference of ways of thinking and the mass media has also been 
studied by Blommaert et al. (2003).  These researchers found that individuals’ differing degrees of 
physical distance from a refugee centre changed the way that they described it.  In particular, they 
noted that interviewees who lived close to the centre used their knowledge as a source of authority 
more than those who lived further away.  But they also found that place-based knowledge changed 
people’s interpretation of mass media information about the centre.  Witnessing the centre for 
themselves allowed them to challenge information offered by the media with a level of authority 
(2003: 311). 
 
In the extract discussed above, the relationship between media representations and interpersonal, 
place-based knowledge (or at least awareness), is similar to that found in Blommaert et al.’s (2003) 
study.  Examples of suffering that are not reported in the media are used to make the case that 
televisual representations are misrepresentative.  In other words, the mass media is portrayed as being 
concerned with a certain sort of situation, whereas the real problems lie elsewhere.  According to Jess’ 
account, what the mass media presents is ‘images’ of suffering (line 9), whereas the information her 
friend provides is recounted as giving more transparent access to the situation in the valleys, because 
it is backed up by an eyewitness account and professional knowledge (line 12).  At the same time, the 
information provided by Jess’ friend is constructed as something that people are less aware of than the 
television representations they see of suffering elsewhere (line 10).  In this account, mediated 
suffering is known, but unreal and unmediated suffering, whether seen or unseen, is the reality it 
masks.  In terms of representational closeness, the people who appear on television are placed at a 
distance from the people who view them.  The speakers here portray their own reality as being 
removed from these pictures.  This sense of removal is also emphasised by Joe in lines 2-3.  The word 
‘lens’ carries two meanings here.  Firstly, it is a mediator between the image and the viewer, 
separating the sufferers from the people who view them only on television.  Secondly, it is a filter 
through which only part of the picture is shown. 
 
A number of Extreme Case Formulations (Pomerantz 1986) are used here.  The pockets of suffering 
are described as being ‘all around you’ (line 4), ‘on our doorsteps’ (line 15) and as places that 
‘nobody’ visits (line 18).  Suffering elsewhere, on the other hand, is described as being ‘very visible’ 
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(line 5), and as something we are ‘very aware of’ (line 10).  The use of pronouns and possessive 
determiners here projects the idea that this experience is universal for those present: poverty is ‘all 
around you’ (line 8), and ‘on our doorsteps’ (lines 14-15).  Despite this, Jess and Joe present their own 
interpretations of the relationship between knowledge and media representations as more unusual than 
unquestioning acceptance of the media’s representations of suffering.  A view of poverty as a nuanced 
issue that sometimes lies close to home is presented by Joe as being more considered (line 1) than an 
association of poverty with only extreme deprivation elsewhere.   
 
The level of detail given about suffering within and outside of the UK is also very different.  Jess 
identifies a specific area of Wales as underprivileged (line 12), while Joe refers to ‘Africa and India 
and other places’ (lines 3-4), not differentiating between these regions or specifying which nations 
might be included here, alongside India.  The frame of reference for what counts as poverty in each of 
these places is also quite different.  India and Africa are identified as ‘underprivileged’, presumably in 
comparison with the UK and America.  The valleys, however, are ‘one of’ the poorest areas ‘in the 
UK’ (lines 13-14).  In this short stretch of talk, then, speakers emphasise the representational distance 
between them and the sufferers that they see on television.  This adds to the physical and social 
distance that exists between these speakers and individuals in Africa and India.   
 
In the following extract from the Office group, speakers voice similar concerns about the 
representation of poverty on television.  Just before the following stretch of talk, Helen has compared 
conditions for people living in Britain with those of people elsewhere.  She argued that witnessing 
suffering on television leaves the viewer with a sense of responsibility, as well as gratitude for one’s 
own situation.  In the extract that follows, Gill contradicts this interpretation by suggesting that 
conditions in the UK are unknowable, which makes comparison with situations elsewhere impossible.   
 
Office group, original line numbers 393 – 398 (see appendix 6) 
1 Eve         [yeah but then there are (.) there are people in this country 
2  who haven’t got a (.) nice warm house and a flat screen television aren’t  
3 Gill                    [yeah exactly (.) I think we should concentrate on our 
4 Eve //there 
5 Gill //home (.) first of all (.) so that all the kids it’s not just kids it’s the 
6  elderly as well you know? (1.0) (quieter) we probably don’t know half of 
7 Eve   [hmm yeah 
8   what’s going on  
 
In lines 3-5, Gill refers to the UK as ‘our home’, yet she describes the scope of its people’s problems 
as unknown to her (line 6).  Her utterance in lines 6-8 contains markers of lower modality (‘probably’, 
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‘don’t know half of what’s going on’), although she corroborates Eve’s high modality presentation of 
this hidden reality (‘there are’, line 1) with emphasis (‘exactly’, line 3).  Gill’s utterance also suggests 
that some aspects of these problems are identifiable: they involve elderly as well as young people, and 
can be ameliorated by focusing on these issues (line 3) instead of considering problems elsewhere 
(line 5).  Gill’s tag question (line 6) implies that she expects consensus on this issue (Edwards and 
Potter 1992: 16).  In this stretch of talk, as in the extract from the Academics group, the relationship 
between knowledge about suffering and mediated representations of it is complex.   
 
In both of these examples, nearby, personally-witnessed suffering is presented as both real and 
unknown, whereas mediated distant suffering is portrayed as known but less real.  It is not just other 
people who are presented by these speakers as being unaware of hidden suffering.  In both extracts, 
speakers include themselves in the group of people that they identify as having this unbalanced 
impression of suffering.  What is also interesting about these extracts is that the participants in both 
groups argue that suffering in the UK is under-reported compared to the suffering in other countries.  
They suggest that whole continents’ problems can be easily understood by watching media 
representations (Academics group, lines 5-6), whereas the UK’s problems are more complex.  While 
Blommaert et al. (2003) suggest that knownness is linked to closeness, here some of what is close 
appears unknown.  While Gerrard and Farrugia (2014) theorise images of suffering as glimpses of 
reality that reveal the artifice of the spectacle, here, some suffering appears unreal.    
 
The ideas that are expressed by these speakers are particularly interesting in light of CiN’s 
presentation of suffering in the UK.  As I suggested in chapter 4, CiN reveals places of suffering as if 
they are unknown to viewers.  While CiN makes viewers aware of the issues faced by its 
beneficiaries, it preserves the idea that they can only gain knowledge of these issues via media 
representations such as its own.  It is possible that the representation in the media of UK problems as 
only knowable through them is linked to audiences’ mistrust of both media representations of 
suffering and the unmediated suffering that they assume also lies beyond them.  If audiences are given 
to understand that the suffering they are now being shown has previously been concealed from them, 
this might lead them to question what else is yet to be uncovered.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Examining the idea of the spectacle has revealed another dimension of the role of distance in my data.  
CiN portrays beneficiary vignettes both with high modality and with similar visual features to 
fundraising scenes.  This means that the representational distance between sufferers and viewers is to 
some extent minimised; they share the same reality.  The show, however, keeps these sites and the 
people who appear in them distinct.  Because CiN consistently separates representations of sufferers 
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from representations of fundraisers by presenting the studio between these scenes, it fails to project 
the idea that their lives share the same level of reality.  As I explore in the following chapter, the 
mode of action suggested to viewers is one that can operate at a distance.   
 
While beneficiary vignettes in themselves might encourage indulgence in emotional reactions, the 
juxtaposition of these vignettes with celebratory scenes indicates that these emotions should be 
limited – powerful to the extent that they elicit donations, but not so overwhelming as to curtail the 
enjoyment to be found at other points.  The juxtaposition of celebratory and pitying frames ultimately 
creates the impression that engagement with others’ suffering can and should be temporary and 
superficial.  The management of spectacle and emotion in this way is not, however, straightforward.  
For those who believe the mass media’s portrayal of suffering others to be misrepresentative or 
unrealistic, there are at least two possible responses.  Some viewers may use interactive media to put 
across an alternative view, while others will disconnect from these types of presentations altogether 
(Kaun 2013: 72). 
 
The discussions of hidden places of suffering in the focus group data reveal an interesting interaction 
between the visibility and perceived reality of suffering.  In particular, media representations are 
described as less real than both visible and invisible unrepresented suffering: they are described as if 
they are simply one more ‘image’ to see.  Mediated suffering can therefore be interpreted as part of 
the spectacle, rather than as an exception to it.  Personally-witnessed suffering, on the other hand, is 
experienced as a complete rupture in the fabric of the spectacle.  This seems to present an impossible 
position for the mass media seeking to inform audiences of suffering.  But it might be that it is only 
when watching programmes in which other types of spectacle are presented that viewers apprehend 
representations of suffering in this way.  Further research on a range of television programmes would 
be required to clarify this.   I now move on to examining the second aspect of representational 
distance: the degree to which it appears that action to redress the suffering of others is possible. 
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Chapter 7: Representational Distance  
Part 2: Action and Myth 
 
In both the previous analytic chapter and the present chapter, I examine the data in relation to a 
concept I have called ‘representational distance’.  In chapter 6, I examined the degree to which 
viewers were encouraged to see the lives of sufferers as being real.  Representational distance was 
understood as being minimised where suffering others were represented or interpreted as real, and 
maximised where sufferers were seen or shown as lacking reality.  I concluded that some aspects of 
CiN minimise the representational distance between viewers and beneficiaries by presenting 
fundraising places (the location of fundraisers, who are presented as the representatives of viewers) 
and beneficiary settings (where sufferers are shown) using a high level of visual modality, and similar 
visual features.  Focus group speakers, however, did not interpret themselves as being 
representationally close to the people they witnessed on television, repeatedly drawing attention to the 
mediated nature of the interaction.   
 
In the present chapter, I examine the second component of representational distance: the degree to 
which viewers are encouraged to consider it possible to take action to prevent others’ suffering.  I 
draw on the concept of myth (Barthes [1972] 2009) in order to study the degree to which one form of 
action - fundraising - is imbued with additional meanings, while other potential actions are obscured.  
I begin this section by briefly defining myth, before using it to examine the degree to which taking 
action on suffering is represented as possible in my data. 
 
7.1 Myth 
 
When reading any type of sign, there are at least two possible levels of meaning to decode: the sign’s 
denotative or literal meaning, which is widely understood, and its connotative or associated meanings, 
which are culturally-specific and depend on how that thing is represented.  For example, the sign: 
  
uses a continuous line to roughly approximate the shape of a human heart.  It denotes a heart, but the 
connotation attached to it in western culture is the idea of love.  It is no longer necessary to 
understand or to remember a) the link between the physical responses that accompany loving 
someone and the human heart, or b) the link between the shape of this symbol and that of the human 
heart, in order to make the connection between this symbol and the concept of love. 
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Barthes argues that there is a third level of meaning associated with some signs; in addition to 
denotative and connotative levels, there is an ideological or mythical level of meaning (2009 [1972]: 
138).  This level of meaning is created by a given society, where it usually serves the interests of those 
in powerful positions by making ideological interpretations of the world appear natural and eternal 
(2009 [1972]): 148, 168).  At the same time, aspects of the sign that were once meaningful are 
obscured and changed into a gesture (2009 [1972]: 146).  For example, a picture of a black soldier in 
an army uniform comes to evoke the greatness of a nation, while his specific characteristics and 
history are ignored (2009 [1972]: 146).  Such signs function as myths. Barthes presents a number of 
examples of signs that function as myths, including detergents.  Detergents and soap powders, and 
advertising for them in particular, naturalise a number of ideas about how one should operate in 
society.  For example, they assume that one should be interested in appearances and strive to be better 
than others.  This is achieved by offering before and after views, one of which is ‘whiter’ and appears 
self-evidently more desirable (2009 [1972]: 32).    
 
The concept of myth shares some important features with the concept of the spectacle.  Myth, like 
spectacle, involves signification (though, in this case, not only visual signification) in which some 
parts of the referent are placed at a distance from the decoder (Barthes 2009 [1972]: 151).  The theory 
of myth does not hold that all instances of communication are detached from reality, but singles out 
particular examples that are.  In this way, it is similar to understandings of the spectacle that single out 
particular examples, rather than to the post-aesthetics understanding of the spectacle.  What are 
obscured in both myth and the spectacle are the social relations behind what is articulated (2009 
[1972]: 169).  Like the spectacle, myth is also posited as something that is used by dominant powers 
in society to maintain their position.  However, what gives myths their power is their ability to project 
their reality and naturalness, whereas the spectacle is assumed to maintain its power despite people 
being aware of its unreality. 
 
Van Leeuwen (2001: 98) focuses on the connotations that can be created not only by depicting certain 
objects or people, but by the way in which these figures are represented.  In other words, grammar, as 
well as lexis, creates meaning (2001: 98).  Having examined the visual presentation of sufferers in 
detail in chapter 6, in the present chapter I refer to these issues only very briefly, using images 
illustratively rather than for analysis.  I use the technique suggested in ‘iconography’ (e.g. Panofsky 
2006 [1939]), of using others’ interpretations to determine what can be said to be a myth, rather than 
taking my own reading as evidence (van Leeuwen 2001: 101). 
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7.2 Data analysis: the myth of giving as good 
 
CiN presents the money raised by its donors as a cause for celebration across a range of different parts 
of the programme.  Totals are the focal point of reports on fundraising activities and appear in front of 
other images (see frame 7.1) at the conclusion of these vignettes.  Similarly, in the ‘local’ sections of 
the programme, fundraisers are asked to report how much money they have raised and are verbally 
congratulated by the presenter (frame 7.2).  The monetary contributions made by the sale of particular 
products or the use of particular campaigns are announced and applauded in the studio.  For example, 
in image 7.3, CountryFile presenter John Craven announces the amount raised by selling the CiN 
CountryFile calendar, and the amount raised by baked goods shop Gregg’s special CiN products 
appears on the screen after a clip about the shop’s efforts (see frame 7.6).  Running combined totals of 
all the money pledged are also presented throughout the show (e.g. frame 7.4), accompanied by 
lighting displays, drum rolls and applause (frame 7.5).  Partly because many of these moments take 
place in the studio, they appear visually striking, with a broad spectrum of highly saturated colours.  
This enhances the impression that these figures are pivotal points for celebrating the show’s success. 
 
      
7.1 (23:49)   7.2 (27:37)   7.3 (31:16) 
 
     
7.4 (32:40)   7.5 (32:50)   7.6 (53:08) 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, fundraising figures, both from individual groups and across the event as a 
whole, appear decontextualised in terms of outcomes, although the costs of service provision are  
given at the end of each beneficiary vignette (frames 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9).  The figures that have been 
raised are thus not related to what this money might mean for beneficaries.   
 
    
7.7 (22:51)   7.8 (50:58)   7.9 (65:41) 
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There is a presumed link between giving more money and achieving these outcomes, but, at the point 
where money has been raised, this is backgrounded in favour of a celebration of giving itself.  The 
only frame of reference provided for interpreting fundraising totals comes from a comparison with 
those of the previous year.  It is not just in the programme itself that the figures raised in CiN are 
announced as a measure of success.  Newspaper reports about CiN also emphasise its success with 
reference to the total figures raised.  The final total is often widely reported.  It is this information that 
is therefore most likely to reach those who do not watch the programme.  In these contexts too, the 
figure is only compared with previous totals (e.g. The Daily Mirror 2011; The Telegraph 2011; 
Satherley and Anisiobi 2011), and no reference to specific outcomes is made.  Shown in isolation in 
this way, these amounts are not easily interpreted by viewers, as I will examine below.   
 
As I mentioned in chapter 1, the common practice of showing the figure raised at fundraising events 
prompts a sense of competition between the current fundraising efforts and those of previous years or 
of other charities (Tester 2001: 123).  In other words, all attention is focused on the actions of donors, 
rather than on its impact on the lives of recipients.  In this way, representational distance is 
maximised; viewers are encouraged to celebrate and connect with other fundraisers, but not with 
beneficiaries.  This is the ultimate ‘impersonalisation’ of beneficiaries that occurs in the mass media 
(Boltanski 1999: 18), which limits, rather than creates, shared understanding.  On the other hand, 
being given a clear impression of what action can be taken reminds viewers that this situation is real, 
and therefore demands more than the emotional response that a fictional depiction of the same 
situation would call for (Boltanski 1999: 152).  Action is clearly represented as possible, but at this 
point it is action without an object.  At these moments, the figures raised are presented as evidence of 
something good having been achieved, while these actions are not explicitly referred to.  However, 
the comparison between funds raised in the present and previous years suggests that an increase in 
money is to be interpreted as a sign of more good having been done.   
 
Returning to Barthes’ definition of myth ([1972] 2009: 138), the signifier (a pound sign followed by a 
number) denotes an amount of money.  There is also a connotation (‘concept’ / ‘second signified’) 
attached to this sign.  In this case, this is the idea that the money will be used to pay for the types of 
activities detailed in frames 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9.  In addition to this connotation, there is another level of 
meaning attached to this sign: of benefit, success, or achievement.  This latter level of meaning is 
expressed not only in the fact that the figures are announced in this way, but also in the form that 
these announcements take.  They are displayed centrally, in bright colours, and are accompanied by 
lighting displays (frame 4), applause and smiles (image 5).  
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I now turn to data from the focus groups in order to examine how such figures are interpreted by 
viewers and potential viewers of the show.  In four of the six focus groups, participants point out that 
CiN’s donations reached a staggeringly high figure in 2011.  They also mention that the figure raised 
in this year is higher than it was in the previous year.  While some speakers echo the idea presented in 
CiN that increased money equals increased good, others challenge this view, exposing the 
assumptions that lie behind it and questioning whether these assumptions are always correct.  Such 
challenges to the ‘money = good’ assumption are accepted or rejected to differing degrees by other 
participants.  In my analysis of these extracts, I focus on how the money is characterised differently 
by different speakers.  In each of the following sections of talk, participants perform ‘character work’ 
(Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2013: 70) to justify their different stances towards fundraising figures.  While 
the first extract is an example of funds raised being characterised as good in themselves, in the 
following three extracts, one or more of the participants challenge this assumption.  In the extract 
below, participants in the Office group discuss CiN’s financial success.  There is agreement on this 
across speakers and other charity events with similar levels of success are mentioned.  The money 
raised is characterised as an achievement but such donations are also described as a finite resource, so 
that raising money in this way might mean other charities receive less support.   
 
Office group, original line numbers 570 – 587 (see appendix 6) 
 
1 Helen Children in Need bucked the trend  
2 Eve yeah (1.0) yeah they collected more 
3 Helen  [they collected more this time again didn’t they? 
4 Eve      [yeah            [they did (1.0) 
5  yeah 
6 Fern     [they always seem to and (.) um Sports aid [sic] and Comic Relief and 
7 Gill        [Comic Relief  
8 Helen        [they do and (.)  
9  //every year it goes up doesn’t it 
10 Eve         [yeah 
11  //yeah 
12 Gill //yeah 
13 Fern // that they always seem to do better and better yeah 
14 Eve yeah (.) so people are still (.) um 
15 Fern           [hmm 
16 Fern //but it- maybe it’s to the detriment of others that 
17 Helen //but is it just that you get whipped up in the occasion rather than in (.) 
18  like monthly regular giving (.) like we used to with the (1.0) you know (.) 
19 Eve            [yeah   
20 Helen people resisting to give the (.) Friday donation (1.5) 
 
  
 
 
145 
 
In this extract, CiN’s financial success is characterised as running counter to expectations (line 1), but, 
it is also described as being part of a trend for this type of event (lines 6-9).  Charitable donations are 
framed as a finite resource, with other forms of giving losing out as a result of the success of such 
televised events (lines 15-18).  However, the increase in donations is also described as if it were a 
phenomenon that occurs without the agency of donors – as something that simply ‘goes up’ (line 9).  
Donors are therefore erased (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38) from this description.  It is the charities who are 
credited with success here; they ‘collected’ (line 3) the money, a task at which they ‘do better’ every 
year (line 13).  The only action that potential donors are explicitly described as performing is ‘resisting 
to give’ elsewhere (line 20).   
 
Indeed, charities’ success is described only in terms of their ability to raise large sums of money.  
Listing the charities as event names, rather than in terms of their beneficiaries (line 6), means that 
recipients are also removed from the picture.    In terms of representational distance, donors are set far 
apart from beneficiaries.  The mediators (charities) are foregrounded, but their actions relate only to 
donors, rather than to recipients.  Charities are framed as competing with each other (line 16), instead 
of collaborating to effect social change.  This example demonstrates that the raising of money is 
sometimes described as if it is an end in itself, as a sign that charities are doing ‘better’ (line 13) than 
before.  What underlies such arguments seems to be the idea that fundraising = good.  While charitable 
work helping beneficiaries is understood by these participants as valuable, and fundraising has been 
seen as necessary in order to carry out this work, these parts of the process seem to have been 
obscured, so that fundraising is taken as good in itself.  This interpretation can partly be accounted for 
by the fact that the speakers articulating it in this extract have no immediate experience of charity 
work themselves.  In the final extract in this chapter, I present the Charities workers’ discussion on the 
same topic, which contrasts markedly with the Office workers’ extract.  
 
In the following extract, taken from the Academics group, Joe challenges the idea that the fundraising 
totals from shows such as CiN that are reported in the mass media should be taken as evidence that 
beneficiaries have been helped by their efforts.  He characterises fundraising figures as meaningless 
and unconnected to calculations about need.    
 
Academics group, original line numbers 1157 – 1169 (see appendix 10) 
 
1 Joe it seems to go up every year (indistinguishable) ((I don’t understand)) 
2 Vera            [yeah  [yeah (.) yeah 
3 Joe but (.) one thing that has always puzzled me about (.) about these big 
4  events is is really the problem of scale that (.) you know you get these 
5  huge numbers that no-one can really (.) interpret (.) um you know how 
6 HL          [hmm 
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7 Joe many mill- I honestly don’t know whether it was (.) five million fifteen or  
8  fifty what was it that was (1.0) taken (.) from Children in Need but it’s a 
9 Jess      [I don’t know  
10 Joe huge amount of money and yet (.) um (.) going back to the structural (.) 
11  social things that we were talking about at the beginning uh I have no 
12  conception of (.) how much of a dent that makes in (1.0) the need you  
13 Vera          [uh huh 
14 Joe the need you know  
 
In this stretch of talk, Joe suggests that the needs of beneficiaries should be considered when assessing 
charities’ successes (lines 11-14).  He starts, however, by describing the current situation, in which 
these needs are not the focus of attention.  In this way, Joe attempts to reintroduce beneficiaries into 
the discussion, lessening the representational distance between them and members of his own social 
group.  At this stage however, the specific details of the beneficiaries is lost and he can therefore only 
refer to the possible ‘need’ (line 12) that might have put them in this role.  Like Helen in the Office 
group, Joe characterises the increase in donations as something that appears to ‘go up’ without the 
agency of donors (line 1).  He, however, distances himself from this statement, by describing it as an 
impression that is given in CiN (‘it seems to’, line 1), rather than as an objective truth.  Despite 
apparently commenting only on his own lack of understanding, Joe nevertheless makes the point that 
fundraising totals are incomprehensible more generally.  As an academic speaking to peers, he is 
unlikely to regard his own intellectual ability as something that might be questioned.  It is likely to be 
taken as read by the other participants that what ‘puzzles’ Joe is also likely to puzzle others.  This 
sense of incomprehensibility is reinforced by Joe’s use of Extreme Case Formulations (Pomerantz: 
1986), such as ‘always’, ‘huge’ and ‘no-one’ (lines 3 and 5), and of a three-part list of uninterpretable 
figures in lines 7-8.    In line with his argument, Joe downplays the significance of the amount raised 
by displaying his inability to remember it, even to the nearest £10 million.  Joe concludes his turn by 
providing a justification for his classification of this unfathomable figure as a ‘problem’ (line 4): such 
information is removed from considerations of ‘need’ (line 14).  In stating that he does not know what 
effect such money has on donors (lines 11 – 14), he implies that this information is not given when the 
figures are announced.  In other words, Joe expresses frustration that fundraising is portrayed as an 
end in itself, regardless of its efficacy in effecting change.   
 
In the following extract from the Students group, CiN’s fundraising total is also represented as 
somewhat unrelated to the beneficiaries for whom it was raised.  This is a common theme in 
participants’ criticism of the presentation of this figure.  But whereas Joe’s critique goes unchallenged 
by the other participants in the Academics group, participants in the Students group reassert the idea 
that fundraising is ‘good’ in itself, for a number of reasons.  Before this extract commenced, 
participants had discussed charity advertising.  Two of them expressed their dislike of watching 
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charity adverts, and the group went on to discuss whether such requests were effective.  Dave stated 
that £26 million had been raised by CiN, and put this amount into context by guessing the average 
amount given by individual donors and estimating what proportion of the population would have given 
a donation, based on this figure.  In the following section of talk, I question the group about their 
decision to characterise charities as ‘effective’ on the grounds that they raise more money than others.  
While Ben appears to assume that more money results in more help, both Dave and Amy question the 
link between money and effectiveness.    
 
Students group, original line numbers 1106 – 113 (see appendix 5) 
1 HL   [(laughs) when you (.) when you talk about this figure 
2  that that was raised on Friday (.) you know (.) is is that a measure of  
3  effectiveness do you think? do you think that that means that it must’ve been (.) 
4  effective (3.0) 
5 Ben well they tell you that (.) tell you it is isn’t it isn’t it the most they’ve ever raised 
6  or something like that so 
7 Dave  [yeah I think they bil-(.) beat last year by eight million (.) so in that sense 
8  it’s effective? but (1.0) if that was to end only uh help ten children (.) then I think 
9  we’d all agree that wasn’t effective (.) so is (.) effectiveness measured by the 
10  outcome (1.0) um (3.0) 
11 Ben because it’s never going to be a (.) solution 
12 Amy      [but then (.) surely if you start measuring 
13  outcome in that (.) (quieter) oh I don’t know (2.5) in that way (.) then just kind of 
14  you’re turning it into like (.) business like (.) activity (1.0) 
15 HL in what way 
16 Amy in the sense that (.) I’m saying (.) how do you measure uh er (.) just using  
17 HL       [I mean (.) when you measure it in what way 
18 Amy financial (.) fin- (.) just money (1.0) how do you (3.0) I don’t know  
19 Dave I think there’s a business element to everything (1.0) because (.) if your twenty 
20  six million is going to help (1.5) a big (.) uh you know you can go to (.) prepare  
21 Amy         [but help (.)  
22 Dave //you to help a lot more 
23 Amy //how (.) how much help them? how much help them? (1.0) 
24 Ben better than what they (.) enough if if you didn’t raise anything though (1.5) it’s  
25  better than nothing  
26 Amy yeah yeah I’m not saying that (.) you don’t need money (.) I’m just saying that (.) 
27 Chris                 [and better than a slap or a punch in the face  
28 Amy how you measure effectiveness is 
29 Ben maybe you uh that should ‘is it better than what we had (.) just before we did it’ 
30  perhaps? I don’t know (2.5) is that in itself just an effective outcome (1.0) the  
31  fact that it wasn’t there before but now twenty-six million has been raised so 
32  there’s something there that wasn’t there before (.) is that enough? I don’t  
33 Amy          [yeah 
34 Ben know (3.0) 
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In this section of talk, the taken-for-granted link between money raised and charitable work carried out 
is picked apart and made more explicit.  Ben initially interprets ‘effectiveness’ in terms of funds raised 
relative to previous years (line 5).  He distances himself from the assertion that the 2011 figure is the 
most ever raised by questioning its trustworthiness.  He emphasises the fact that this information is 
received from elsewhere (‘they tell you’, line 5) and is imprecise about what this information is (‘or 
something like that’, line 6).  However, this evidence is presented as a sign of the charity’s 
effectiveness to the extent that it is true.  In terms of representational distance, Ben foregrounds the 
relationship between givers, and beneficiaries are removed from the picture.  Giving is associated with 
good, while the specifics of the outcomes it facilitates and the people it helps are obscured.   
 
In lines 7-10, Dave introduces the possible results of fundraising and its effects on beneficiaries into 
the discussion.  He takes the interpretation of effectiveness as measured by funds raised as a starting-
point and contrasts it with one centred on a different kind of outcome.  The example he gives of ‘ten 
children’ is an extreme one in the sense that it is obviously too small, and his projection that there 
would be wide consensus over such a situation (‘we’d all agree’, line 9) reinforces the point that the 
situation he describes would be unrealistic and unsatisfactory.  However, his turn achieves a shift of 
focus to the beneficiaries of charitable action, minimising the representational distance between them 
and those who view them.  Amy takes Dave’s point further, suggesting that any kind of finance-based 
assessment risks commercializing what should be a social project (lines 12-14).  In other words, using 
money as a unit of measurement is an ideologically-loaded decision that is tied to capitalist 
understandings of what constitutes success (see Berg 2005; Mason 2011; Seu 2010).  Dave responds 
by making the link between increased funding and increased help that has been implied in previous 
turns explicit: raising money is good, because it is linked to an increased ability to produce other 
outcomes (lines 19-22).  When Amy questions this assumption (line 23), Ben makes a contrast not 
between different ways of measuring effectiveness, but between fundraising and not fundraising. 
Despite the challenges to the idea that ‘money = good’ that Dave and Amy put forward, it is Ben who 
is allowed to conclude this subject.  He rearticulates the myth that the money raised by the charity is 
good, characterising it as an isolated entity, unlinked to other structures or demands for resources (line 
32).  He does this invoking the rhetoric of argument (Edwards and Potter 1992: 162), by using a 
question and answer sequence that makes it appear as if the evidence is being forced upon him.  
 
In the following extended extract from the Counselling group, different participants also provide 
diverse interpretations of fundraising figures.  Tina, whose remarks close this extended stretch of talk 
on this topic, also does so by upholding the myth that fundraising is evidence of good.  Unlike Ben’s 
logical style of reasoning, Tina evokes an emotive scene to make her case for fundraising.  The use of 
figures to assess the success of charity events is again questioned by some speakers.  Before this 
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section of talk, I asked whether the participants thought that charitable giving was ‘working’.  I then 
introduced the topic of the CiN show, which had been aired the previous Friday night.  The talk 
comes from one 5-minute section towards the end of their hour-long discussion.  I have removed short 
sections that repeated the themes discussed here; missing sections of talk are represented by line 
breaks.  
 
Counselling group, original line numbers 843 – 848, 1423 – 1441, 1459 – 1462, 1469 – 1473 and 
1487 – 1494 (see appendix 9) 
1 Sara and people like volunteering (.) strange enough (.) and they like raising money  
2  (2.0) for some strange reason (laughing) people love raising money (3.5) well  
3 Ruth       [hmm 
4 Tina                   [yeah there’s (laugh) 
5 Sara they do: (2.0) (laugh) 
 
6 Ruth       [hmm (.) hmm (.) hmm (.) but 
7  Children in Need (.) um (.) you know each year and it uh you know (.) here we 
8  are in a recession (.) and (.) each year 
9 Uma     [hmm 
10 Tina       [hmm it always happens doesn’t it  
11 Ruth they (.) they (1.0) go even (1.0) uh I I don’t know the figures I don’t know the  
12 Tina        [yeah 
13 Sara          [yeah        [yes 
14 Ruth figures but they always do better  
15 Tina  [they just (?) doesn’t it (.) yeah 
16 Sara    [I mean look at how Newfield school  
17 Tina Newfield Comp my daughter’s in the sixth form and last year they raised twenty  
18 Sara       [of cour- 
19 Tina two and this year it’s twenty five thousand (indistinguishable----------------------) 
20 Ruth     [hmm (.) hmm 
21 Vicky         [so uh (.) it was on the (.) on the news  
22 Sara         [it’s an  
23 Vicky //wasn’t it  
24 Sara //enormous sum from a town like Newfield  
 
25 Tina    [there’s a competition with the Sixth Form though I 
26  think ‘we’ve got to beat last year’s’ 
27 Sara    [oh it’s huge now 
28 Tina      [yeah 
 
29 Ruth    [I wonder (.) I wonder with that (.) having been involved in that and 
30  you know (.) there are always different things that they do i- in different schools 
31  and I wonder (.) about (1.0) um (2.0) whether people kind of lose sight of what 
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32  they’re actually doing it for 
33 Uma the motive  
 
34 Tina I think it was a real team spirit with them though it was really lovely to see (.) 
35  because on the last day then on the Friday they announced it on the stage the 
36 Ruth       [yeah 
37 Tina headmaster was there and (.) they they taped it and everything and I was  
38 Ruth        [hmm            [hmm 
39 Tina watching it and they were all crying (.) they were all hugging each other and  
40 Sara               [hmm 
41 Tina crying and I thought ‘what a lovely way to bring them all together’ 
 
In the extract above, participants contest the value of different emotions, some of which connect 
donors with beneficiaries, and others which only unite donors with each other.  It is Ruth who first 
responds to my question about CiN by referring to the figures raised (line 11).  She repeatedly states 
that she does not know the amount (line 11), but appears confident in asserting that the charity has 
‘do[ne] better’ than the previous year (line 14).  This echoes the discussion in the Office workers 
group.  When Tina relays the figure raised by her daughter’s school, she also compares it with the 
amount raised in 2010 (Lines 17 - 19).  In the second subsection of this talk (lines 27-30), Tina states 
explicitly that, for her daughter’s school, the previous year’s fundraising figure becomes the focus of 
‘competition’.  Outcomes in terms of recipients’ needs are not described as a motivator for 
fundraising.  Sara stresses the enormity of this figure in relation to the community (line 24), though 
does not state whether this is in terms of the town’s size or level of affluence, or both.   The fact that 
this activity has been deemed newsworthy on the Welsh national level is also noted as an indicator of 
its specialness (line 21).   This section of talk characterises the figure as a success marker.   This 
assessment of success by comparative levels of fundraising indicates that raising money is seen as 
being good in itself, regardless of the specific outcomes achieved for beneficiaries. 
 
In lines 29 - 32, Ruth challenges this characterisation by suggesting that fundraising activities should 
be more connected with beneficiaries and / or outcomes.  She expresses concern that the excitement 
that such events create becomes the focus of attention, while the problems that they are intended to 
address are overlooked (line 31).  She downplays the uniqueness of the event described by Tina by 
suggesting that these events are ‘always’ happening (line 31).  While Ruth positions herself as 
someone who has been part of such events and therefore as someone who is knowledgeable about 
schools fundraising (line 30), she distances herself from the phenomenon she describes, by using the 
word ‘people’ and the third person pronoun ‘they’ (lines 31 and 32).  Although Ruth does not specify 
what it is that people lose sight of, she nevertheless suggests that attention is focussed on the wrong 
areas. For her, emotion between fundraisers is a distraction from action on beneficiaries’ suffering.    
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Tina counters Ruth’s interpretation by reasserting the positives of fundraising as a collective activity in 
itself.  She describes fundraising as an example of ‘team spirit’ (line 34), notable for its emotional 
nature.  She repeats that the children were ‘crying’ (lines 39 and 41), repeatedly using the ECF 
(Pomerantz 1986) ‘all’ to describe the wide-ranging displays of emotion and affection.  She offers a 
vivid description of the climax of the fundraising at her daughter’s school, giving an array of details 
such as time (line 35) setting (line 35), and the presence of prominent figures (line 41).  This rich 
account allows the other participants to imagine themselves as part of the scene (Edwards and Potter 
1992: 164), particularly as Tina includes herself in it (lines 37 – 39).  She also includes her own 
assessment of the event, which she considers ‘lovely’ (lines 34 and 41).  The idea that fundraising is 
‘doing good’ is presented as having an additional dimension – that of creating links between 
fundraisers. 
 
Jasper (2011) provides a typology of the many emotion types that are at play in social movements.  He 
argues that a sense of connection between people who unite for a given cause can induce them to 
remain members of activist groups longer than they otherwise would (2011: 290).  This sense of 
connection is a result of sharing emotions such as love, pride, and emotional excitement with other 
members of the group (2011: 290).  However, the point of contention in the extract above is not 
whether the emotional bond made between schoolchild fundraisers is a positive thing or not, but the 
degree to which this connection being made comes at the expense of making a connection with 
beneficiaries.   
 
Taken together, these extracts suggest that the interpretation of figures produced from CiN is complex.  
Although fundraising totals are put forward as markers of success and reasons to celebrate, not all 
viewers and potential viewers adopt this interpretation.  The accounts that are produced in support of 
the ‘money = good done’ reading reveal that fundraising is often assumed to stand for a wide range of 
other processes, such as help provided for those who need it and the teamwork of fundraisers.  The 
fundraising figure thus appears to function as a sign of a range of other socially-meaningful processes 
that take place around it.  Doing good is signified by fundraising, but the contingency of this on other 
processes being carried out is obscured and sometimes invisible.  On one level, the discursive link 
between providing services for sufferers and the raising of money reflects an economic reality (Callen 
1994).  But this link is not reliable: some services can be carried out without it, and fundraising does 
not necessarily lead to successful outcomes for sufferers (1994: 215).  What might have originated in 
the observation of a correlation between an action and a set of social practices has become 
mythologised as a way to judge the success of charities.  The idea that giving can be interpreted as 
evidence of outcomes is reinforced discursively when it is stated, repeated and left unchallenged.  
Although the participants here do challenge this interpretation at some points in their conversations, 
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the last word on this topic in many cases is a rebuttal (e.g. Students, lines 29 – 34; Counselling, lines 
34 - 41). 
 
It is, however, possible that this link between money and the idea of ‘doing good’ or ‘success’ is not 
specific to the context of charitable giving.  It could be that the link appears in these data because 
money is taken as a measure of accomplishment more generally.  In the Charities group, the phrase 
‘doing good’ appears in a context that is closely related to charity.  This suggests that this idea is 
specifically related to this context. 
 
Charities groups, original line numbers 1072 – 1083 (see appendix 8) 
 
1 Penny                                       … but you have to go with the will and the wisp of (.)  
2 Mary the funders 
3 Penny       [the funders (.) the money 
4 Nicola   [and it’s so outcome driven isn’t it and (1.0) based on the data 
5 Penny       [oh (makes vomiting noise) 
7 Nicola collection and I know people need that to prove that the projects are working (.)  
8  but it- (.) I think it gets to a point then where it takes away from the focus of the  
9  project (.) and you spend (1.0) more of your time (.) collating data about the 
10 Penny   [hmm               (indistinguishable) 
11 Nicola good that you’re doing than actually doing the good (.) that you’re supposed to 
13 Mary                [yeah yeah 
14 Nicola be doing 
 
In this section of talk, the relationship between charitable giving and ‘doing good’ that is expressed in 
extracts from the Office, Students and Counselling groups is inverted.  Instead of facilitating charities’ 
work, the need to account for actions in relation to donations diverts charity workers’ attention from 
tasks they would otherwise be carrying out.  Yet despite these speakers articulating a disjunction 
between fundraising and the chain of events that leads to good being done, the association between 
charitable work and ‘good’ remains intact.  Mary summarises the range of tasks carried out by 
charities such as the one she works for as ‘doing […] good’ (line 11).  This phrase emphasises the 
importance of these tasks, which, she contends, are what she is ‘supposed to be doing’ (lines 11 - 14).  
Moreover, the fact that this way of referring to her work is unquestioned by her co-participants 
indicates that this is an established, accepted way of referring to it among people who work in this 
sector.  About 5 minutes before this section of talk, Kate, another participant, also referred to 
voluntary work in this way, asking ‘do you have to put your heart and soul into it? (.) if it (.) if you’re 
doing good?’ (original line number 969).  Whilst this is not an uncommon phrase, the word ‘good’ 
occupies an unusual place in these formulations.  It would be hard to imagine synonyms such as 
‘beneficial’, ‘honourable’ or ‘charitable’ replacing the word ‘good’.  Rather than being used as an 
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adjective, as in ‘doing something good’, it has been nominalised.  It is also imprecise with regard to 
activity.  Even in settings where most people would agree that the work carried out is socially 
valuable, such as healthcare work, referring to this  work as ‘doing good’ would seem out of place.  
Charitable work, and the enabling of this work via donations, is unusual in being described in moral 
terms as an act of ‘good’ in itself.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the mode of action suggested in CiN and the reaction of its potential 
audience members to this.  Giving money has already been recognised as a form of help that 
maintains the distance between donors and recipients insofar as it depersonalises both their 
contribution and their needs, and requires a mediator to translate funds into goods and actions 
(Boltanski 1999: 18).  In these data, however, an additional level of separation seems to have taken 
place.  Money and fundraising appear to have become the measure of charities’ success and the focus 
for the celebration of charitable action, instead of this being judged in terms of how much they impact 
on the lives of beneficiaries.  This can be described as a myth, in which the fundraising total has come 
to signify not only the success of a given charity, but the idea that good has been done.  What is 
obscured in this myth is the chain of actions that are needed to convert this potential for action into 
deeds that will be of benefit to others.  Focusing on the donors’ success comes at the expense of 
paying more attention to outcomes for recipients.  The representational distance between these two 
groups of people is therefore maximised by making the needs of sufferers and the offers of donors 
seem unrelated.   
 
What many of the focus group discussions have in common is the participants’ criticism of this aspect 
of charities’ communication.  CiN’s success is clearly not always interpreted as directly related to its 
ability to encourage financial donations.  Kaun (2013) suggests that when people criticise media 
representations, they use such criticisms to account for one of two reactions that they have as a result.  
Some people respond by wanting to engage in media dialogues, such as giving feedback on online 
articles as a way of producing counter-narratives.  Kaun refers to these people as ‘critical media 
connectors’ (2013: PG).  Others use what they see as the problems with mass media as reasons to 
disengage, becoming increasingly reliant on personal networks for information.  These individuals are 
referred to as ‘critical media disconnectors’.  Based on the focus group conversations alone, 
participants overwhelmingly seem to fall into the latter category.  While they attempt to reintroduce 
the idea of beneficiaries into discussions of charitable giving, the speakers who make these criticisms 
do not report making an active contribution to charity mass media discourses.  They do, however, 
connect with recipients of other charities in alternative ways.  For Amy (Students group) volunteering 
while at university is a way of connecting with and helping vulnerable others, as is Ruth’s 
 
 
154 
 
(Counselling group) voluntary work with the Cruse bereavement charity.  It is also worth noting that 
the focus on fundraising is seen as more of a problem for those who regularly engage in other 
charitable activities than for those who do not, or who do not vocalise these experiences.   
 
The concept of myth is useful for explaining how a certain indicator of carrying out actions for social 
good (giving) has come to be understood and enacted as a marker of social good.  In the myth of 
giving as good, several levels of meaning are built upon the act of giving.   In capitalist societies, 
money is needed in order to carry out certain actions.  In order to run a pre-school breakfast club for 
children, for example, money is needed to buy the food, pay staff, and possibly to hire a space in a 
building.  Charities who want to provide more of such services need money in order to do this.  When 
people donate money to such a charity, they assume that these actions will be carried out as a result, 
although this link between donating money and increased charitable outcomes is not always 
straightforward (Callen 1994).  The action of giving money therefore comes to be associated with a 
range of other actions (e.g. feeding children, administering medical care, or providing access to safe 
spaces), which it is assumed will be carried out as a result of them.  The idea of helping vulnerable 
others has become so tied to the idea of giving money that giving money in itself is taken as a sign of 
this action having taken place.  The pre-existing link between money and the actions facilitated by it 
has been replaced with a belief that to fundraise is to do these actions.  Fundraising becomes seen as 
an end in itself, an event to be celebrated.  The idea that to provide assistance without reward is 
virtuous means that a wide range of charitable actions are shorthanded in the phrase ‘doing good’.  
Ultimately, the giving of money comes to be read, and performed, as a sign of good having been 
done.    
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have examined how an intra-national telethon and talk by some of its potential viewers 
represent the relationship between the charity’s beneficiaries and its potential donors.  I have drawn 
upon Boltanski’s (1999) concept of pity, and particularly the aspect of distance this theory 
incorporates, in order to examine the extent to which beneficiaries are portrayed as detached from, 
different from, and possessing a similar level of reality to, donors.  I have suggested that in CiN 
disadvantaged others are generally presented as socially and representationally distant from donors.  
However, in the experiential dimension, donors and beneficiaries are represented as close, because of 
their shared national identity.  In this way, CiN suggests that its beneficiaries are reachable only 
through the help of an intermediary such as a charity, despite the fact that they occupy the same 
country as its viewers.  In other words, CiN’s beneficiaries are no more accessible than those in other 
countries, but the moral obligation towards them is presented as higher.  In the present chapter, I 
return to the research questions posed at the end of the literature review, in order to assess how my 
research has contributed to the gaps in knowledge I identified in previous studies.  I then consider 
how these findings relate to the theories I have engaged with, before reflecting on the limitations of 
this work and possible avenues for future research. 
 
8.1 What sort of relationship does CiN suggest should occur between its donors and beneficiaries? 
 
Put simply, from the perspective of CiN, the relationship between donors and beneficiaries is one that 
does not exist outside of the mediated interaction it provides.  This question was addressed to some 
extent in each of the chapters, but particularly in the first analytic chapter (chapter 4) on social 
distance and in chapter 6, where the spectacular aspect of representational distance was considered.   
In chapter 4, I examined the extent to which both the media and focus group data represent different 
types of social actors as sharing the same or occupying different places.  I presented by finding that 
CiN represents different types of participants (beneficiaries, celebrities, fundraisers) in distinct places, 
as these places are used for different activity types (such as displaying entertainment, fundraising or 
suffering and its amelioration).  These places are presented using strikingly different visual styles, 
which, I argued, suggests that they, and therefore the different social actors associated with them, are 
irreconcilably different from one another.  This visual representation of beneficiaries as being distant 
from viewers is enhanced by a verbal narrative that presents beneficiaries’ struggles as if they are 
unknown to them.  In this way, the programme reinforces the idea that mediators, such as the charity 
itself, are needed to negotiate between these different groups of people: their worlds are represented 
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as being so different that the needs of the sufferers and the efforts of the viewers cannot be reconciled 
without the charity or another body communicating their privations and efforts to each other.   
 
In the focus group data, I identified an underlying assumption that people who are geographically 
close to one another will have some level of shared experience.  In tension with this assumption is the 
recognition of speakers that this is not always the case.  Indeed, participants stress that distance on a 
very small scale can sometimes result in neighbours having irreconcilably different experiences. Also 
notable was the repeated motif that appears in these discussions of groups with very different 
circumstances who are physically close to one another and require the same services (government 
support, education, healthcare), but with unequal access and attitudes to them.  In terms of the politics 
of pity, I argued, these data suggest that, while the fortunate may regard the unfortunate from socially 
distant positions, both groups may be looking to a third party, rather than to each other, to redress the 
differences between them.  This may explain the role that charities such as CiN have in mediating 
between different social groups who are geographically close to one another.  It also suggests that 
more work needs to be done on clarifying the status of different groups in relation to charities, as I 
discuss under ‘Limitations’ below.   
 
8.2 What effect does mediation have on this relationship? 
 
In chapters 6 and 7, I addressed my own concept of ‘representational distance’, which I defined as a 
distance that is maximized when the lives of others are portrayed or experienced as being less real 
than those who witness their suffering and minimized when they are made to seem equally real.  As I 
discussed in chapter 6, the programme represents the places of sufferers and those of fundraisers as 
sharing a similar level of reality, and therefore minimises the sense of representational distance 
between them to some extent.  Furthermore, beneficiary vignettes encourage emotional reactions to 
the suffering of those who appear in them.  However, the extent to which viewers are encouraged to 
feel pity is limited by the juxtaposition of these scenes with scenes of celebration.  This prevents 
viewers from being overwhelmed by negative emotions, but it also creates the impression that 
engagement with others’ suffering should be temporary and superficial.  Overwhelming emotion 
might lead viewers to seek other avenues for action or to call into question the efficacy of charitable 
action.  Viewers are encouraged to engage with disadvantaged others only to the extent that they are 
motivated to donate.  Perhaps most strikingly, as I explored in chapter 4, the show reinforces its own 
role as mediator by addressing its viewers as if they do not know about the suffering of children in the 
UK.  To the extent that viewers accept this, it follows that they will feel reliant on CiN’s 
representations.   
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The focus group data indicate a more radical disjuncture between the experience of reality and 
representations of suffering.  In some of these conversations, media representations of suffering are 
described as if they are simply one more image to see.  Mediated suffering can therefore be 
interpreted as being part of the spectacle (Debord 2002 [1967]) for viewers, rather than as the reality 
the spectacle masks.  Suffering that is witnessed by peers, on the other hand, is experienced as a 
complete departure from the spectacle.  This seems to present an impossible predicament for the mass 
media seeking to inform audiences of suffering: my findings suggest that none of their depictions of 
suffering are experienced as being entirely real, regardless of how they are presented.  However, at 
these points in the focus group discussions, participants are talking only about charity programmes.  
Viewers might respond differently to representations that do not have a celebratory aspect.  Further 
research is needed in order to explore this idea more fully.  As I examined in the literature review, 
studies on a range of media genres have already indicated that there may be stark differences in the 
ways in which viewers interpret their level of reality (e.g. Hoijer 2004; Seu 2010).  
 
In considering representational distance in the focus group data, I also highlighted the theme of 
hidden suffering that emerges in some of the discussions.  In the extracts I presented, the participants 
discuss near and distant suffering in a way that appears to invert the positive correlation between 
reality and closeness that has been noted in previous studies (e.g. Blommaert et al. 2003; Harvey 
2006).  In fact, this relationship is complicated by a less than straightforward relationship between 
“knownness” and reality.  Close-hand, personally-witnessed suffering is represented as being both 
real and unknown, whereas mediated distant suffering is portrayed as known, but less real.  
Furthermore, participants in both the academics’ and office workers’ groups argue that British 
suffering is under-reported compared to the suffering in other countries, and they represent the former 
as being more complex.  This finding is particularly interesting in light of CiN’s representation of 
British problems as being unknown, as shown in chapter 4.  I suggested that there was potentially a 
link between media representations of British problems as only knowable through them and 
audiences’ mistrust of mediated representations of suffering. 
 
8.3 How does a shared national identity between these groups alter the relationship? 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, most charitable donations made by UK citizens in 2011 were to 
charities for UK citizens.  It was thus only to be expected that CiN would try to create a positive 
impression of the UK.  Caring for vulnerable citizens can be a point of national pride (Ryan 2000), 
and highlighting shared national identity between donors and recipients can also make donors more 
generous (Levine and Thompson 2004).  The UK’s only other regular media charity event, ‘Comic 
Relief’ (also broadcast on the BBC), raises funds for projects both in the UK and abroad.  CiN’s 
provision exclusively for projects within the UK is therefore part of its unique selling point.  But, 
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unlike in many previously studied examples, there is no separate recipient nation that can be 
contrasted with the beneficiary nation in this case (e.g. Driessens et al. 2012, Mason 2011).   Instead, 
the impression of the UK that is constructed and celebrated in CiN is one of a nation in which its 
citizens care for each other and use their ability to mobilise to overcome its problems.  However, this 
does not mean that the show offers no invitation to viewers to make comparisons between UK 
recipients and those in other places.   
 
The national identity shared by both potential donors and recipients, which was examined in chapter 5 
with reference to the notion of experiential distance, is the main means by which these groups are 
represented as close to one another.  Yet I argued that this aspect of their relationship goes beyond 
simply creating a sense of closeness between these groups; a sense of national identity is also 
constructed for viewers at other points in the show, where benefactors are not the main focus.  In a 
number of ways, CiN both draws upon and reinforces the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2004 
[1983]) of the UK.  Firstly, the live broadcast format of the show (Marriott 1996: 69) is utilised as a 
means of creating a sense of connection between citizens, through a shared simultaneous experience 
(2004 [1983]: 35).  Secondly, a sense of shared past is evoked in fundraising and entertainment 
sections of the show.  Turns of phrase associated with particular periods in history are used, including 
those associated with ‘safe war’, an idea I defined as the playful use of military language associated 
with an unthreatening past, rather than with present threats to safety.  Although the nationalistic aspect 
of the programme can be read optimistically as minimising the experiential distance between the 
charity’s donors and beneficiaries, it should also be borne in mind that relating to others because they 
share certain demographic features with you inevitably means distancing yourself from those who do 
not.   
 
Set against this view of donors and beneficiaries as united in their national identity are the differences 
between these groups that are highlighted at other points in the show.  In particular, the presenters use 
an idea of the normative family or child in the UK as a point of contrast to highlight the problems 
faced by its beneficiaries by comparison.  Shared experiences, such as starting school, are used in CiN 
to emphasise the difference between the UK’s typical child on the one hand and children who face the 
difficulties it seeks to remedy, such as poverty or disability, on the other.  While contrasting the lives 
of these groups maximises the experiential distance between them, it is of course necessary to 
distinguish between donors and beneficiaries in order to justify requests for help (a similar case about 
people with disabilities is made by Rix 1984).  I indicated that terms associated with chronic problems 
in developing countries, such as ‘poverty’ and ‘hunger’, are used in CiN to suggest a similarity 
between children within and outside of the UK.  This implies that UK problems are equally serious 
but easier and more important to remedy.   
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In the focus group data, participants are more explicit about the comparison between the needs of 
sufferers in the UK and those elsewhere.  In these discussions, a recurring metaphor that expresses the 
relationship between the fortunate and unfortunate in the UK describes citizens of different countries 
as different species of animal.  Again, this metaphor highlights the similarity between compatriots, 
minimizing the experiential distance between UK sufferers and non-sufferers.  Although such 
metaphors are generally associated with negative attitudes and practices towards others (El Refaie 
2001: 368; Santa Ana 1999; Shields and Bhatia 2009: 116), I found encouraging evidence in some 
focus groups of this metaphor being contested and subsequently rejected.   
 
8.4 What sorts of actions are presented as possible in redressing the suffering of others? 
 
In chapter 7, I considered the extent to which action by the fortunate to alleviate the suffering of the 
unfortunate was presented as being possible.  The only ameliorative action suggested in CiN is the 
giving of money.  Utilising Barthes’ (2009 [1972]) concept of ‘myth’, I analysed CiN’s presentation 
of fundraising figures as carrying an additional level of meaning, so that the raising of money is 
construed as an unequivocal social good and as an end in itself, rather than simply as one possible 
means of helping others.  Overall, I suggested that the idea that money = good done has become 
mythologised, so that fundraising is taken as evidence of other outcomes, which, although facilitated 
by giving, do not necessarily occur as a result of it. 
 
This impression was modified by my consideration of the focus group data on this topic.  Alongside 
the discussion of international issues, this is one of the most significant differences between the two 
data sets in my study.  I considered a number of extracts taken from different groups in the study 
where they discuss and interpret fundraising figures.  Some speakers suggest that fundraising totals 
can be used as markers of charities’ success and as causes for celebration.  Others, however, are 
careful to make the link between this ‘outcome’ and the social processes that it might denote more 
explicit.  Members of the Charities group in particular highlight the stark difference between the 
money = good view and the reality of their working lives.  Furthermore, in practice many of these 
individuals do interact with disadvantaged others in a variety of ways: working with them, 
campaigning on their behalf, and interacting with them face-to-face in both social and volunteer 
settings.  In this way, the impact of representations of others on programmes such as CiN is likely to 
be more limited than that of programmes depicting people in other countries, where physical distance 
adds to (but does not replace) other types of distance. 
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8.5 Why donate to a national charity?   
 
Taken together, my analytic chapters present a complex view of the relationship between the fortunate 
and the unfortunate that is posited in both data sets.  While CiN’s viewers and beneficiaries appear 
socially distant (they occupy different places), they are nevertheless represented as experientially 
close (they share characteristics such as their national identity).  Although they are representationally 
close in CiN according to one measure (visual modality), they are representationally distant when 
considering the brevity of beneficiary vignettes.  The focus group data, meanwhile, suggests that 
knownness and reality are not always equivalent.  While a clear means of action (giving money) is 
suggested in CiN, this action is tied up in a process in which the signified is distanced from the 
signifier, and the needs of beneficiaries are obscured in the process of celebrating fundraising success.  
 
The significance of this quite confusing picture of distance creation and collapse in CiN is that 
viewers are made to feel close to depicted sufferers in ways that might encourage them to donate, yet 
not close enough to lead them to act on their suffering in other ways.  So, for example, when 
experiential distance is minimised by emphasising a shared national identity, beneficiaries seem closer 
(and therefore more worthy of care) than those of international charities.  However, distinctions are 
drawn between viewers’ and recipients’ experiences of UK life in ways that maintain the idea that the 
people depicted are worthy recipients of donations. Social distance is maintained, so that other types 
of action involving face-to-face interaction do not seem possible.  The act of fundraising is celebrated 
and mythologised as unequivocal evidence of social good, but it is the viewers and fundraisers who 
celebrate these successes, rather than the beneficiaries whose lives should have been transformed by 
it.   
 
In these ways, a sort of charitable distance is maintained – a distance at which charity is both 
necessary (for information and action, given the social distance that exists between potential donors 
and beneficiaries) and desirable (as these beneficiaries seem closer and therefore more deserving than 
those in other countries).  The focus group data add another layer of complexity to this picture.   My 
findings indicate that the relationship that CiN suggests should occur between its viewers and its 
beneficiaries is questioned by its potential audience.  Suffering others are sometimes experienced as 
unreal or unrepresentative, and fundraising is sometimes portrayed as having uncertain value.    
 
8.6 Intra-national pity 
 
In this section, I consider the study’s engagement with and contribution to relevant literature.  The 
present study is unusual if not unique in considering the concept of pity (Boltanski 1999) in an intra-
national context.  The notion of pity is based upon a distinction between beneficiaries and benefactors, 
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who are regarded as comprising separate groups and existing at a distance from one another (1999: 5).  
This thesis has examined the possible shortcomings of a theory of pity based exclusively on physical 
distance, drawing upon more complex and nuanced understandings of the types of interpersonal 
distance that can exist between people, particularly when they are represented in the media.   It has 
also considered the extent to which these types of distance could be created as well as reflected in a 
charity media event and in discussions between peers.  CiN clearly encourages its viewers to relate to 
its beneficiaries as objects of pity in that it portrays them as being socially distant from its viewers, 
despite the fact that both groups occupy the same country.    
 
This, however, is not the whole story.  As discussed above, and as anticipated in the framework 
chapter (chapter 3), the dimension of national identity complicates this aspect of distance in ways that 
go beyond the implication of spatial proximity this involves.  This study therefore constitutes a 
critique of the concept of pity when applied to intra-national suffering.  While it suggests that the 
concept of pity can be useful when applied in such contexts, two important amendments to the general 
theory of pity are also suggested: 1) that the sense of distance integral to pity can be created and not 
only reflected in media and other texts and 2) that the element of nationalism constitutes a separate 
dimension of the relationship between donors and beneficiaries, which should be considered alongside 
the impact of other types of distance.   
 
Nevertheless, I contend that the concept of pity is productive when considered from this perspective.  
When applied to my data, the concept of pity means understanding the relationship between donors 
and beneficiaries as one that is premised on them being irreconcilably different from one another, 
whilst seeming to connect them.   
 
Chouliaraki (e.g. 2013) suggests that the charity media environment has shifted from the politics of 
pity to ‘the politics of irony’.  In the present environment, she argues, the viewer is called on to 
experience the suffering of others only through his or her own choices, experiences and fears.  Such 
campaigns focus on the viewers’ potential sense of satisfaction if they choose to give, the fear they 
might feel if their human rights were denied them, or the kudos that they could enjoy as a result of 
showing their support for a modish cause.  This is evidently relevant for the data she examines 
(appeals for Amnesty International, Oxfam and the World Food Programme (2013: 65-69)), but 
appeals that invite the viewer to offer support as an aesthetic choice are still relatively rare.  The 
examples Chouliaraki gives are also limited to international charity appeals, which, although 
important in shaping our ideas of others, are not those that UK benefactors primarily engage with, if 
giving is to be taken as evidence of engagement.  I would also contend that explaining viewers’ 
responses (or lack thereof) to international aid appeals can only partly be explained by examining the 
appeals themselves.  As individuals are generally understood as having predetermined limits for their 
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financial contributions to charities (Sargeant and Woodliffe 2007: 277), the successes of intra-national 
charities could be understood as a limiting factor for those of international charities.  Therefore, in 
order to understand the failure to donate to international charities, it is worth examining the means by 
which members of one’s own country come to be accepted as more important. 
 
Alongside the critique of pity, this thesis has also engaged with a number of other theories in different 
chapters.  The following three points are particularly significant.  Firstly, my focus group data 
indicates a more complex relationship between mediation, distance, knowledge and the perception of 
reality for some speakers than has been suggested in previous literature (chapter 6).  Blommaert et al. 
(2003) argue that being close to something gives people knowledge of it that can help them to contest 
media representations.  In my focus group data, some of what is close appears unknown, and media 
representations, by contrast, seem more knowable.  Furthermore, knownness does not appear to be the 
same as realness for these speakers.  Nearby, personally-witnessed suffering is presented as both real 
and unknown, whereas mediated distant suffering is portrayed as known but less real.   
 
Secondly, the evolutionary metaphor I examined in relation to the focus group data in chapter 5 
appears to be an offshoot from metaphors that have been observed in other contexts that refer to 
Darwinian theories or the ‘great chain of being’.  My analysis built upon previous understandings of 
metaphors and how they can shape understandings of out-group members (El Refaie 2001; Santa Ana 
1999; Shields and Bhatia 2009).  In particular, I sought to reveal how this particular metaphor framed 
the relationships between the members of different nations and the actions that were possible to 
alleviate the suffering of non-nationals by considering what could and could not be ‘mapped’ in this 
metaphor (Lakoff and Turner 2009).  Following Cameron et al. (2009), I also demonstrated how such 
metaphors can be either successfully contested or stabilised in the course of a conversation.   
 
Thirdly, I utilised Barthes’ (2009 [1972]) concept of myth to examine how fundraising has come to be 
seen as worthy of celebration in itself (chapter 7).  This analysis drew on both data sets to demonstrate 
how the act of giving has come to stand for additional meanings: the carrying out of charitable work, 
and the associated concept of virtue.  I now consider the limitations of the study, including some 
possible directions for future research, before closing this chapter with some final remarks about the 
study as a whole. 
 
8.7 Limitations 
 
My research questions and my literature review informed my choices in selecting and analysing the 
data.  However, I recognise a number of potential problems associated with this aspect of my research 
design.  The most obvious and serious limitation of this study is in what (and who) it does not address.  
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The study has excluded the views of the show’s beneficiaries, i.e. those that it defines as 
disadvantaged.  The CiN and focus group data have been useful in illuminating the relationship 
between the fortunate and unfortunate in the UK as defined by the former but not the latter.  This is of 
particular concern given the dearth of literature exploring the views of charities’ recipients in general.  
While some recent research has sought to redress this imbalance (e.g. Anderson, Brown and Jean 
2012), the majority of literature on this area has neglected to consider recipients’ views.  This would 
constitute an important counterpoint to this study, which would potentially yield very different results.    
Secondly, as CiN is only one programme of a wide range of telethons and other media information, 
focusing on this as my sole source of mass media data means that my research effectively constitutes 
a case study.  This impedes the study’s wider validity, i.e. the extent to which it is generalizable to 
discourse about charitable giving in the UK as a whole.  While the focus groups were designed to 
broaden the scope of the findings to include different types of discourse on the subject, this method is 
also very limited in terms of generalizability.  It is also possible that the decision to recruit groups 
only in South Wales influenced my findings. These shortcomings are, however, common to most 
research that attempts to provide detailed analysis over a limited amount of time.   
 
A third important limitation of my study is the possible incompatibility of the different types of data I 
have analysed.  CiN is pre-planned, multimodal, and designed for a large audience.  The focus group 
talk, by contrast, is emergent, only recorded and transcribed in one mode, and is directed at a small 
audience. The focus group discussions also included a much broader range of topics than CiN.  These 
differences added another layer of complexity onto an already complicated subject, and made the task 
of analysing these data and presenting the findings more difficult.  However, I see this ambitious 
approach as a potential strength.  Much of the research on the topic of charity media so far has looked 
exclusively at either media texts or their reception, and taking both into account has enriched the 
analysis, making the conclusions more complex, but also more nuanced than they would have been 
otherwise.   
 
Another related limitation is the study’s reliance on a distinction between sufferers and non-sufferers, 
potential donors and potential beneficiaries, the fortunate and the unfortunate, that has not been fully 
examined.  These distinctions are problematic.  For one thing, a person can be a sufferer in one area of 
his or her life and a potential donor in another.  Even treating only the donors and beneficiaries of this 
charity as distinct groups is inaccurate at certain points.  Not all of CiN’s beneficiaries are financially 
poor, so it is quite possible that some of the programme’s donors might be more economically 
disadvantaged than some of its recipients, for example.  As I noted in chapter 4, some of the show’s 
beneficiaries (a choir group) are shown to be taking part in fundraising for the charity.  I defined this 
group primarily as beneficiaries, because this is the smaller group, whereas potential donors include 
all citizens in the UK (as well as those who might view the programme from elsewhere).  This 
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dividing-line is an issue that is likely to occur more for intra-national charities than for international 
charities, but studies on both could benefit from more clarity in this area, particularly as, for the most 
part, donors and beneficiaries are depicted as being socially and experientially different from each 
other in charity appeals. 
 
8.8 Closing remarks  
 
As a whole, this project has attempted to shed light on what is a complex and multifaceted 
relationship between donors to and beneficiaries of a UK intra-national charity.  Utilising the concepts 
of pity and distance to clarify the different aspects of this relationship, I have highlighted the tension 
between representations of beneficiaries as existing outside of viewers’ social interactions, yet being 
united with them by a shared national identity.   
 
The focus group data complicate this picture by suggesting that this projected relationship between 
CiN’s potential viewers and its beneficiaries is not necessarily taken up.  However, my participants’ 
talk broadly supports the key premise on which CiN bases its demand for money: that the difficulties 
faced by disadvantaged people in the UK are the same as, or even more complex than, those of people 
elsewhere, but that, as compatriots, they are more deserving of support.  This goes some way to 
understanding the enduring appeal of intra-national charity, despite the option of face-to-face or 
political action, and when those in some other countries still lack the educational, health and welfare 
services that are currently (though in ever-diminished forms) in place for citizens of the UK.   
 
My hope is that this research will eventually be used to encourage some charities and individuals to 
consider more carefully what the championing of UK and other national identities means for those 
who happen to have been born elsewhere.  I would like it to help to challenge the idea that 
compatriots are more deserving of any kind of support than other human beings.  I also hope that 
charities such as CiN will be persuaded to use a more integrative approach to solving the problems 
that they rightly identify and bring to our attention.  Far from making it their aim to compete for 
donations in order to survive, where possible charities should encourage political and community-
based action alongside giving and inspire their viewers to find as many ways as possible to make them 
obsolete. 
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Appendix 1: Consent form 
 
This study is about people’s opinions about social inequality.  As a group, you will be asked 
a series of questions about what you think, for you to discuss.  The session will be recorded 
(sound only – not video) and I will later write out what was said, from this recording.  When I 
do this, I will use random letters for different speakers, rather than your own names, so other 
people who read it will not be able to tell who you are.  I plan to use this (anonymised) data 
as part of my PhD thesis and possibly as part of conference presentations in my subject 
area.  Only myself and my supervisor will have access to the original recording. 
At the end, I will give you some more information about the study to take away, and my 
contact details, in case you have further questions.   
The session will take up to 60 minutes.  If you want to leave at any point, you are free to do 
so, without having to explain why.  If you are experiencing any discomfort at any point during 
the session, you can let me know.    
 
 I understand that my participation in this project will involve a focus group discussion that 
will be recorded for analysis by the researcher and that it will take approximately 40-60 
minutes of my time.  
 
 
 I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw 
from the study at any time without giving a reason.  
 
 
 I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I 
experience discomfort during participation in this project, I am free to withdraw or discuss 
my concerns with the researcher. 
 
 
 I understand that the information provided by me will be held anonymously, such that 
only the researcher can trace this information back to me individually.  
 
   
 
 
I, __________________________________   (PRINT NAME) consent to participate in the study 
conducted by Harriet Lloyd, School of English, Communication & Philosophy, Cardiff University, under 
the supervision of Professor Adam Jaworski. 
 
 
Signed: 
  
Date: 
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Appendix 2: Information slip for participants after the focus groups 
 
My study is on the ‘discourse’ of charitable giving.  I want to find out how people talk about 
things like what can be done for disadvantaged people.   
I very much appreciate your help and would be happy to provide you with a copy of my 
findings if you would like one.  If you have any further questions, please contact me on: 
Lloydhr1@cardiff.ac.uk 
Or 
07749 716383 
Harriet Lloyd  
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Appendix 3: Transcription Conventions 
 
(.)  untimed short pause 
(2.0) pause timed in seconds 
(faster) informal commentary on style of following utterance, or phonological feature 
? rising intonation towards previous word(s)  
[ overlapping speech 
= ‘latched’ to previous utterance (following without a perceptible pause) 
underlining noticeably heavier emphasis 
 
 
 
Adapted from: 
 
O’Connell, Daniel C. and Kowal, Sabine (1995) ‘Basic principles of transcription’ in Johnathan A. 
Smith, Rom Harré and Luk Van Lagenhove (Eds.) Rethinking Methods in Psychology London: 
SAGE Publications, pp. 93-105 
